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ABSTRACT 
This study wi I I, it is hoped, provide a contribution to the 
knowledge of the industrial geography of a small third world country, 
Libya, by shedding I ight on the location and development of its industries. 
Particular attention has been given to the role of the government in 
industrial development and industrial location, and the changes which have 
taken place in Libya's industrial structure and problems. 
The study proper begins in part one, chapter two, by exemining 
Industrial structure and location from the late Turkish period to the mid-
nineteen fifties. In chapter three an attempt is made to analyse the 
characteristics, location and growth of the oi I industry, while the main 
developments and changes in the industrial structure and spatial patterns 
from 1964 -t-o 1971 are discussed in chapter four. The roles of the private 
industrialist and the government, including the latter's measures of en-
coul"agement and industrial finance, as well as its direct participetion, 
are critically examined in chapter five. 
In part two, chapter six is a geographical analysis of the 
nature, location and regional distribution of industrial activities a~:; they 
existed in Libya in 1971. Chapter seven deals primarily with the main 
factors which affect present industria! location as wei I as the relation-
ship between industrial location in Libya and some theories of industrial 
location. The areal distribution and character of industry In the main 
cities <Tripoli and Benghazi) has been examined very closely in chapter 
eight. 
Finally, in part three, chapter nine deals with the main 
industrial problems: 1~hi !st sor.:e important indicators for the industrl::il 
future and concluding statements are presented in chapter ten. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Libya is a large country in terms of its geographical area, 
covering about 658,000 square miles, and consisting of two widely sep-
arated coastal strips, in the northv1est and northeast, as well as a huge 
desert hinterland in which there are scattered oases. In 1973 it had a 
population of about 2,275,000 (I) and the country's settlement pattern is 
dominated by two major cities and some sate! lite towns. 
Unti I recently the Libyan economy was clearly a deficient 
economy. The country depended mainly upon foreign and international 
organizations to finance the government's development programmes. At the 
time of its independence in 1951, there was I ittle hope for a viable future 
for Libya, due to its small population, which was poor and iII iterate, and 
to the lack of a resource base, as Benjamin Higgins described, 
"Libya combines within the borders of one country 
virtually all the obstacles that can be found anywhere 
geographic, economic, political, sociological, technological. 
If Libya can be brought to a stage of sustained growth, there 
is hope for every country in the world." (2) 
However, since the discovery of oi I, and Libya's entry into the 
oi I market in 1962, the economy has changed from being capital-deficient to 
being capital-surplus. As a result of this sudden growth, a dual economy 
has been created, transforming the former predominantly primitive rural 
economy with nomadic I ivestock breeders and subsistence farmers. Now 
there is a growing market in the towns where wage earners, such as government 
officials, tradesmen, teachers and office workers, are developing into a new 
( 3) 
middle class. 
The value of Libyan oi I increased from about LD 196 mi II ions in 
1964 to about LD 921 mi II ions in 1971, and the gross domestic product 
2 
increased from about· LD 365 mi II ion to LD 1480 mi II ion in this period. (4 ) 
Like any other developing country which has surplus capital, the Libyan 
governmental located about 70 percent of the revenue from oi I to development 
plans which cover many sectors and objectives, to improve the economic and 
social conditions in the country and raise the standard of I iving. The 
industrial sector has been included in official pol icy in the development 
plan, and efforts have been made to develop industrial projects. In fact, 
the industrial sector has gained in importance in terms of its contribution 
to the G. D.P., increasing from about LD I 1.5 mi I I ion in 1964 toLD 25 mi I I ion 
in 1971. (5 ) From now on, the oil revenue can provide the industrial sector 
with the necessary funds and infrastructure, as well as enlarge local markets. 
Definition Of Industry 
Industry in this study refers to alI modern manufacturing 
activities plus the oi I industry. This particular interpretation of industry 
was adopted by the author from the last Industrial Census which, however, 
does not provide information about the oi I industry; that was provided by a 
special census. Power stations and mining activities are excluded from the 
study owing to the lack of statistics. In short, apart from the oi I industry, 
the term industry is used for those industrial activities in which machines 
are used to change the form of raw materials into more useful products, and 
which employ five or more workers for this process. 
The Objectives Of The Study 
There are several aims in this study : 
I. An examination of the bibliography reveals that I ittle of significance 
has been pub I ished on Libyan industry. This being the case, it is 
important that a study is attempted, in order to throw some I ight on it, 
and hopefully i-o provide a basis tor future studies of this sector. 
Libyan industry is underestimated by existing research. 
2. The study is intended to organize avai !able data as wei I as add new 
data. 
3 
3. It is intended to describe and examine industrialization and the role of 
the government in its development, as wei I as describe changes and trends 
in Libyan industry. In addition, close scrutiny is given to the loc-
ation, regional distribution, classification and problems of industries. 
4 It is a!so intended to identify and discuss the underlying factors of 
industrialization and the extent to which they explain the spatial 
pattern. 
Data Sources 
A. Fieldwork 
Most of the data in this study are the result of two periods of 
fieldwork, during the summer of 1972, and the summer of 1973. The first 
period was spent in collecting statistical data, I iterature and relevant 
materials pertinent to the study at various government I ibraries and depart-
ments. During the second period, questionnaires were prepared (Appendix I. I) 
using stratified sampling. 
It was possible to interview 62 establishments, about 18 percent 
of the number of establishments employing ten or more workers, as recorded 
in the 1971 Census. Personal visits to the establishments chosen for inter-
view made it possible to get information which it would be difficult to get 
solely through correspondence. The responses of the establishments visited 
were helpful, and only a few refused to provide information, but even these 
agreed to help after reading the official letters provided by the Faculty of 
Arts of the University. The most serious deficiencies of data were in relat-
ion to capital and finance, and in these cases findings were based on estim-
ates made by the respondents themselves. 
4 
Because of the difficulty of one person conducting alI the 
interviews in a short time, ten students were chosen from the geography 
department of Benghazi University to help collect the information. After 
they had been given instructions and guide! ines for gathering the answers 
and relevant materials, they paired up into five teams and helped the 
respondents to compile the data. Each two interviewed one establishment 
under the supervision of the author. This was to ensure that a! I the answers 
were collected with accuracy. The remaining time of the second period was 
spent in Tripoli and Benghazi interviewing some industrial officials and 
visiting government departments to look for up-to-date statistical inform-
ation. 
B. Other Sources 
Throughout this study much official statistical data are used, 
but they are largely from three major sources : I. Census and Statistical 
Department, Industria I Census 1964 ( 1965); 2. Industria I Research Centre 
( I . R. C . ) , I n d us t r i a I Est a b I i s h men t s I 9 7 I ( I 9 72 ) , an d I n d us t r i a I Ce n s u s I 9 7 I 
(1973); 3. National Oil Corporation (N.O.C.), Libyan Oil 1954-1971 (1973). 
Data from the third source\'Jereused to emphasize the characteristics of the 
oi I industry, but data from the other censuses were used to examine the char-
acteristics and the changes in manufacturing industries which occurred in 
Libya between 1964-1971. 
The census materials posed some problems for the study, because 
both tabulation and information differed from one census to another. This 
difficulty was particularly acute where the distribution of industries, value 
added and wages were concerned. For example, the 1964 Census does not give 
the regional distribution of the industrial groups, and neither 1971 census 
pub! ication mentions the regional distribution of value added, capital invest-
ments and wages. !his census, the most recent avai !able, and the most fre-
quently used, was pub! ished in two forms, one in 1972, and the other in 1973, 
5 
but both lack information on many topics, which makes the study I imited in 
many parts. In addition, their figures differ. The Industrial Establish-
ments, 1971 is mainly geographical, giving the characteristics of each 
establishment and its workers, and showing the distribution among the regions 
and the industrial groups, as wei I as size and ownership. 
The Industrial Census, 1971 was intended to be more detailed, 
but unfortunately some important information is not included, such as : 
I. There is no survey of the regional distribution of workers nor of 
sub-industrial groups. 
2. It does not cover the distribution of workers by size of establishment, 
within the various regions and industries. 
3. In the classification of workers, there is no information about the 
proportion of females who are employed in industries. 
distribution of foreign workers is also omitted. 
The regional 
4. In terms of value added, capital investment, production costs and wages 
and salaries, information is available just for the industrial groups, 
while regional distribution is not included, nor the characteristics for 
each industrial group in each region. 
5. There is also no information about plot and floor areas, manpower short-
ages and turnover, hours of working, training, and the capital sources. 
It was decided, thereto re, to use Industria I Estab I i shments, I 971, 
because it identifies and precisely locates every establishment, indicating 
its nature and workers, thus providing easily the most accurate and rei iable 
facts available for a geographical study of industrial regional distribution. 
rvb reover, by checking the number of estab I i shments in 1 ndustri a 1 Census, 1971, 
it was found that some establishments known to the author were not included. 
Therefore, only a few figures are used from this census volume, and in 
making comparisons, adjustments had to be made. 
6 
Variables Used 
Except in few places, the number of the industrial workers and 
establishments are the basic indices used in measuring the location, size 
and importance of the industry. They have been favoured over other variables 
because of the avai labi I ity of detailed sources, their fami I iarity and simp I-
icity, and their direct relations to other geographic elements in the community. 
For example, a change in the number of industrial workers in the community is 
( 6) 
reflected in altered demand for housing, schools and transport services. 
Moreover, figures for workers are perhaps most widely used today because of 
their common inclusion in censuses and because of their freedom from the 
problems of inflation or deflation associated with statistics involving 
money. (7) Fuchs also wrote, 
nThe location of manufacturing activities is described both 
in terms of value added by manufacture and of total employment. 
In a few cases the choice of variables makes a considerable diff-(S) 
erence, but most of the results are similar for both measures." 
For two reasons, the study wi I I be concerned withal I establishments which 
have more than five workers. First, the number of establishments which have 
more than ten workers is very sma I I; I ess than 345 estab I i shments, and some 
muhafadat, such as EI-Kaleg Muhafada, do not have any such industries. Sec-
ondly, the 1964 Industrial Census I isted alI establishments which have more 
than five workers under the category of large industry, and when this is 
compared with the 1971 Census, the study wi I I give a clear picture with the 
same number of workers. 
Major Research Difficulties 
As in many developing countries, in Libya scholars are faced by 
local factors that research cannot fully overcome, such as the difficulty in 
obtaining precise figures. Even those which are pub I ished in many forms 
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rarely stand up to the exacting requirements of research, either because 
they are insufficient or incomplete, unclear in the case of the 1971 
Industrial Census, or simply inaccurate as, for example, when two different 
numbers are given for the same item. Consequently, most of the tables are 
computed by the author himself. 
of the census department. 
These shortcomings are due to the weakness 
Another problem is that there is no industrial location map of any 
kind in the country, either in the Ministry of Industry, or in the municipal-
ities. These problems meant that the study has tended to be restricted to 
features for which fairly rei iable information has been obtained. 
Organization Of The Study 
The study is divided into three parts. In part one, chapter two 
is devoted to the characteristics and distributional patterns of Libyan 
industry from the later Turkish period to the mid-nineteen fifites. In 
chapter three, the geographical location and growth of the oi I industry are 
discussed in deta i I . To show the impact of the oi I industry on the manu-
facturing sector, chapter four examines the growth of manufacturing industries 
in Libya between 1964 and 1971, with special emphasis on the changes in 
structure and industrial redistribution. The government of Libya has 
attempted to develop the industrial sector in many ways, and chapter five 
deals with the attitude of the government towards industry. Industrial 
policies and institutions concerned with financing private and pub I ic 
industries are discussed, and some consideration is given to protection. 
Part two concerns the recent location of industry. Chapter six 
describes the nature of the industry and its present form, and outlines the 
actual regional pattern of distribution of various groups of industries. 
An attempt is also made to measure the intensity of concentration of 
industries by quantitative methods, using the coefficients of localization 
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and specialization. Chapter seven examines the relation between the 
location pattern of industries and various factors such as market, raw 
materials, labour, transportation, etc, which have an important influence 
on the process of industrial location. Some location theories are examined 
to see how they relate to industrial location in Libya. In chapter eight, 
the pattern of industrial distribution for the major urban areas is examined 
l n deta l l, as we I I as future industria I zones and estates. 
In part three, chapter nine evaluates some of the problems and 
obstacles confronting industrialization in the country, while chapter ten 
contains a summary and concluding statements. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE INDUSTRIAL PAST 
The industrial geography of Libya is closely related to specific 
historical events. Each period of the recent history of the country has 
had a distinct effect upon the economy, and the cumulative result is a 
relatively early stage of development. As a result of the Turkish Empire, 
Libya was late in acquiring industry, and unti I the ltal ians colonized the 
country it was sti I I exclusively a country of handicrafts; subsequently these 
suffered a substantial decline, and at the same time new types of handicrafts 
and modern industry began to make an appearance. This chapter shows how the 
industrial sector developed, and outlines its nature and geographical 
distribution in Libya. 
I. TURKISH PERIOD, 1911 
At this period the majority of the people derived their I ivel ihood 
directly from agriculture and animal husbandry. Industry was mainly in the 
nature of handicrafts, as the major supplier of goods for sale. There was 
sti II no opportunity for· nKJdern industry, almost a century after Britain had 
= _I -"':, ' (""' 
initiated the Industrial Revolution. This is certainly true of motive power, 
which is considered a necessary characteristic of industry. Owing to the 
simple I ife of the people, the lack of capital and power supplies, there was 
I ittle motivation. In addition, transportation was a problem with the exist-
ence of several raw materials in different places, and there was a complete 
I ack of the ski I I ed work force necessary to modernize industry. Moreover, 
the Turkish government concerned itself only with collecting as much 
additional irevenue as possible from its colonies, through taxes and 
tariffs on imported commodities, and with exporting the main raw 
materials to Turkey, or sel I ing them in foreign markets. 
This pol icy affected many goods, and a good example is the 
Tobacco Monopoly which was entrusted to the concern that held the 
tobacco monopoly in Turkey itself, the "Regine Company". lssawi 
stated that this was done because of a new trade agreement made 
after the American Civi I War which destroyed the crop, and in addition 
the local consumption of tobacco in Turkey was greater than in any 
( I ) 
other country because of the spread of the habit of smoking. 
Consequently, in Libya, cultivation of tobacco was permitted only 
in Tripoli ,in order to render supervision easier and less costly, 
and the type of tobacco leaves required were rather specific. The 
( 2) 
cultivation was only permitted under the following conditions 
I. To follow the instructions given by the Monopoly 
2. To accept the purchase prices established by the Monopoly 
3. To raise no objection to its control and enquiries 
4. To produce a testimonial of honesty 
* 5. To undertake, through a dea I drawn up by the "Mud i r" 
to cultivate tobacco for the exclusive account of the Monopoly 
6. To prove ownership of a suitable plot of land. 
One can understand from these stipulations that the government 
was looking for good quality and a cheaper-priced tobacco so that it 
II 
would be better appreciated in foreign markets, and that it was anxious 
to prevent smuggling. Another example was the monopoly in natural 
sal~ which came from various pans scattered along the Libyan coast. , 
The finished product was exported to Turkey and the surplus sold in 
* Mudir means mayor of the region 
foreign markets. Some Europeans attempted to establish a tuna 
fishing and canning industry, but they were deterred by the Turkish 
authorities who demanded high taxation. 
Handicrafts were the best-organized industry in the country 
and some of these handicrafts reached a high mark of excellence and 
enjoyed a high reputation abroad. These handicrafts may have 
benefitted from the tarriff imposed on imported articles which assured 
local products immunity from competition with foreign manufactured 
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goods, and with the backward Turkish industry too. The simple products 
of most handicraft activities could survive despite the transportation 
problems, although many Libyan towns were wei 1-placed for the major 
caravan trade routes. 
A further advantage to local craftsmen was the establishment of 
the Islamic Arts and Crafts School (I.A.C.S.) in Tripoli. This school, 
which was created with the help of popular contributions and encouraged 
by the authorities, was the first institution in craftsmanship. In 
1909-1910 it had about 108 students. (3 ) There is no doubt that the 
school did a great deal to provide young craftsmen. 
THE STRUCTURE AND GENERAL DISTRIBUTION OF HANDICRAFTS 
The Libyan handicrafts which were able to survive depended 
on local raw materials in the rural and interior areas and on local 
and imported ones in urban centres. Three types of raw materials 
were used in Libya on handicrafts : agricultural, animal and mineral. 
The agricultural materials were mainly esparto and palm-tree fibre 
produced locally. Besides imported cotton and silk, local animals 
provided wool and hides, and the mineral materials included local 
pottery and imported metal. These were used in various handicrafts, 
and the most important ones are discussed below. 
A. TEXTILE AND WEAVING 
Some textile and weaving processes were developed to provide 
for the local demand for clothes. Artificial silk, wool, cotton 
and mixtures were used, producing various kinds of articles. The 
type of products reflected the distribution of raw materials and 
the market. In the interior, where people looked for cheap articles, 
there were plenty of wool len goods made from local materials. The 
weaving of luxury and semi-luxury goods which depended on silk, 
cotton and fine wool, was only located in the main cities, especially 
Tr i poI i. This was partly a result of its position close to Europe; 
it imported silk from Italy, Chinese silk through Marsei I les, and 
cotton and fine wool from Great Britain. Cachia estimated the 
yearly production of silk barracani as about 3000 pieces, 1vorth about 
5000 Turkish I ira, most of which was sold in Tripolitania, and the 
remainder exported to Cyrenaica and Egypt. (4) 
Weaving was the chief handicraft and was carried on in alI 
Libyan cities and vi I lages, using three types of looms. The heavy 
hand-operated shuttle was common in the cities; Tripoli, Benghazi, 
Misurata and Zletin; whi 1st primitive vertical looms and narrow 
horizontal looms were widely used in rural areas, and the latter 
were common among the nomads. 
B. LEATHER PROCESSING 
Each town had some leather workers, but this craft was 
especially concentrated in Tripoli, Benghazi, Mi1surata and Derna, 
because these were the major I ivestock slaughtering towns. Finished 
goods, such as "Sebbat", "Belgha" and belts using low quality leather, 
were made for the local population. Embroidered work, which demanded 
good quality leather, silk and silver, was made for the tourist trade 
in the cities. The leatherwork in cities was mainly done by special 
artisans, mostly Jewish women. 
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C. METAL AND POTTERY-MAKING 
Many metal ornaments, articles of silver, gold and copper, brass 
plates and jewellery, found a market amongst the tourists and the wealthy 
local population. The work was concentrated in the two cities, Tripoli 
and Benghazi, and was exclusively in the hands of the Jews. This was due 
to the nature of the process which depended mainly on silver imported from 
the U.S.A., copper from Italy, and gold from France. In bolh cities, silver 
and gold were popular because of the widespread belief that money can be 
treasured by buying silver and gold articles. 
Libyan pottery production was concentrated in Gharian, where 
deposits of clay were to be found, nearly every house in the town having its 
own pottery. it rnay a I so be noted that i"h is town contained rnany tr-og I odyte 
dwe I I i ngs, cut in the soft stone. Pans, jars, and other household tools, 
were produced, using primitive ki Ins fired with wood grown in the vicinity. 
Since it was a low-value product and susceptible to breakage when transported 
on rough roads, it was made for the local areas. 
D. OTHER PROCESSES 
There were various other rural crafts which were limited to 
the areas located close to the necessary raw materials, where there was the 
necessary 'know-how' to stimulate the craft. Misurata and Tawargha 
specialized in mat-making and produced many types of mats with various 
designs and colours. The mats were manufactured on looms with twine, 
wool, palm or esparto cord interwoven with stems o~ rush which grows in 
great quantities around the marshes of Tawarghaoasis. Misurata specialized 
even more in carpets, and owing to its ski I led artisans had a high reputation, 
not only in Libya, but in many other countries. They wove the carpets by hand, 
in many sizes, reproducing various characteristic geometrical and mixed 
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designs. Some 7000 carpets were made yearly, representing a value 
of about 20,000 Turkish I ira, and most of these were exported to Egypt 
d C 
. ( 5) 
an yrena1ca. Baskets, hats, ropes and fans were made from 
lengths of palm fibres in many oases, in the south, especially Sebha, 
Murzough and Kufra. 
The foregoing discussion about Libyan industry shows that 
it was very diversified, the types of articles being dependent on local 
raw materials, imported materials being used in only a few specific 
places. Handicrafts based on widely avai !able materials were found 
in nearly every town and vi I lage. Others which were based on raw 
materials of I imited distribution tended to be monopolized by a few 
centres. The importance of local materials tended to result in 
local specialization, some towns usually being noted for one or more 
specific handicrafts. 
However, there were two distinct types of location. First, 
there was a high concentration of handicrafts in Tripoli and Benghazi 
cities, which had the advantage of eas i I y ava i I ab I e I oca I and imported 
raw materials. In addition, they were major markets for luxury and 
cheap goods. According to the Turkish census of 191 I, these two 
cities were the largest, with Tripoli having about 30,000, (6 ) and 
Benghazi about 16,600 inhabitants. (7 ) These large numbers were 
due to their position as the main administrative headquarters of the 
Turkish government. Besides being a garrison town, Tripoli was 
also the centre for the Ottoman Fleet, the I.A.C.S. and the commercial 
centre for the caravan trade. Within Tripoli, handicrafts were 
located in the old city, particularly the south-east part, which is 
now known as Su9 EI-Mushir, Sug EI-Turk, Sug EI-Sayagh and Su9 El-harir, 
between the Libyan and Jewish quarters and the harbour. In Benghazi, 
weaving, embroidery, gold and silver work were located in the centre 
of the old city, while blacksmiths were to be found in old Fonduk in 
the south of the old city. In both cities handicrafts were located 
near the markets where producers could sel I their wares. Production 
was chiefly in bazaars which took the form of unseparable producer-
retailer units. Although the goods produced in these centres were 
of high value and relatively low bulk industry, they were able to 
take advantage of high-priced central locations. The second type 
of industrial location was smal I towns and vi I lages where cheap 
goods were made with local materials and for local consumption. 
Despite these smal 1-scale industrial developments, at the 
end of the nineteenth century Libya remained essentially a producer 
of some raw material. Industrial activities were limited mainly 
to those necessitated by the isolation of the population centres 
and to low value products. These industries or processes mentioned 
above were largely working in smal I units producing necessities for 
I imited demands. 
2. ITA Ll AN PER I OD I I 9 I I -I 940 
During this period, industrial development in general 
witnessed three different features : (a) a decline in the existing 
handicrafts in main towns; (b) the introduction of new types of 
handicrafts; and (c) the beginning of modern industry. 
A. DECLINE OF EXISTING HANDICRAFTS 
Although the handicrafts were wei !-organized and provided 
a large number of products, adverse conditions existed in Libya which 
cumulatively had the effect of seriously undermining the existing 
handicrafts. The important causes working towards this result were 
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I. The competition with more highly developed forms of industry, 
especially machine-made industries, whose products could 
easily be imported from Italy. 
2. A change in taste and fashions in the towns where foreigners 
I ived, and where western types of goods, particularly clothes 
and shoes, were in great demand. 
3. Increased taxation on handicrafts. As we shai I see, the tax 
exemption which was given to industry by the Ita I ians did not 
include existing industrial activities. 
4. A shrinking of the handicrafts market, due to the departure 
of the Turkish citizens. 
5. New jobs, provided in the Ita I ian army and offices. attracted 
) 
many craftsmen. 
It is not surprising that handicrafts declined during this 
period, particularly those which depended on an urban market, such 
as leather-processing. Handicrafts were sti I I favoured by people 
in the interior because of their simple I ife, and the majority were 
sti I I unable to afford expensive foreign products, while some areas 
were protected by their geographical location. 
B. THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW TYPES OF HANDICRAFTS 
By the end of 1938, there were about 5239 people engaged in 
h d. ft . th f . . t. ( 8 ) an 1cra s 1n e our maJor c1 1es. It can be seen from Table 2.1 
that about 37 percent of these artisans were newcomers (!tal ians) who 
came after 191 I, and about 60 percent of them were located in Tripoli. 
The fact that the ltal ians came from different cultures and were engaged 
in this type of activity means that new kinds of handicrafts were 
introduced to the country. 
Table 2.1 Ita I ian And Libyan Workers Engaged In Handicrafts 
tn Major Towns, 1938 •. 
* Places Ita I i ans Libyans Total 
Tripoli II 61 1900 3061 
Benghazi 527 700 1227 
De rna 161 200 361 
Misurata 90 500 590 
Total 1939 3300 5239 
* includes non-Ita! ian foreigners. 
Source Bank of Libya, The Economic Research Division, 
Economic Bu·l I et in, Mu It i Press, Tri poI i, Sept-Oct. 1970 ·• 
Table 2. 2 reveals that 1939 !tal ians were engaged in about 
twelve different types of crafts. Most of them either worked at old 
crafts, using new techniques (e.g. iron and metal, brassware or 
leather), or developed new crafts (e.g. photography, decoration, 
nursery gardens and marbleware) to serve the European community with 
its different requirements. There are no statistics to show the 
distribution of Libyans in these new types of crafts, but there is no 
doubt that most of them were new, brought for the first time into 
the country by the !tal ians. 
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Table 2.2 The Distribution Of The Ita I ian Craftsmen Among Crafts. 1938.• 
Type of crafts No.of persons engaged % 
Transport repairs 250 12.9 
Tailoring and dressmaking 248 12.8 
Plants and nurseries 221 II • 4 
I ron and metal 219 I I. 3 
Wood 210 10.8 
Leather and shoes 164 8.5 
Barbers and similar 164 8.5 
Paint and decoration 76 3.9 
Marble and stone 53 2.7 
Photography 34 I • 8 
Goldsmithing and watchmaking 29 I • 5 
Various other crafts 271 13.9 
Total 1939 100.0 
Source Bank of Libya, The Economic Research Division, 
EconomiC Bulletin, Multi Press, Tripoli, Sept-Oct, 1970. 
C. THE BEGINNING OF MODERN INDUSTRY 
We now arrive at a consideration of nevi forms of industry 
which were introduced into Libya at this time. Before discussing 
industrial development and evaluating the industrial structure, we 
must take into consideration certain facts underlying the modern 
industry. The improvement in agriculture along the north-west parts 
made it the economic core of Libya. The growing Ita I ian community 
increased the market potentiality, especially for manufactured goods. 
Ita I ian businessmen were encouraged to establish industrial establish-
ments by tax exemption. According to Article 4 of Law No.501, exemption 
was only for new establishments employing less than 100 workers, at 
least two-thirds of them to be ltal ians. (9 ) 
Furthermore, rai I roads, roads and harbours were bui It, 
providing the north region with the best transportation system. 
Ita I ian power stations were established for the first time in the main 
cities. The Banco di Roma, which opened in 1907, became an agency to 
increase Ita I ian influence, and private loans were guaranteed to the 
Ita I ians by the branch. Other commercial banks opened, such as the 
Banco di Sici I ia, Banco di Napoli, Banco d1 Ita I ia and Banco di Sparmi. 
A large ski I led labour force was avai I able from the Ita I ians who came 
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with industrial 'know-how' and modern industrial machinery by ltal ian 
establishments was imported. Besides alI these, there was direct 
government investment in industry. Industries which engaged in processing 
agricultural and fishing products received about 191 mi II ion !tal ian I ira. 
Consumer industries such as text i I es, I eatherwork, printing and paper 
received about 37 mi I I ion Ita! ian I ira. (IQ) These made an important 
contribution to Libyan industries in this period and were to lay the 
foundations of modern industrialization, particularly in the north of 
Tripolitania. 
INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE IN ITALIAN TIMES 
Apart from the previously mentioned handicraft activities, more 
modern establishments producing various types of manufactured goods were 
established in this period. Unfortunately, there is no record of the way 
the 789 establishments were distributed amongst the industrial categories. 
The only information found shows the distribution of !tal ian establishments 
among the different industrial groups <Table 2.3). It Is apparent that 
the Ita! ians held the control of industry, owning about 81 percent of 
alI the establishments. They manufactured products for the local 
markets from local raw materials. Table 2.3 shows that the outstanding 
modern industry was the bui I ding materials group. This industry 
accounted for about half of the total number of Ita! ian establishments, 
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Table 2.3 Distribution Of !tal ian ~tab! ishments Among Industrial 
Groups In 1938. 
Industrial groups No.of establishments % 
Agriculture and foodstuffs 70 I I .0 
Industries related to fishing 33 5.2 
Paper and printing 12 1.9 
Wood 40 6.3 
Chemicals 25 3.9 
Bui I ding materials and work related 321 50.2 
Metal work and transport equipment 91 14.2 
Miscellaneous 47 7.3 
Total 639 100.0 
Source Bank of Libya, The Economic Research Division, 
Economic Bulletin, Multi Press, Tripoli, Sept-Oct; 1970. 
and was largely due to the economic situation in which there was heavy 
Ita I ian investment in construction, bui I ding and infrastructure for 
settlement. These establishments included the production of red bricks 
and cement blocks as wei I as flint and I imestone quarries. 
Agriculture and foodstuffs formed the third largest share of 
ltal ian industry in Libya. 01 ive oi I processing was the major industry 
in this group, accounting for more than half of the total number of 
establishments. other establishments produced beer, wine, macaroni, 
flour, tobacco, soft drinks, ice, bread and castor oi I. The metal work 
and the transport and electricity groups were other important industries. 
The growth of these industries was due to the increased numbers of 
ltal ians using modern machinery. The fishing industry was also one of 
the main industries, with many establishments located along the coast. 
The industry became mechanized, and ltal ian-owned motor-driven fishing 
boats with greater range and better equipment made their appearance. 
This can be attributed to the wealth of tuna and sardines in the Libyan 
coastal waters. other industries with sizeable ltal ian investment were 
confined to a few establishments, particularly for printing, and chemicals 
such as gas, soap, gunpowder, candles and bitumen products. In some of 
these industries ltal ian investment was confined entirely to one or two 
establishments. 
INDUSTRIAL LOCATION IN ITALIAN TIMES 
A large number of establishments making basic items for local 
consumption were operating in various places by the end of the 1930s. 
Table 2.4 i I lustrates the distribution of 789 establishments which were 
recorded by the 1938 industrial and commercial census. It reveals that 
Table 2.4 The Distribution Of !Vbdern Establishments, 1938. 
* Places ltal ian Libyan Total % 
Tripoli 414 135 549 69.6 
Benghazi 137 137 17.4 
Derna 66 66 8.3 
Misurata 22 15 37 4.7 
Total 639 150 789 100.0 
* Includes non-Ita! ian foreigners 
Source Bank of Libya, The Economic Research Division, 
Economic Bulletin, Multi Press, Tripoli, Sept-Oct 1970. 
the locations of modern industries were in four cities : Tripoli, 
Benghazi, Derna and Misurata. Tripoli shows a high concentration of 
modern industry; it had over two-thirds of the total number, more 
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than four times as many establishments as any other city. This was due 
to its increasing politico-economic importance, and the expansion of the 
market. Tripoli served as a major administrative and commercial centre 
and was centrally located with good rai I I inks with the Jeffra plain and 
easy access to Italy. Establishment in this location could minimize 
transportation costs for both imported and local raw materials. Tripoli 
attracted most of the industrialists who had acquired their industrial 
investment capital through local commercial activities. 
23 
Furthermore, Tripoli was the largest city and it had the largest 
population growth, partly due to immigration of the ltal ians who, by 1942, 
numbered about 140,000 throughout the country, 70 percent of whom were in 
T . I . t . ( I I ) Th t t f . . r1po 1 an1a. ere was a grea er percen age o European 1mm1grants 
in the north-west than any other region,and there they formed part of an 
active aggressive business community. More than two-thirds of Tripol i 1 s 
establishments were ltal ian-owned and 90 percent of the ltal ian establish-
ments were in Tripolitania. In contrast, industry in Benghazi and Derna 
was mainly Libyan-owned because the ltal ians never settled in large 
numbers in Cyrenaica. 
( 12) Within Tripoli, industry was located in three areas, 
each with a different character. 
I. the north-west of the city, between the old town and the 
municipal stadium, contained I ight industries such as tobacco, 
soft drink, fish canning, printing and some building materials. 
This area developed apart from the residential area, but close 
to the harbour, where it is easier to handle imported raw 
materials. 
2. South Tripoli, south of the Moslem Cemetery, contained 
mechanical engineering and chemical industries, textiles, 
a tannery and the shoe industry. The low density of population 
and the extent of undeveloped land were the main reasons for 
location in this area. 
3. The south-east of the city, at the Ben-Gashir gate, contained 
agricultural industries such as olive oi I, flour mi II ing, and 
the paper industry. The location had excel lent I inks with the 
markets in the city and with the raw materials from the Jeffra plain. 
The Birra Oea establishment, on the other hand, was located 
in Dahra, north-east of the city, and its stores were located 
in the centre close to the market. 
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Within Benghazi three areas also can be distinguished 
I. An area south of the old city and north of Sidi-Hussein, 
between Salmani Sebka and west of the interior lake, contained 
food industries I ike flour, soft drink, macaroni, and also 
printing and textiles. This location had access to the railway 
station which connected the city with the rural surroundings and 
it was near the old city market and the harbour. 
2. Sidi Hussein and Berka area, contained beer, ice, macaroni and 
soft drink industries, and had the advantage of a central 
situation on the main south road connecting the north and the 
south of the city. It was also near the Ita I ian army headquarters 
and camps and the Berka local market. 
3. South of the city Fuwehat contained the noisy industries such as 
tanning and bui I ding materials because of : 
(a) the avai labi I ity of raw materials I ike I imestone 
(b) the noxious odours from the tannery and the dust 
from bui I ding materials, and 
(c) the availability of cheap land. 
The industrial situation during the ltal ian period may be 
summarized by the fact that about four-fifths of the total number of 
establishments were smal I, with I imited and out-of-date equipment in 
the case of the Libyans. Tripoli was the major industrial centre and 
the industry that did exist was largely Ita I ian-owned. 
Before leaving this section it should be noted that the develop-
ment of modern industry during this period by the ltal ians was due to 
colonial motives and for the settlement of ltal ian fami I ies in Libya. 
The industry largely owed its origin to foreigners and was characterized 
by foreign investments, workers and ownership. 
3. PERIOD FROM 1940 - 1956 
The Second World War inti icted its greatest damage on 
the bui It-up areas, and as a result a large number of establishments 
vie re camp I ete I y destroyed. Moreover, the ltal ian businessmen and 
the Jews emigrated, transferring their capital to Italy. The 
Ita I ian commercial banks closed down except for the Banco dl Roma. 
The political situation was unstable because the British and French 
occupation was transitory; hence their pol icy was based on care 
and maintenance, the aim of which was to enforce the laws and methods 
of the previous Ita I ian Administration, with the exception of the 
Fascist and racial laws. Ci 3 ) Besides this, droughts occurred in 
1947, 1948 and 1949 which caused low demand in the markets. 
However, in spite of this, some establishments remained 
in operation; those which had not been damaged or destroyed. The 
Foreign Office estimated that the number of establishments which 
. ( 14) 
remained in operation was over 100. These included fish canning, 
tobacco, olive processing, macaroni, beer, soft drinks and textiles. 
Industry was sti I I under foreign control except in a 
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few cases where Libyans had opportunity to take over some establishments 
after the evacuation of the ltal ians. There were no changes in 
location because this would have involved the construction of new 
bui I dings, and this was a difficult time as capital was in short 
supply. 
In 1951 Libya was incorporated into a newly created 
independent state, but up to 1956 it remained an industrially 
backward area. This can be attributed to a variety of factors 
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I. Lack of finance was a stumbling block to economic development. 
The main problem of industrialization during this period was the 
shortage of capital as domestic saving power was very I imited. 
Establishments depended upon their founders alone for their 
capIta I • Unt I I 1963, except In a few cases, the capIta I Invested 
was individually owned. Moreover, international loans and 
assistance were for other priority areas, and there was no foreign 
Investment source available for industry owing to the economic 
situation of the country. Even when capital was available, there 
was preference for other sectors rather than industry. The 
mission of I.B.R.D. stated in their reports about the Libyan 
economy that 
"what has been holding back capital from investment in 
industry is rather limited opportunities for the 
establishments to exploit the opportunities that exist, 
and the feeling that present-day industry is rather 
precariously based on a market which depends heavily on 
income generated by outside forces through foreign aid 
mi I itary expenditure." ( 15) 
2. There was an absence of planned industrial development and of 
experience in this field. 
3. The Tariff Law No.l9 of 1954 Introduced a duty as low as 5 
t t · t ( 16 ) · t . ff f I I t. I percen on mos 1mpor s and no ar1 or a ar 1c es 
Imported by American and British armies, so that many establish-
ments closed down because of sharp foreign competition. 
4. Some taxes were imposed on certain industries while there was no 
duty on the same commodities imported from abroad (such as beer), 
while the tax was the same for industry and commerce, viz. 
I 0 pe.rcent. 
5. The pol !tical division of the country into three provinces, each 
one with its own system of rules, was another deterrent for 
industrialization. 
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For these reasons, and the lack of ski I led labour, raw materials 
and power, there was little hope for fast industrial devel~pment without 
government help. Although the government faced economic backwardness, 
this does not mean that it neglected industrial development completely 
during this period •. The government showed great interest in developing 
industry by supporting the industrial sector with technical assistance, 
and by providing two training centres, with United Nations' assistance, 
in Tripoli and Benghazi. It also established three printing establishments 
in Tripoli, Benghazi and Sebha, and it took over the monopolies on the salt 
and tobacco processing. With aid from F.A.O. and the Netherlands govern-
ment it established a date-processing factory, the first one which was 
established with United Nations and United States help. However, the 
situation was such as to attract only a relatively smal I number of 
establishments, only few entrepreneurs wishing to be involved in the 
industrial sector. 
The I.B.R.D. report estimated that : 
"Of the 3121 enterprises registered in the 1956 Census 
of employment and produc+ion, 87 percent employed less 
than 10 workers and 25 units more than 50 on an al 1-
the-year-round basis". ( 17) 
This reveals the backwardness of the industrial sector which sti I I used 
largely traditional processes in smal I units. Food, textiles, wood, 
bui I ding materials and footwear were sti I I the main industrial groups, 
as is estimated by the report 
"In terms of the value of output, about 50 percent of 
industrial production refers to food, beverage and 
tobacco products, 10 percent to textiles, clothing 
and footwear, another 10 percent to housing materials 
and furniture, and 30 percent to a variety of products 
and services which are largely based on imported materials." 
As far as location is concerned, Table 2.5 indicates that in 1956 
nearly alI industrial establishments were concentrated in Tripoli and 
Benghazi. They accounted for 77 percent of the total number of establish-
( 18) 
ments and for 90 percent of the total industrial workers. Tripoli by 
itself had more than half of the total of establishments and more than 
three-quarters of the workers. 
Table 2.5 Industrial l.ocation 1 1956. 
Estab I i shment Workers 
Place Total % Total % 
Tripoli 1773 57 II ,493 79 
Benghazi 628 20 I, 631 II 
other urban areas 720 23 I ,380 10 
Total Libya 3121 100 14,504 100 
Source : International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
The Economic Development of Libya, John Hopkins Press, 
Baltimore, 1960, p. 437, 
Besides the availabi I ity of faci I ities mentioned earlier, 
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Tripoli, with the adjoining settlement areas, had an ~ggregate population 
of 250,000 and provided the largest single market in the country. The 
establishment of the U.S. Air Force Base at Wheelus, near Tripoli, and 
the sizeable foreign community, added a demand for manufactured goods. 
Purchasing power in Tripoli may wei I have accounted for nearly half of 
the total expendable income in the country, and it would appear that the 
bulk of the goods manufactured there were consumed within the city and 
"t d" . • (19) 1 s a JOining areas. 
However, some of the establishments located outside these two 
cities were justified by the importance of local raw material. This 
applies in the case of some establishments for tomato canning, fish 
canning, date and olive processing, and stone and marble cutting. 
Therefore, industrial location in 1956 was mainly due to the pattern 
of available resources and markets. 
Consequently, in spite of the fact that before 1963 there 
was no systematic national development programme of the industrial 
sector~ or other sectors, by 1959, the year of the great of I 
discoveries, some significant progress had been registered. 
Therefore, before studying this progress after 1964, it may be 
important to study first the development of the oi I industry. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE OIL INDUSTRY 
This c~apter discusses the geographical aspects of the oi I 
industry including the industry's growth and location and Libya's 
position in the international oi I industry. The study excludes 
alI economic aspects such as prices and the oi I revenue. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE OIL INDUSTRY 
A. PRE EXPORTATION 
The first indication of the presence of Libyan oi I was the 
appearance of gas in 1914 in a well at Sidi El-M sri in Tripoli, 
( I ) 
at a depth of 160 metres The same thing happened at Zletin 
in 1928 and at Tajora in 1934. Traces of oi I were discovered in 
1937 at Mal I aha, near Tripoli, at the bottom of a wei I 259 metres 
deep. (2 ) In the years immediately preceding \'/orld War II, vague 
studies with a view to confirming the presence of the precious 
mineral were made in the I ight of the very modest knowledge and 
means available. The eyes of the international oi I companies 
were only focussed on the large area of North Africa in the 1950s 
when oi I had been struck in large quantities elsewhere in the 
M id d I e East • 
The o i I industry in Libya started with the passing of 
Law No.25 in 1955, (3 ) which served to attract the international 
companies. The first companies which received permits to prospect 
in Libya were Esse Standard, Anglo-Saxon Petroleum, Mobi I Oi I, 
American Overseas, Oasis Oi I, Nelson Bunker Hunt, Compagnie Francaise 
(4) des Petroles, D1Arcy Exploration and American Oi I Company. 
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Consequently, by the end of 1958, about 20 companies of various 
nationalities had obtained I icences for exploring in different parts 
of the country. By 1960, these companies had obtained about eighty-
two concessions, about 65 percent of the total area of the country. 
On 20th January of 1958 the first productive well, No. B2-l in 
concession No.I in the fourth petroleum zone, was discovered, and it 
was named AI-Atshan. It inaugurated the second stage of the history 
of the o i I industry in Libya. 
B. EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
Even though Libya has held its prominent position in the world 
of petroleum only since the sixties, oi I was discovered earlier in 
many places. In July 1958, Oasis Company discovered the Bahi wei Is 
which produced 800 barrels a day from a depth of 1700 metres. In 
June 1959, the Esso Standard Company discovered a large field at 
Zelten which produced oi I from a depth of 5500 feet at a rate of 
17,500 barrels a day. In August of the same year, at a point a few 
kilometres from the first, a field producing oi I at a rate of 1500 
b I d f d th f 5770 f t d. d (5) arre sa ay rom a ep o ee was 1scovere • The 
Zelten field I ies about 150 kilometres from the Mediterranean Sea 
Coast and about 400 kilometres from Benghazi. 
After that almost every month brought news of further 
discoveries, because the companies had a special incentive to press 
on as fast as they could, the surrender clause in the 1955 Law 
undoubtedly stimulating not only rapid exploitation but also a 
fragmentation of concessions almost unknown in the more traditional 
oi !-producing areas of the Middle East. Concessionaires were 
expected to surrender one-quarter of their concession blocks at the 
end of five years, a further quarter after eight years, and within 
ten years concessions in the two northern zones of the country had 
to be further reduced to one-third of their original size, and those 
in the two southern zones to one-quarter, surrendered areas were 
(6) 
awarded again. 
By mid-1962 much field geology had been accomplished. Prior 
to launching intensive geophysical programmes, gravity and ground 
magnetometer surveys were begun, and a great part of the country was 
surveyed by aerial photography, and by that time there were 46 
dri I I ing rigs operating in Libya. Production and exporting began in 
1961-1962, and records show that about 73.7 mi I I ion barrels were 
produced, mainly from three fields, Zelten, Raguba and Dahra, and 
about 71.7 mi I I ion barrels were exported from Marsa EI-Brega. 
After the early sixties the oi I industry in Libya witnessed 
important institutional and statutory developments, especially during 
1965-1966 due to two factors : 
I. The announcement on 28th May 1965, inviting new companies 
and those already operating in Libya to submit applications 
for obtaining new concessions in areas rei inquished by oi I 
companies already operating in the country. 
2. The decree of 20th November 1965 introducing certain 
amendments to the Libyan petroleum Law No.25 of 1955. 
These two factors, with others which wi I I be discussed later, played 
an important part in developing the oi I industry. The result was 
that on 2oth February 1966 the government gave awards to 49 companies, 
including 15 new companies. A total of 41 concessions were obtained, 
covering a total area of 193,000 sq. kms. Thus, taking into account 
the fact that certain oi I companies had surrendered some parts of 
their previous concessions during this period, the total area covered 
by both the old and the new concessions, which numbered 95, went up 
to 572,000 sq. kms. In 1967 the total number of concessions reached 
about 136, including an area of about 597,475 sq.kms, owned by about 
32 companies. 
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Some of these companies discovered oi I in their concessions, 
but others were unsuccessful. In 1969 the principle of partnership 
in the oi I industry became operative, with the agreement of the French 
ERAP group, and later three more agreements were signed. These 
agreements were with the Agip company, covering an area of 20,000 sq.kms. 
Ashland Oi I and the Refining Company of Kentucky with an area of 
7,500 sq.kms, and Sirtica She! I Exploration with five concessions 
(7) 
covering 20 sq.kms. By 1972 Libya was covered by 167 concessions, 
owned by 20 companies besides the National Oi I Corporation (N.O.C.) 
which owned the majority of these concessions (Figure 3. I oversize, 
see pocket of the thesis) and Appendix 3. I. 
C. THE NATIONAL OIL CORPOPJ\TION (N~O.C.) 
The National Oi I Corporation was established in March 1970, 
replacing the General Libyan Petroleum Corporation (LIPETCO) which was 
established in 1968. The jurisdiction of the Corporation was extended 
in order to increase its effectiveness to include alI steps of the oi I 
industry, from the stages of exploration and production, to the 
subsequent stages of transport, marketing and industrialization. 
It also included the task of managing and operating companies dealing 
in the importation, sales and distribution of oi I products in the 
( 8) 
country. It worked towards its objectives either directly, or 
through joint-venture agreements, with others. 
However, in the area of exploration and production, the N.O.C. 
in 1972 owned outright 75 concessions accounting for 42.6 percent of 
alI concessions, and 13.6 percent were owned in association with the 
Aquitaine, Agip and Sertica Shel I companies. These concession areas 
were transferred to the corporation after the companies had rei inquished 
them due to the decree of 1965. Table 3. I reveals that the corporation 
operated by itself in an area of about 234,000 sq.kms, about 76 percent 
36 
Table 3.1 The Distribution Of The N.O.C. And Associated Companies 
Concessions, 1972. 
Total area 
Owner No. concessions No. of Zone in sq. kms. 
N.O.C. 23 73,947 
N.O.C. 24 2 40,638 
N.O.C. 5 3 15,800 
N.O.C. 23 4 I 02,797 
Total 75 233,182 
N.O.C./Aquitaine 13 2 30,346 
N.O.C./Agip 6 2-3 20,017 
N.O.C./Sirtica She I I 5 2 19,964 
Total 24 70,327 
Overa I I Total 99 303' 509 
Source N.O.C. Information, Facts and Statistics, Tripoli, 1973. 
of it in the western part of the country (Zones I and 4), while the 
associated areas covered about 70,000 sq.kms, most of it concentrated 
in Zone 2. This may be explained by the fact that most of the 
companies withdrew from their concessions in the western part of the 
country owing to the low quantity of oi I discovered there, and the 
high cost of exploration, production and transport. 
In the areas of production, it is currently producing oi I from 
the Um EI-Froud oi I field at an average rate of 4000 barrels a day. 
This oi I field I ies within the Sirte Basin and was discovered by the 
Phi I I ips Company and surrendered to the N. 0. C. in 1971. The product 
is transported through Mobi I Oi I pipelines, exported by the Ras-Lanuf 
terminals, and marketed by the N.O.C. itself. The other main 
activities of the corporation are the oi I refineries, and Lubricating 
Oi I factory in EI-Zawia, and the petro-chemical complex, as we shal I 
see I ater. 
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2. THE LOCATION OF THE OIL 
A. LOCATION OF FIELDS AND WELLS 
According to the Law of 1955, Libya was divided into four zones 
and each one was divided into many concessions (see Figure 3.1 ). 
Zone I covers the whole of the north-western part of the country, 
north of latitude 28° and between 18.5° E and 12.5°E longitude. 
Zone 2 covers alI the north-eastern part, east of longitude 18.5°E 
and north of latitude 28°N. Zone 3 covers all the south-eastern part, 
south of latitude 28°N and east of longitude 18.5°E, while Zone 4 
covers the rest of the country. In these zones operations started 
a I rnost i rnmed i ate I y after the granting of concessions, wh i I e exp I oration 
has mainly been carried on since 1958. By 1972, Zone 2 was the chief 
zone, and contained 85 concessions, covering most of its land, while 
nine of them covered alI or part of the shore area. Zone I contained 
51 concessions, more than half of them concentrated in the Sirte Basin. 
The south zones (3 and 4) contained fewer concessions, Zone 4 contained 
27, concentrated mainly west of Hamada EI-Hamra and the Murzough Basin, 
and Zone 3 contained 13 concessions concentrated in EI-Sarir and the 
S i rte Basin. 
It wi I I be seen from Table 3.2 that the location of the oi I 
has been concentrated in the two northern zones. These two zones 
have about 88 percent of alI the oi I fields and about 91 percent of 
all the producer wells in the country. Zone 2 is the major location 
area for oi I, accounting for more than half of the fields and more 
than two-thirds of the producer wei Is. Moreover, Figure 3.1 shows 
that Zone 2 has important fields I ike lntisar A.G.O., with a 
production of 510,627 b/d, Zelten with 314,405 b/d, Natoora and 
Augi Ia with 237,113 b/d, Amal with 163,520 b/d, Samah with 51,186 b/d, 
Gebel with 18,151, Ora with 15,336, Beda with 7,752, Raguba with 
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Table 3.2 Number Of Oi I Wei Is And Fields Discovered u~ To 1971. 
Oi I Wells Oi I Fields 
Zone Zone Zone Zone Zone Zone Zone Zone 
Year I 2 3 4 I 2 3 4 
1958 2 
1959 2 4 4 5 
1960 26 15 3 2 
1961 56 42 ! ! 3 2 
1962 27 52 5 7 17 
1963 53 70 10 5 5 2 
1964 47 149 17 4 II I 2 
1965 42 114 36 3 3 7 
1966 2 116 23 4 
1967 4 101 5 6 
1968 80 7 6 
1969 14 146 14 4 
1970 27 127 II 3 
1971 3 6 3 2 
Total 303 I 022 128 3 40 76 9 6 
Source N.O.C. Libyan Oil, 1954-1971, Tripoli, 1973. 
3,000, Zaggut with 2,492 b/d. In Zone 2 also are located the major 
concessions. For example, concession No. 59 is the major concession, 
according to the number of its fields, which include Waha, Zaggut, 
Samah, Defa, Bei-Hedan and Gialo. It is the highest producer of all 
concessions in the country, averaging about 687,412 b/d, followed by 
concession No. 103, which averages about 570,627 b/d. In Zone I 
are located Bahi (103,079 b/d), Dahra (35,495 b/d), and EI-Hofra 
(7,899 b/d). Zone 3 contains the EI-Sarir field (424,553 b/d), 
while in Zone 4 are located the less important fields I ike the 
AI-Atshan field in the south-west, close to the Algerian-Libyan 
border. 
Most of the concession areas are smaller in the northern 
zones, especially in the Sirte Basin, than in the southern zones. 
This may be because the companies concentrated their activities 
around the Sirte Basin (due to early forecasts of the probability 
of oi I), and because of the early discovery of Zelten field in 
this area. Besides being close to the coast, the Sirte Basin has 
the advantage of being free from expanses of sand dunes, the more 
common topographical features being large stretches of flat rough 
( 9) 
sand, gravel pavements, salt flats and smal I mesas. Trans-
portation in this area has presented fewer difficulties than in 
most of the Libyan desert. These factors reduce the total invest-
ment for exploration and production. Transportation through the 
desert is very costly, especially if the field production is not in 
great quantity, as in the AI-Atshan field which was discovered early 
by Esso Company but has not yet been exploited for this reason. 
Thus the major location for the oi I industry in Libya in terms of 
production fields and wells is concentrated in the Sirte Basin, 
south of the Gulf of Sirte, and extends between longitude 17°- 22.5° 
east and latitude 30° - 27.5° north. 
B. LOCATION OF THE PIPELINE SYSTEM 
Before it can be exported, the oi I has to be carried through 
pipelines across the desert to the terminals, and loaded into tankers 
to be transported to the world markets. 
As far as the first operation is concerned, this study w i I I 
neglect the smal I pipelines which connect the wei Is with the field, 
and wi II be concerned only with the main pipelines. All the Libyan 
fields are inland fields, connected with the terminals by pipelines 
carrying crude oi I to the shipping point. Fortunately, the oi I 
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does not need a large number of pumping stations to move it to the 
shore. The exception to this is the oi I from EI-Sarir field which 
needs pumping to make it flow, because the crude oi I is very waxy. 
There is also a useful clause in the oi I law which allows one company 
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to share another's pipe! ines and terminals if the capacity is avai !able. 
Figure 3. I shows that the hinterland of the country is covered 
by a network of oi I and gas pipe! ines flowing in many directions. 
There are five routes for crude oi I destined to be exported, and 
every route has a group of pipe! ines (Appendices 3.2 and 3.3). 
About 4474.7 kms of pipelines carry the oi I and gas to five points 
I. The Esso group constructed the first pipeline in Libya, 
a 173 km long, 36 inch I ine from Zelten to Marsa EI-Brega, 
connected with the 87 km long, 20 inch I ine from Raguba. 
This group has the shortest distance of pipe! ines due to 
the proximity of the nearest terminal to its fields. 
2. Oasis group has second place with 23.5 percent of the total 
pipe! ine length, connecting Gialo, Waha, Samah and Dahra 
with the E 1-S i d ra term ina Is. About 423 km of Oasis I ines 
go into concession 59, passing within 30 km of Esso 1 s I ine 
from the Gebel field. 
3. Amoseas, Mobi I and Aquitaine have the longest distance of 
pipe! ines, about 25 percent of the total, connecting fields 
such as Amal, Beda, Nafoora, Khuff, etc. with the Ras-Lanuf 
term ina I • This group has two long pipelines, one coming 
from Amal in the east and the other from Beda in the south. 
4. The Occidental group has a short-cut pipeline from lntisar 
and Augi Ia to the Zuwaytinah terminal. 
5. Arab Gulf (B.P.) has the longest single I ine flowing from 
the EI-Sarir field to Marsa EI-Hariga, about 513 km. The 
quality of the EI-Sarir oi I suggested that a pipeline to 
Tobruk was most suitable, as since the harbour in Sirte Gulf 
is shallow, the pipeline would have to flow under the sea to 
reach the tanker berths, and this might have reduced the flow 
of the EI-Sarir oil. So Marsa EI-Hariga, with its deeper 
harbour, was considered more suitable for transporting the 
EI-Sari r oi I. 
The Libyan pipeline pattern now has pipelines running from 
the Amal and Nafoora fields to Ras-Lanuf right across the Esso and 
Occidental pipeline system. The Zaggut pipeline runs across the 
Raguba pipelines and the Khuff, Dor and Beda ones across Samah ones. 
This large number of pipelines was due to the pol icy of the producing 
companies, which have separate terminals and pipelines. Their fields 
were not located close together; for example, Gialo is located in the 
east of the oi I area, lvhi le Beda, owned by the same company, is a 
long distance away in the south of the area. Moreover, some fields 
were I in.ked·:'by pipe! ines before others; for instance, \tJaha was I inked 
with Samah before Zaggut was connected with EI-Sidra terminal. 
Furthermore, the other possible explanation for the complexity 
of the pipeline network is that the government did not have any control 
over the companies, and in an indirect way encouraged this system. 
The distribution of the pipelines and terminals has been in I ine with 
government pol icy. It is an open secret that the distribution of 
the oi I terminals in the country was in the past greatly influenced 
by political and economic considerations, especially before 1964. 
During the establishment of the first three terminals in the Sirte 
Gulf, Libya was divided into three provinces, each one having its 
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own local government besides the federal government. The location 
of terminals in a province would greatly benefit the province by 
giving greater opportunity for labour, taxes and customs, beside 
indirect benefit which would result, such as the bui !ding of roads. 
The provincial authority may have been behind the scheme when the 
first terminal was located in Cyrenaica. The second and third 
terminals, whose oi I comes from Cyrenaica, were located in Tripolitania. 
The federal government was probably behind this to avoid the concentration 
of terminals in just one province. 
This system involves some pipelines which are smal I in diameter 
and so increase transportation costs. In order to a I I ow the o i I to 
move much faster, large; rather than small, pipe! ines are needed, and 
the larger the diameter of the pipe! ine, the lower is the unit cost of 
optimum capacity, due to the fact that the cost of bui I ding and operating 
a pipe! ine does not increase in proportion to its diameter. <IO) 
Moreover, in order to run and operate these I ines at ful I capacity and 
less expense in the future, when the oil production rate will decrease, 
such a large number of pipe! ines may prove uneconomical. The companies 
wi I I then have to abandon some of them and modify the system by con-
structing new ones. This may make the transportation of oi I much 
more complicated, if we compare it with Kuwait, for example, where 
the transportation of the oi I is a fairly simple process, as crude 
oi I only has to travel from the fields to two tank farms. 
The large number of separate pipelines in Libya is not economic, 
and it would be better to have fewer pipelines than this if the pipe! ines 
could be integrated. In Nigeria, for example, the Sheii-B.P., Satrap, 
Agip and Phi I I ips companies combine their fields with an integrated 
pipe! ine, the trans-Niger pipe! ine. In terms of exploration and 
production it is true that Libya has the advantage of not having its 
industry monopolized by one company, and having instead many companies. 
But this advantage has its own drawbacks, among the most visible ones 
being the fact that there had to be added investment for laying 
separate pipelines for every company, rather than saving time and 
money by having fewer pipelines, as they would do if there were fewer 
companies. 
C. LOCATION OF TERMINALS 
Loading the oi I at the terminal is the second operation in 
the system of crude oi I transportation. The terminal point offers 
a coastal outlet for the crude oi I and gas, through which it reaches 
the world markets for further uti I izatlon in various fields. It 
must be kept in mind also that the location of the terminals should 
be as close to the oi I fields as possible to avoid the cost of 
additional pipelines between the oi I fields and the terminal. The 
terminals, then, should be on the Gulf of Sirte. But, in spite of 
the advantage of its 700 km long shore, the Gulf does not provide 
certain conditions which are required for establishing terminals, 
such as sheltered deep water at the shore, a smal I harbour for the 
launches which guide and service the tankers, and a high ridge above 
sea level to make the oi I flow naturally from the tanks to the shipping 
points by force of gravity, without the application of any pumping 
methods. 
The Gulf of Sirte has no inlets or any kind of bays of a 
sufficient depth to enable tankers to reach the shore. Offshore 
it is also shallow for more than a kilometre and the coast is, in 
general, a sandy lowland containing stretches of long and high 
loose sand-dunes. The Gulf is also open to the strong winds which 
blow throughout the winter and have their effect on the Gulf. The 
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Ghibli winds blow during the spring with particular intensity in the 
Gulf and carry heavy loads of dust, making visibi I ity very difficult. 
During the winter the northerly prevai I ing wind brings storms and 
. ( II ) Increases the wave swel Is towards the south-east of the Gulf. 
When establishing new terminals, the companies had to take 
account of these geographical obstacles. Terminals situated in a 
shallow water area must be created either by dredging or by building 
a jetty towards the deep water, or by constructing berths in the 
deep water. To solve this problem of reaching deep water, the 
companies in the Gulf of Sirte preferred the third proposal, a 
submarine loading berth, with a system of several mooring buoys, 
but even this is costly to run because of the number needed, and the 
length of pipeline required to connect them to the shore, besides 
the amount of time which can be lost through berthing problems during 
bad weather. But it is simpler to instal than the other proposals, 
and more practical when only one company is involved. 
Libya has now a unique situation amongst the producing 
countries in having five oi I terminals. It is the first country to 
have this number in twelve years, all located on one sea coast, four 
of them being situated within 300 km of each other on the coast of 
the Gulf of Sirte. The fifth one is located in the eastern part of 
the country at Marsa EI-Hariga in Bomba Gulf. A study of their 
locations and a comparison between them is gi~en below. 
I • THE F I V E TERM I NA LS 
(I) Marsa EI~Brega is located in the south-east part of the Gulf 
of Sirte, about 240 kilometres from Benghazi (see Table 3,3), at 
0 0 30.25 Nand 19.35 E. After the company discovered a large field in 
Zelten they started to look for various sites. Marsa EI-Brega was 
Table 3.3 Oil Terminals located·in.Libya,·l971. 
Termi na I 
I. Marsa EI-
Brega 
2. EI-Sidra 
2. Ras-Lanuf 
4. ~·1arsa El-. 
Hari ga 
Location 
South-east of Sirte 
Gulf, east of 
Tripoli; 240 kms 
south-west Benghazi; 
70 kms west Ajdabia 
Sirte Guif, 680 kms 
east of Tr i poI i , 
370 kms south-west 
of Benghazi 
Sirte Gulf, 700 kms 
east of Tripoli , 
20 kms east of 
EI-Sidra 
Gulf of Bomba, 470 kms 
east of Benghazi, in 
Tobruk 
5. Zuwaytinah Sirte Gulf, 150 kms 
south-west Benghazi, 
close to Ajdabia 
date of 
shipments 
12 Sept 
1961 
I June 
1962 
12 Dec 
1964 
Jan 
1967 
Feb 
1968 
Total 
No. of shipments 
shipments in barrels 
362 159,798,152 
808 302,057,341 
423 169,109,216 
355 
616 219,529,457 
Source N.O.C. · Libyan Oi 11 1954-1971, Tripoli, 1973. 
chosen as a suitable site for an oi I terminal because its location 
provided an elevated site for the tank farm, and it had foundations 
( I 2) for a harbour large enough to receive cargo vessels. Besides 
this, it was the closest point to its oi I fields and was able to offer 
such a good harbour potential. The terminal has five berths, but 
before the berths were instal led, it was dredged and a smal I harbour, 
two wharfs and a breakwater were constructed. A 500 metre peninsula 
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was extended and enlarged with local I imestone which was later buttressed 
with scarp metal on the seaward side to retard the effects of wave 
erosion. For the breakwater itself, one-piece, 2200 tons eel lular 
concrete caissons were designed, each having dimensions of approximately 
( I 3) 33 by 15 metres. 
seawards for 975 metres. 
The pier 'L 1-shaped wharf stretches 
It can accommodate cargo ships with 
a 24 foot draught. The second one extends about 300 metres north 
from the shore. This was designed to give greater protection for 
small boats and industrial faci I ities and to increase the docking 
space for shallow-draught ships. (! 4 ) 
(2) EI-Sidra is located 30.38°N and 18.21°E on the west side 
of the Gulf of Sirte, about 130 kms away (see Table 3.3). The 
Oasis Company and its contractors selected this site, which offers 
relatively deep water close to the shore, a highland scarp on which 
they could build a tank farm, and reasonable proximity to its Dahra 
oi I field. The company bui It a small harbour for the launches and 
boats. A smal I breakwater bui It of local materials extends a few 
hundred metres from the shore. However, because the local stone 
was too soft, more than 2000 concrete tetrahedrons were fabricated 
at a maximum rate of twenty-two per day and dropped on the seaward 
side of the breakwater to resist the action of the sea. (! 5 ) The 
terminal has four berths located at different depths. 
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(3) Ras~Lanuf is located about 20 kms east of the EI-Sidra terminal 
0 0 
and about I 10 kms west of Marsa EI-Brega at 30.31 Nand 18.34 E. 
The site was chosen by the Mobi I Oi I Company and its partners for the 
same reasons as the previous terminal. The terminal was connected 
to the oi I field by two major pipelines, and it has four berths as well. 
Like the previous terminals, it has a smal I harbour and a breakwater 
of 300 metres, protected by prefabricated steel eel Is on the outside 
I ike Marsa EI-Brega. 
(4) · Zuwayt i riah is I ocated on the east side of the S i rt e Gu If, 
east of Marsa EI-Brega and close to Ajdabia town. The location was 
chosen by the Occidental Company because it offered a site close to 
its fields, deep water offshore, and proximity to Ajdabia where it 
is easy to get labour and some taci I ities. The terminal site is 
one kilometre west of the old harbour of ZuwaYtinah. 
(5) Marsa EI~Hariga is located in the eastern part of the country 
at Tobruk city on the Bomba Gulf. The B.P. Company chose the site 
for many reasons. The site has a natural port protected from the 
prevai I ing winds and high waves, and deep water close to the shore 
tor 270 metres (it is about sixty feet deep along the shore). Keeping 
in mind the nature of the EI-Sariroi I, and the company's desire to 
build a separate terminal, the present location of the terminal is 
quite convenient for exporting this type of oi I because, as mentioned 
earlier, the oi I in the EI-Sarir field has a high viscosity and a 
higher wax content than other Libyan crude oi Is. An underwater 
pipeline for offshore submarine loading to buoyed tankers in the 
shallow water of SirteGult was considered a risk because the crude oil 
might jellify and solidify in the line. (l 6 ) The EI-Sarir field is 
much further from the coast than any other of Libya's oi I fields, 
especially from the Gulf of Sirte, and connecting the oilfield with 
any site at the Sirte Gulf would require almost the same length of 
pipe I i ne. Moreover, the company saved more time and money in this 
location than if it had established a terminal on the Gulf of Sirte. 
However, because of its separate location, this terminal wi I I be 
excluded from the following study. 
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2. COMPARISON OF THE SITE TERMINALS 
This study w i I I dea I with the functions, the berths and 
the length of their submarine pipeline, the depth of \vater, the rate 
of the waves, and the capacity of each of these terminals. Taking 
function first, Marsa EI-Brega has the advantage. It has a multiple-
function port, while the others have a single function. Besides 
exporting crude oi I, it has a small harbour suitable for small ships 
carrying the imports required by the company and the proposed 
industries. This may be more economic for the company than to import 
its requirements through Benghazi and Tripoli, as happens at the other 
terminals. Moreover, the government has now signed a contract for 
bui I ding a new harbour serving the proposed new petro-chemical complex, 
and costing about LD II million. (!7) The Marsa EI-Brega terminal 
has many advantages over the other terminals in the Sirte Gulf. This 
terminal has a tank farm about six kilometres from the shore at an 
altitude of about 43 metres above sea level, housing 16 storage tanks 
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with 268,000 barrels capacity each. The total capacity in the storage 
tanks is equivalent to about twelve days of the company's 1971 
production. From the farm, five separate submarine pipe! ines run 
to five berths (Figure 3.2.A). A 23-inch pipe! ine runs north-east 
of the terminal to berths one and two, a 42-inch pipeline leads to 
berths three and four, and a 48-inch one to berth five, each at a 
different length and at a different depth (see Table 3.4). The 
gravity flow in Marsa EI-Brega permits a maximum loading rate higher 
than that of the other terminals; the maximum varies from 35,000 
barrels per hour at berth one to 65,000 barrels per hour at berth 
three, and three of its berths have a higher rate than any of the 
EI-Sidra berths. 
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Table 3.4 Some Characteristics Of The Terminal Berths In The 
Gulf Of Si rte. 
Length of Approx. length The maximum 
Depth tankers of submarine loading 
Berth in a I lowed pipeline rate 
Terminal No. feet (in.feet) (in metres) barrels/hr. 
Marsa EI-Brega 42 434 I ,220 35,000 
EI-Si dra 
Ras- Lanuf 
Zuwaytinah 
Sources 
2 42 434 i ,690 39,000 
3 . 96 unlimited I ,890 65,000 
4 72 
•• 
I ,920 60,000 
5 140 
•• 
3,050 48,000 
62 800 I, 950 44,000 
2 62 800 I ,550 44,000 
3 63 1,000 2,280 44,000 
4 72 1,100 3,700 44,000 
65 unlimited I, 520 60,000 
2 72 
•• 
I, 780 60,000 
3 75 
•• 
2,230 60,000 
4 96 , ' 3,750 60,000 
Alpha I 00 . , 2,360 
Bravo 70 , . 2,230 
Char I i e 100 
•• 
2,680 
Delta 70 . ; 1,900 
Echo 100 
•• 
2,950 
Direct Communication with Ministry of Petroleum, Information 
on the Libyan Terminals, Tripoli, Summer 1973; Esso Company, 
Information About Marsa EI-Brega Terminal; Information 
collected through correspondence with Oasis Oi I Company, 
I etter dated I Oth Sept, 1974; Brown, R. W. "Geographic 
Factors in the Construction and Operation of Libyan 
Petroleum Ports;" The Libyan Economic and Business Review, 
Vol. II, No.2, Autumn, 1966. 
EI-Sidra has an advantage in the number of storage tanks and 
their high capacity (19 tanks, 6,695,000 barrels) at an altitude of 
73 metres above sea level. Its disadvantage is its loading speed 
which is by gravity at a maximum rate of about 44,000 barrels per 
hour at any berth. Each of the four berths is I inked with a 36-inch 
pipeline (Figure 3.2.8); also they are located at a more shallow 
depth (see Table 3.4). 
Ras Lanuf has fewer advantages than the two previous terminals 
both in the number of storage tanks and in their capacity (6 tanks, 
3,000,000 barrels), but its loading capacity is better than either, 
by gravity, about 60,000 barrels per hour, through a 40-inch pipeline 
to four berths (Figure 3.2.C). This might be due to the altitude 
of its tank farm at about 99 metres above sea level. Ras-Lanuf has 
the same number of berths as EI-Sidra, but fewer than Marsa EI-Brega. 
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Zuwaytinah (Figure 3.2D) has two disadvan}ages, the long length of its 
submarine pipelines, most of them longer than two kilometres, and the 
terminals facing the north-western winds which blow during the winter. 
With respect to the depth of the water, the wind, waves and 
swel I, Table 3.4 shows that by comparing the depth of berths with their 
distance from the shore we can show that in general the water is deeper 
at the Ras-Lanuf terminal. For example, berth two in Ras Lanuf (about 
1,780 metres from the shore), berth four in EI-Sidra (about 3,700 metres 
from the shore), berth four in Marsa EI-Brega (about 1,920 metres from 
the shore), and Bravo berth in Zuwaytinah (about 2,230 metres from the 
shore), are alI located at the same depth (70- 72 feet). In addition, 
it shows that the Ras-Lanuf berths are on average deeper than the others, 
but as a separate location Marsa EI-Brega's berth No.5 has the advantage 
of depth over any other berth in Libya. It is up to 140 feet deep and 
can receive a large number of tankers. 
Fig.3·3 SEA CONDITIONS IN THE GULF OF SIRTE 
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Figure 3.3 shows that the EI-Sidra and Ras Lanuf terminals have 
better locations weather-wise than Marsa EI-Brega and Zuwaytinah. 
High winds and waves, especially during the Winter, can affect the 
loading operation. Adverse weather can stop the loading operation at 
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the berths for many hours. Berth No. 3 at Marsa EI-Brega and No. 4 at 
the EI-Sidra terminals are completely different in design from the other 
submarine berths. These two are bow- and mono-mooring berths, which are 
designed to reduce average mooring time. Moreover, these have often 
loaded tankers in heavy weather, while the other submarine berths were 
c I osed. 
However, one may wonder why Libya has this number of terminals, 
especially in the Si rte Gulf, where there is no natural location even 
for one terminal. This can be explained by the reasons which have 
been mentioned before. At present, since the new pol icy of reducing 
production, economically speaking, Libya should have fewer terminals 
in order to reduce investment, faci I itate control, and establish large 
industrial areas, instead of these small ones. The berths are floating 
submarine berths, and it is easy to move them to a nev1 site. Moreover, 
some of the present sites are close together, such as EI-Sidra and Ras 
Lanuf, which are only 20 kms apart. There might not be any need to 
move the tank farm from either of them if the two sites were connected 
together. The number of shipments wi II decrease according to the new 
pol icy, and the berths in each terminal wi II work below their full 
capacity. Joined, they might not receive as many ships as the two 
sites would receive separately, but one can see from Table 3.5 that, 
for example, EI-Sidra in its peak year loaded about 865 ships, with 
345,500 thousand barrels. Working according to the new pol icy of 
production, the EI-Sidra and Ras-Lanuf terminals exported about 
438 mi II ion barrels in 1972. But the maximum oi I loading rate from 
the berths given by the company indicates that the daily average rate 
Table 3.5 The Total Exports And Number Of Ships At Each Terminal 
1965~1972 (In ,000 barrels). 
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Mars a E 1-Brega EI-Sidra Ras Lanuf Zuwaytinah 
Total No.of Total No.of Total No.of Total No.of 
Year exports. ships. exports shi~s exports ships exports ships 
I 965 205 I 948 535 184,380 680 52,368 176 
!966 212;416 470 237,430 804 97,505 295 
1967 215,183 484 228,999 708 122 I 977 354 
1968 269,550 616 250,567 742 177,987 517 135,762 362 
1969 267,291 594 286,000 734 233,032 676 218,696 577 
1970 247,189 511 345,538 865 219,817 585 245,492 686 
1971 159,798 362 302,057 808 169 I I 09 423 219,529 616 
1972 122,41 0 285 I 772 152 I I 42 155,891 
Sources :1. N.O.C. ·Libyan Oi I ,1954~1971, Tripoli, 1973. 
2. Central Bank of Libya, The Economic Research Division, 
Economic Bulletin, Tripoli, 1973. 
is about 1,700 thousands of 100 percent tanker avai labi I ity. (! 8 ) 
This means that the EI-Sidra terminal could handle the exports of the 
two terminals. A depth of about 40 feet is capable of hand I ing ships 
with a displacement of up to 50,000 tons dead weight. The E 1-S i d ra 
and Ras Lanuf berths are capable of hand I ing ships more than double 
this size, and if they were to deal with ships of a capacity of 
100,000 tons, only about 620 would be needed each year. This is less 
than the number of tankers received by EI-Sidra since 1965 and less 
than the number received by Ras-Lanuf in 1969. The same thing could 
be said of Marsa EI-Brega and Zuwaytinah. Marsa EI-Brega 1 s total 
exports in 1968 (269,550,000 barrels) are almost equal to the total 
amount (278,300,000 barrels) exported by the two terminals in 1972. 
A detailed study of the advantages and disadvantages of a 
reduction in terminals is not the aim of this study, but it may very 
wei I be that a reduction in numbers would be beneficial. 
A comprehensive analysis from the technical and engineering 
point of view might be worthwhile. This might consider reducing 
the four terminals in the Sirte Gulf to two, connecting the three 
pipe! ines of Esso, Occidental and Amoseas (Nafoora and Amal groups) 
together to one terminal and the rest of the pipe! ines to the other 
terminal. 
3- CRUDE OIL 
A. CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION 
The development of crude oi I production within Libya compared 
with other members of the O.P.E.C. countries is shown in Table 3.6. 
Phenomenal growth in Libyan production during the 1960s gave it by 
the beginning of 1-969 the fourth position amongst these countries 
and second amongst the Arab countries, behind S. Arabia. By this 
year, Libyan production surpassed Kuwait production. The table also 
observes two other features, namely the sharp upsurge of 1968, and 
the sharp decrease since 1970. 
The extraordinary general expansion of oi I production in 
the 1960s was due to many reasons besides the natural advantages of 
Libyan oi I, in both geographical location and quality. 
I. Libya was a country new to the industry, and discovery of 
new fields occurred monthly, whereas in other countries 
the discovery of new fields had stopped. 
2. Libya was different from other Arab producers in the 
competitive atmosphere that prevailed among operating 
companies. Most Middle East countries have only a 
handful of operators to deal with, for instance, 
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Aramco Company in S. Arabia and K.O.C. in Kuwait, while 
Libya in 1972 had about 20 companies besides N.O.C., 
sitting on about 175 concession areas. According to 
Professor M. Adelman, this large number of companies 
and concessions was the most effective factor behind the 
Libyan success story : 
"Today, a single iease covering the whole country 
is unthinkable. Libya, the greatest of the new 
countries, had welcomed 28 concessionaires by 1968. 
The lesson has not been lost on other countries : 
the more the exploring companies, the faster the 
development." (19) 
3. As mentioned earlier, the provision of the oi I Law required 
the periodic surrender of unexplored acreage; as a result, 
the companies were under pressure to explore as much 
. (20) territory as possible before concessions expired. 
4. Political factors were also important. The problems which 
occurred during the Iranian crisis, and the temporary closure 
of the Suez Canal in 1956, are sti II remembered. Since the 
end of the Suez crisis in 1956 the energy authorities of 
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Western Europe counted primarily on the existence of alternative 
oi I producing areas to provide security of oi I supply in the 
event of difficulties with the oil-producing and transit 
countries of the Middle East. Companies were encouraged 
to search in other areas, especially in North Africa, and 
particularly in Libya, where discovery of new fields 
naturally created much competition for oi I development with 
Middle East countries. 
5. The government also pressed the operating companies to increase 
their capacity of crude oi I production. This arose from the 
government's need for more money to finance its economic 
development plans. 
6. Some companies increased their daily average rate of 
production by completing new producing wells, by increasing 
the production capacity of producing wei Is, and by 
increasing their pipe! ine capacity. For example, Esso 
Company completed the installation of a second pumping 
station between Zelten and the Marsa EI-Brega terminal , 
in order to absorb the increasing quantities produced from 
the company fields, and this pumping station increased the 
pipeline capacity by 50,000 barrels per day. The daily 
average product amounted to about 2.77 mi I I ion barrels 
during 1968, as compared to 1.87 mi II ion barrels in 1967. (21 ) 
7. The sharp increase of 1968 was also due to the coming of new 
companies and the new large fields which were discovered in 
1967. For instance, the Occidental Company discovered in 
1967 its first field in Augi Ia. In the same year they 
discovered the biggest well in the country in lntisar field 
in concession 103, with a production of 43,000 b/d of high 
. t . I (22) grav 1 y o 1 • 
8. The 1967 Middle East crisis, the closure of the Suez Canal, 
the shut-down of the Trans-Arabian pipe! ines, and the Nigerian 
Civi I War which dropped the exports of the Nigerian oi I from 
500,000 barrels per day to about 50,000 barrels, alI meant 
that the Europeans began to depend on imports from Libya. 
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Production declined after 1970 because the companies were ordered 
to follow the oi I pol icy which was issued in 1970 in order to conserve 
the country's oi I wealth. According to the new pol icy, the companies 
have been ordered a production cut-down of 780,000 b/d from their 1970 
production. In terms of the companies' production, Table 3.7 shows 
that Oasis group produced about 35.5 percent of the total during 1972, 
Table 3.6 Crude Oi I Production In Libya And O.P.E.C. Countries From 1961 To 1972 By Thousands of Barrels. 
Abu lndon- s. Venez- Libyan actua I 
Year Dhabi esia I ran Iraq Kuwait Qatar Arabia uela Algeria Libya % of increase 
1961 - 154,863 438,804 367,851 633,280 64,675 540,237 1,065,757 120,791 6,642 
1962 5, 183 165,485 487,084 368,358 714,598 67,980 599,666 I, 167,916 159,463 66,543 901.8 
1963 17,593 162,054 544,325 424, 09() 765,150 69,884 651,890 I, 185,511 184,061 161 , 272 142.3 
1964 68,369 167,130 626,107 459,403 842, 160 78,813 694,302 1,241,782 204, 140 315,621 95.7 
1965 I 03,003 175,430 696,520 4 79,099 861,527 84,902 805,190 1,267,602 203,916 444,862 40.9 
1966 131,400 169,572 778, I 09 508, 141 906,702 106,307 950,059 1,230,464 262,308 547,902 23. I 
1967 139,467 184,471 950,180 448,239 912,427 118,100 1024,263 1,292,874 301,385 635,285 15.9 
1968 181,756 219,864 1039,367 550,208 956,549 124,266 1114,177 I ,319,357 330,922 952,357 49.9 
1969 218,798 270,863 1232,155 555,241 I 012,306 129,7461173,877 1,311,837 345,420 I, 134,839 19. I 
1970 253,237 31 I ,546 1397,585 565,239 1091,189 132,261 1386,727 1,353,420 375,622 I ,211,086 6.7 
1971 341,056 325,617 1656,918 61 8, 335 I I 66, 796 157,206 1740,722 1,295,403 286,686 1,007,692 - 16.8 
1972 384,227 394,804 1838,455 536,375 1201,578 176,543 2200,575 I ,178,483 388,802 819,619 - 18.7 
Source : O.P.E.C. Annual Statistical Bulletin 'June 1973. 
(.]" 
0' 
thus maintaining the leading position among the companies. Its 
daily production dropped about 12.8 percent in 1971, compared with 
the 1970 production. In 1972, the daily production continued to 
drop, but more sporadically and at a slower pace, about 3.3 percent. 
Occ i denta I took the second pI ace from Esso in 1970 and had a da i I y 
production record of about 18.9 of the total production in 1972. 
Its production also decreased, and a share rate of production, about 
27.8 percent less than in 1971, was recorded, while Esso Company in 
the third position had a reduction of about 25.2 percent less than in 
the 1971 production. The only company whose daily production was 
increased in 1972 was the National Oi I Co-operation <N.O.C.). The 
reason is simply that it is a pub I ic company. It was clear that the 
rate of cut-down was different between the companies, but unfortunately 
there is no official statement about this, though it might be dependent 
on the relations between the companies and the government. Also, it 
might be dependent on oi I field situation and the pipe! ine system of 
the companies. For example, Oasis, Mobi I and Amoseas Companies, which 
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had the lowest rate of cut, have most of their fields far from terminals 
with long pipe! ine systems. The companies which have less pipeline 
and important fields have had a high rate of cut-down. This might be 
sound for a future plan of nationalization. It also depends on the 
companies' situation, for example, the Occidental Company accepted the 
new order to cut-back at a large rate, because it is an independent 
company and heavily dependent on Libya for crude oi I supplies. 
B. CRUDE OIL EXPORTS 
Marketing in the crude oi I industry depends on the size of the 
demand and the consumers' needs, and not on sel I ing what is produced. 
The marketing and distribution of the oi I products to the market depends 
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Table 3.7 Crude Oi I Production In Libya By Operating Companies, 
· 1967~1972 in,OOO of barr~ls per day~ 
Company 1967 1968 1969 .1970 1971 1972 
Oasis 630.0 686.1 789.0 946. I 824.4 796.9 
Occidental 381. I 607.8 659.4 586.4 423.3 
Esso Standard 495.9 613.7 618.3 570.6 349. I 260.9 
.A.moseas 128.9 243.9 369.! 322.9 26!. 5 233.8 
Arabian Gulf (a) 165.2 159.6 156.4 212.6 196.3(b) 66.5 
Hunt 144.5 164.9 200.3 223.3 146.0 
Mobi 1/Gelsenberg 204.2 237. I 264.2 252.9 186.5 162.8 
Esso Si rt e I 07 .I 127.6 127.8 121.4 98.2 93.2 
Agip 17.7 
Aqu ita i ne 5. I 19.9 16.8 16.0 
N.O.C. 4.8 7.4 6.0 4.2 3.7 13.0 
Amoco 4.4 I • I 0.5 7.7 14.6 9.4 
Total I ~740.5 2')602. I .. 3., I 09. I 3.,318.0 2.,760.8 2.,239:5 
(a) 
Source 
Prior to 7th December 1971. B.P. (b) 2.2 T b/d produced by Arabi an Gu I f. 
O.P.E.C. Annual Statistical Bulletin, June 1973. 
on where it is wanted and also on the quality, the quantities and the 
price req u i red. The Libyan oi I export operation to the market began 
when Esso Company started exports of Zelten crude oi I in September 1961. 
Only eight years later, by 1969, Libya not only held the first position 
among the Arab oi !-exporting countries, but also among the O.P.E.C. 
countries, but in 1971 the Libyan position dropped to fourth, behind 
Saudi Arabia, Iran and Kuwait, due to the new regulation <Figure 3.4). 
In 1970 record exports were recorded, 7.7 percent more than 
the exports of 1969. The exports, according to the new pol icy, dropped 
in 1971 to about 18 percent less than in the previous years, and 
continued to decline in 1972. 
Fig 3·4 CRUDE OIL EXPORTED BY SOME O.P.E.C. 
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Table 3.8 The Distribution Of Libyan Crude Oi I By Consumer Countries~ 1966.:..1972 Cin /000 bbs) C 1) 
Year 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 % of the 1972 % of the 
Country total total 
Italy 65,692 128,413 200, 171 252,689 306,310 236,991 23.94 164,517 20.74 
W. Germany 188,31 I 149,914 214,909 252,794 220,968 180,125 18. 19 173,963 21.92 
France 64,217 84,882 101,522 130,320 166,222 131,308 13.26 79,218 9.99 
Holland 53,373 55,945 71,328 110,937 I I 0, 791 54,233 5,48 49,234 6.21 
Be I g i um 20,772 34,607 29,919 43,866 47,789 25, I 15 2.54 9,352 I. 18 
( 2) 
Tot a I of E. E. C. 392,365 453,761 617,849 790,606 852,080 627,772 63.41 476,284 60.04 
-- --
Gt. Britain 75,970 75,406 170,941 154,542 178,822 162,042 16.41 106,784 13.46 
Spain 21,056 28, I 03 56,697 59,241 58,840 45,624 4.61 21,902 2.76 
U.S.A. 27,437 18,568 52,806 58,086 34,388 54,865 5.54 63,762 8.04 
U.S.S.R. - - - - - - - 13,999 1.76 
Switzerland 4,792 5,563 7,518 I I, 505 18,272 15,299 1.54 12,341 1.55 
Denmark 7,740 13, 169 8,873 10,035 8,700 3,544 0.36 678 0.08 
Norway 3,876 6,682 10,447 7,657 5,969 3,177 0.32 1., 710 0.22 
Trinidad I, 991 - - 8,739 18,874 60,409 6. I 0 61, 136 7.71 
Others (3) 12, 124 26,629 19 ,29_5 20,219 30,895 17,321 I. 75 34,714 4.38 
Total 547,351 627,881 944,426. I, 120,630 I, 206,840 990,053 .. ·. 100.00 793,310 100.00 
Cl) Excluding N.O.C. exports. ( 2) During that time Gt. Britain and Denmark sti II outsid·s E.E.C. 
( 3) Including W. Indies, Rumania, Brazi I, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece, Canada, Argentina and Uruguay. 
Source : Central Bank of Libya, The Economic Research Division, Economic Bulletin, Tripoli, Vol. 13, No. 12, Oct-Dec 1973, 
\Jl 
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The geographical distribution of the crude oi I market 
(Table 3.8) indicates that the greater part of these exports went to 
Western Europe, about 93 percent of the total exports in 1970, and 
86 percent in 1971 (Figure 3.5). The E.E.C. countries absorbed about 
70 percent of the total exports in 1970, but they dropped in 1971, and 
alI the E.E.C. countries have contributed to this decrease. which was 
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due to the new po! icy, as wei I as to the government's attempts to find crude 
,oi I importers outside Western Europe. As a result,Canada has resumed 
importation of Libyan oi I, and Argentina appeared for the first time 
in 1971. Moreover, the imports by countries other than those of 
Western Europe increased from about 7 percent in 1970 to I 4 percent 
of the total exportation in 1971. The high percentage of West 
European imports can be attributed to several factors besides the 
location factor. Firstly, the producing companies had outlets in 
Europe to which Libyan as wei I as other Middle Eastern crude oi I 
could flow. Secondly, there were the price adjustments which made 
Libyan oi I more competitive, especially before 1969. Third I y, a 
dollar shortage prevailed throughout most of this period, and the fact 
that American and Venezuelan oil was dollar oil, and the oil of Libyan 
and other Middle Eastern countries could be paid for largely in sterling, 
helped to direct European demand towards it. (23 ) Another important 
factor is the competition from other producers, whose oi I competes with 
Libyan oi I in the world market outside Western Europe. For example, 
the competition from the Gulf States in Eastern Asia affects markets, 
especially in Japan. There is competition from Venezuela in the 
markets of South America, and from Nigeria in South Africa. It is 
believed that the European demand for oi I wi I I rise. It is indicated 
that West European countries in 1970 used 12 mi I I ion b/d of crude oi I, 
almost alI of it imported. The commission of the European community, 
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in common with other experts, now estimates that overal I requirements 
wi I I at least double in 15 years, indicating a probable figure of 
around 25 mi I I ions b/d for 1985. Against this, it is now hoped that 
indigenous production, chiefly from the North Sea, may reach some 
3 mi I I ions b/d by 1980, and conceivably 4- 4.5 mi I I ions b/d five years 
I ater. The ar-ea's probable import requirement in 1985 would, on this 
basis, turn out to be rather less ................... _.. 111011 21 millions b/d, sorne 75 percent 
or so more than in 1970. (24 ) 
This increase is due to many factors 
I. To the technological progress which has required more and more 
energy and the growth of European industrial production. 
2. The decrease of coal production and its use as a power source. 
3. The increase in the capacity of the European refineries. 
However, the future opening of the Suez Canal wi I I mean that 
Libyan crude oi I wi I I be facing severe competition from Middle Eastern 
producers such as Saudi Arabia and Iran who are eager to expand their 
rate of production, especially since the Middle East countries were 
formerly the main suppliers to Western Europe which, after the Suez crisis, 
had shifted somewhat to suppliers from North African countries. 
C. CRUDE OIL RESERVES 
Table 3.9 shows that proven oi I reserves are much less abundant 
than those of Middle East countries. In 1973, Libya's production 
amounted to about 3 percent of the known reserves, while the production 
in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, for instance, did not exceed 1.8 percent of 
the reserves of these countries. Libya, with 4.8 percent of total 
world reserves, accounted for 3.7 percent of the world production, 
while Saudi Arabia, with 26.5 percent of total reserves, and Iran, 
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with I I percent of total reserves, produced 12.9 percent and 10.3 percent 
of the total production respectively. From this table there can be no 
doubt that Libyan crude o i I has a I ow rate of reserve compared with 
Middle East countries, but it is in a better situation than Venezuela. 
As for the reserve/production ratio in Libya, Table 3.9 indicates that 
Libya has a low ratio comparing with some of the Middle East countries. 
Its reserve/production ratio shows that it might have about 33 years 
to go with reserves at the 1973 level of production. However, Libya 
Table 3.9 Total Of Oi I Reserves Arid Production lri Selected Producers 
·In Million bbs,· 1973. 
Reserve Production 
%total of % total 
Country Amount wor I d Amount world 
Libya 25,500 4.8 767.2 3.7 
Saudi Arabi a 140,750 26.5 2,662.3 12.9 
Kuwait 72' 750 13.7 1,010.3 4.9 
I ran 60,000 I I. 3 2' 139.6 10.3 
Iraq 31 '500 5.9 708.8 3.4 
U.S.A. 41 '800 7.9 3,780.7 18.3 
Algeria 7,640 I. 4 372.3 I. 8 
Venezuela . 14 '000 .2.6 I, 305.2 6.3 
World tota I 531 '700 * 20,713.0 
* excluding U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe and China. 
Source Europa, Middle East and North Africa, 1974-1975, 
Twenty-First Edition, London, 1974. 
Reserve/ 
of Production 
Ratio 
33 
53 
72 
28 
44 
II 
21 
II 
sti I I enjoys a better position than most of the main producer countries, 
and the world as a whole, for the world reserve/production ratio in 1973 
was only about 30. But it should be borne in mind that these figures 
might not give the accurate reserve of the country, because companies 
are understandably hesitant to pub I ish precise figures on their reserves. 
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Moreover, new discoveries make for a wide margin of fluctuation in 
(25) 
estimated proven reserves. But it is believed that the reserves 
wi II decrease in the long run if no new fields are discovered, and 
therefore it is almost impossible for Libya to sustain a rapid 
expansion of production. 
4. DEVELOPMENT IN THE OIL INDUSTRY 
One of the greatest aims 0f the oi I pol icy in Libya is to 
encourage a rapid development of the country's hydrocarbon reserves 
to obtain for the country as much benefit from the oi I operation as 
possible. In this section some aspects are examined which could 
greatly affect the long-term prospects for the development of Libya's 
oi I resources on the one hand, and industrialization on the other. 
A. THE GAS PROJECT 
Natural gas is an important source of energy and a principal 
raw material for the petro-chemical industry, and is used in gas 
injection schemes to maintain reservoir pressure in the oi I fields. 
In Libya, natural gas is produced in association with crude oi I from 
various fields, and the quantity of the former is wholly dependent 
on the output level of the latter. Rough estimates of the 1971 output 
d (26) are in the order of 176,710 thousands of cubic feet per ay. 
However, according to a study prepared for the Libyan government in 
the mid-1960s by the I I I inois Institute of Gas Technology the country's 
natural gas reserves were estimated at around 350 bi I I ion cubic metres, 
of which more than two-thirds consist of associated gases. That Libya 
could therefore become a major gas exporter is reinforced by the fact 
that Libyan crude production has doubled since the study was prepared, 
and the figure for potential gas supply by 1972 must now be considerably 
higher than that quoted above. Moreover, it may indicate the potential 
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importance of uti I izing natural gas in industrial development as wei I 
as for export, espec i a I I y as the methane content of Libyan natura I gas 
is between 65 and 75 percent. 
Formerly there was no economic potential for this resource, 
because of the I imited domestic demand and the technical obstacles to gas 
injection in the earlier years of production, where production in Libyan 
. (27) 
oi I fields was being accomplished through water propulsion. Vast 
quantities of gas flared in the atmosphere. Because of the rapid increased 
uti I ization of natural gas for many processes, it is now of economic 
importance. 
The only project which was bui It in Marsa EI-Brega, according to 
an agreement between Esso Company and the Libyan government, was designed 
to be one of the largest gas I iquefaction plants in the world, with a 
capacity of 345 mi II ion cubic feet of I iquefied gas daily. (2S) The 
plant, which cost about LD 60 mi I I ion, includes two 300,000 barrel storage 
tanks, furnaces and turbines, developing a total 330,000 horse-power with 
the plant refrigeration capacity equivalent to the air conditioning of 
100 000 · houses. (29 ) N t I f th" I t f , average-size aura gas or IS pan came rom 
the major Raguba and Ze I ten o i If i e Ids. Two pipelines were constructed to 
carry the gas to the terminal, a 36 inch gas pipe! ine from Zelten to Marsa 
EI-Brega, and the second one, a 20 inch I ine from Raguba connecting with 
the former one (see Figure 3. I). The terminal at Marsa EI-Brega was 
chosen as the site for the plant because : 
I. It is owned by Esso Company, the owner of the project, and 
the terminal :faci I ities could be used economically and easily 
without charge, and at any time. 
2. It is geographically the nearest one for these gas-producing 
fields, and 
3. It has been developed in order to be suitable for handling 
gas tankers. 
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Production, which should have been exporting in 1968, was 
delayed unti I 1971 for various reasons, such as a series of accidents 
during construction, followed by a price dispute with the government. 
After the settlement of a nine-month-long price struggle with Esso 
Company, the first shipment of gas to Spain was made on 14th March 1971. 
During 1971, Libyan exports of gas were about 21,350,287 mi II ion 
thermal units, of which 17,204,379 mi I I ion thermal units were shipped 
to Spain and 4,145,908 mi I I ions were shipped to Italy. 
Due to increased demand for Libyan gas, another plant is now 
under construction in Zuwayti~ah terminal, using natural gas which wi I I 
come by pipe! ine from the lntisar fields. The new plant, which wi I I 
cost about $115 mi II ion, wi II supply about 12 mi II ion barrels of sulphur-
free gas to Japan. In spite of the importance of the gas in terms of 
energy, and in producing raw materials for petro-chemical industries 
such as ammonia, urea, ethylene, propylene, methanol, butadiene, 
acetyleno-black carbon, carbon disulphide and sulphur (30 ), the uti I ization 
of natural gas for local activities in Libya is sti II fairly I imited. 
However, now a petro-chemical complex is under construction in Marsa El-
Brega. This complex wi I I include three units (I) a unit for the 
production of ammonia, with a capacity of 1000 metric tons daily; 
(2) a unit for the production of methanol, with a capacity of 1000 metric 
tons daily; and (3) a refinery for crude oi I with a capacity of 
120,000 barrels a day. 
B •. REFINING 
Amongst some of the oi !-producing countries which are largely 
dependent upon o i I for government revenue and the growth of nation a I 
production, there has been rising concern about the establishment of 
f . t . f th . t . . t ( 31 ) domestic re 1nery plan and an expansion o e un1 s 1n ex1s ence. 
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* In Libya, according to Paragraph of Article 21 of the Petroleum 
Law No. 25 of 1955, the producer companies were not under pressure to 
refine any percentage locally. However, after the oi I production 
increased, the domestic scale of fuel and other oi I by-products in 
Libya continued to increase in I ine with the increase in private and 
pub I ic means of transport, the increase of the fuel wholesales and its 
widespread use in industry and agriculture. Table 3.10 shows that the 
total wholesales of the fuel and other related oi Is in the country rose 
by about 167 percent during the period of 1966-1973. The total whole-
sales of the different types of fuel oils during 1973 amounted to about 
1~12.8 mi II ion I itres, a daily average of about 3.9 mi II ion I itres, 
compared with I .5 mi I I ion I itres in 1966. Yearly increase in wholesales 
was due to the use of sophisticated new equipment and the increase in the 
projects of development plans. Moreover, the achievement of the new 
design techniques of smal I refineries served the local market by 
operating efficiently and economically. 
For these reasons the first refinery was established in Marsa 
EI-Brega by Esso Company according to the following agreement with the 
(32) government. 
* 
I. That the refinery should be established on a purely commercial 
basis. 
2. That a I I its crude input requirements shou I d consist of 
Libyan oil. 
3. That its products should be sold at a free competitive price 
which would permit the realization of a reasonable margin of profit. 
Paragraph I of Article 21 of Libya.n Law stipulates that a concession 
holder who discovers petroleum in Libya and desires to refine it in 
the country shal I have the right to construct, maintain and operate 
a refinery for this purpose in accordance with any legislation 
governing the refining of petroleum. 
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Tab I e 3. I 0 The Total Wholesales Of Fue 1 Arid Other Oi I In Libya 
1966...;.1973 in ,000 Li tres. 
Gaso I i ne Gas Heavy Fuel 
Year Premium Regular. Kerosene Oi I 011 
1966 64,432 78,744 46,269 271 ,084 68,274 
1967 78,628 77,969 52,30q 316,326 70,505 
1968 I 16,517 86,666 68,879 428,018 93,780 
1969 154,751 81 , 809 88,010 489,607 I Oi, 164 
1970 186, 190 78,513 107,429 481,192 193,910 
1971 208, I 06 76,347 80,814 371,024 182,213 
1972 264,713 76,524 94,976 521,344 175,883 
1973 329,91 I 76,408 97,200 670,077 239, 166 
Source Central Bank of Libya, The Economic Research Division, 
Economic Bulletin, Tripoli, Vol. 13, No. 12, Oct-Dec 1973. 
Marsa EI-Brega was sel~cted as a site for the refinery for 
three reasons. First, because it was a crude oil-gathering centre 
from which supplies could be drawn. Second, because of the various 
services available at the terminal. Third, the terminal was under 
the control of the company which owns the refinery. The refinery, 
which started in 1967, could refine up to 8,000 barrels of crude oi I 
each day. A comparison between its production and the local consumption 
<Table 3.11) shows that the production is sti II not enough to meet the 
rapidly expanding local market. Up to 1972, the refinery produced less 
than half of the nation's requirement of super gasoline, kerosene and 
naphtha. 
The second major refinery at EI-Zawia has a capacity of 60,000 
barrels per day of crude oi I. The pI ant, which cost LD 25 mi I I ion, was 
started in 1971 by the National Oi I Corporation. The reason was to 
meet the increase in local consumption. The plant now includes also 
a lubricating oi I plant with a production of about 220,000 barrels per 
year. Therefore the area might be a big petro-chemical industrial 
complex in the future. 
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Tab I e 3~ I I The Percentage Of Output-, F-r._om Loca•I,~<RefLQed .Pro,dud? 
cz=:= 
Kind of .Production ... %to the local consumption 
Super Gasoline 39 
Regular Gasoline 56 
l<:erosene 48 
Naphtha 28 
Fuel Oi I I 00 
Source L.A.R. Tripoli lriterriatiorial Fair 1972, The International 
Department of The General Organization For Fairs, Tripoli, 1972 
No official reasons were given for the choice of this location 
far from the raw materials which come from Marsa EI-Brega and EI-Sidra 
by sea. However, there must be some official reason behind it. More-
over, the location might have some advantages over the location of 
terminals such as Marsa EI-Brega, for the following reasons : 
I. The location is in the centre of the Jeffra Plain, where a 
large agricultural programme was started, and 40 kms from the 
largest urbanized area in the country, Tripoli, so the location 
is market-oriented, which has some advantages. For example, 
it wi I I decrease the cost of transportation, because the cost 
of tanker freights are lower for crude cargo than for refined 
products. In this sense, the refinery wi I I supply the western 
part of Libya, while Marsa EI-Brega refinery supplies the 
eastern part of the country. 
2. The greater avai labi I ity of labour and lm1er wages in EI-Zawia 
than in EI-Brega, which is considered a desert camp involving 
high costs of transporting labourers. 
3. Its proximity to the western countries reducing the shipping 
cost of the pI ant and for spare parts, as we I I as the cost 
of maintenance. 
4. The location of this site might also avoid the problem of 
concentration of refining activities. 
5. A large amount of land is avai !able for future expansion. 
The area may be suggested for more petro-chemical industries; 
espec i a I I y the fert i I i ser industry with easy access to nearby 
agri cuI tura I I and where there w i I I be a I arge demand for 
fertilisers. 
6. The site wi I I be suitable in the future for using the crude oi I 
of the western part of the country (Zones I - 4), after the 
completion of the proposed pipelines of the west. 
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The rapid development of the oi I industry provides the government 
with significant revenues, thus giving it an opportunity, for the first 
time, to invest these funds in developing the economy. There is no 
doubt that the oi I industry has had its effects ,on mitigating the 
backwardness of the industry. Therefore, the following chapters wi II 
examine the impact of the oi I on the industry after 1964, as wei I as 
the industrial development policies adopted towards it. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MODERN EVOLUTION OF MANUFACTURING 
The immediate economic impact of the oi I industry was 
increased population and funds in the towns and increased per capita 
consumption due to higher disposable incomes among Libyans and 
f . . th . I . d t d I t d t. . t' (.I ) ore1gners serv1ng e 01 1n us ryan rea e ac lVI 1es. 
As a result there was a sudden increase in the demand for foodstuffs 
and manufactured goods. Thus, these might expectedly have led to 
significant expansion in Industrial production to meet this increased 
demand. 
The industrial manufacturing sector gained in importance 
in terms of number of workers and establishments. During the period 
1964-1971, the years between the two most recent Libyan censuses of 
manufacturing industries, various industries in Libya experienced 
phenomena I changes reI at i ng to I ocat ion and growth. During these 
seven years the overal I increase in total persons engaged in industry 
was about 7489 workers, 81 .I percent of the 1964 number. An 
important advance has been made by Libyan industry in the past decade, 
with the application of the social and economic development plans, as 
wei I as the introduction of the loan system. But, d i d every 
industrial group and industrial region expand at this rate of growth, 
or did some have a different rate? If so, which regions had the 
fastest rate, and which had the slowest? Which industrial group 
had a rapid growth rate, and which had a declining one? fvloreover, 
was the rate of growth and decline of these industrial groups the 
same, or different, in each of the regions? The purpose of this 
chapter is to answer these questions and to identify and contrast the 
types of change in industrial location and growth which took place in 
the country during this period. By using national and regional 
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manufacturing employment data for 1964 and 1971 it is possible to evaluate 
statistically the relative significance of a region's proportion of growth 
and decline industries and its particular structure. (2 ) 
Industrial change wi II be discussed in two sections. The first 
section wi I I discuss change in terms of the number of workers and establish-
ments throughout the industrial groups and various regions. The second 
section wi II discuss change in terms of value added and value added per 
worker, as wei I as the wages and salaries unit throughout the industrial 
groups. 
Before discussing the changes, it is worth noting that the 
information given by the 1964 census concerns the major regions (Muhafadat), 
not the sub-regions. Besides, the Muhafadat boundaries were changed in 
I 9 7 I ( F i g u re 4 • I ) • Two points, therefore, should be kept in mind : 
I. the comparative study of the change wi I I mainly concentrate 
on the major regions (Muhafadat), and 
2. since most southern regions are not important in terms of 
manufacturing industries, as shown later, and since most 
changes in the regional boundaries were in the south, a 
slight modification must be made to make the study more 
suitable and clear. 
The Ubari and Sebha Muhafadat of 1964 wil I be considered as one Muhafada 
in the 1964 figures, which is Sebha Muhafada of 1971. The new EI-Kaleg 
Muha fad a w i I I be exc I uded from the study s i nee it did not show any 
industrial significance, but its omission wi I I not affect the study. 
Fig. 4~ NEW ADMINISTRATIVE MUHAFADAT IN LIBYA 1971 
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I. INDUSTRIAL CHANGE IN TERMS OF ESTABLISHMENT AND WORKERS 
A. CHANGES IN INDUSTRIAL GROUPS 
The industry or region which grew the most between the two dates 
did not necessarily grow the fastest because there is a difference between 
the amount of growth and the rate of growth. Amount is measured in terms 
of increased numbers, while rate is measured in terms of percentage. There-
fore, this study wi I I consider both aspects of growth. A comparison of 
changes throughout the industrial groups between 1964-1971 is shown in 
Table 4.1. The industrial groups are as in the International Standard of 
Industrial Classification (I .S. I.C.) which is used for the study in Chapter 6, 
except for the clothes and pottery industries which change their groups 
between 1964 and 1971. The former separated from the textiles group and 
moved to the leather and shoes group, while the latter moved from the 
miscellaneous group to the bui I ding materials and non-metal I ic group. 
In spite of the fact that there is a net increase of 7489 workers during 
this period, with about 81 percent general growth, it is quite obvious that 
the change is uneven. Certain industries gained more workers, while others 
showed a decline, but the growth and decline are not at the same rate. 
As far as the rate of growth is concerned, it can be seen from 
Table 4. I that four of the industrial groups grew at a rate greater than 
the national average. These were the food, soft drinks and tobacco, 
leather, clothes and shoes, wood and furniture and metal work groups. 
On the other hand, four industrial groups actually declined either in 
numbers of workers or establishments, namely textiles, paper and printing, 
chemicals and miscellaneous. 
The wood and furniture group, especially the carpentry industry, 
was the fastest growing manufacturing group. It expanded at a rate of 
265 percent, exceeding by more than three times the national rate of growth. 
Table 4.1 Change In Number Of Industrial .rorkers And Establ ishmentS'Anorig 'tv'ejor Industrial Groups, 1964-1971. 
Workers Estab I i shments 
Net total Net total 
Industria I group 1964 1971 emp I oyment % of 1964 1971 establishment % of 
· · .shi.ff shift shift shift 
I • Food, soft drinks and tobacco 3235 8149 + 4914 + .151. 9 142 364 I + 222 + 156.3 
2. Text i I es 565 503 - 62 - II. 0 19 17 - 2 - I 0. 5 
3. Leather, Shoes and clothes 134 308 + 174 + 129.9 8 16 + 8 + I 00.0 
4. Paper and printing 773 5-43 - 230 - 29.8 21 33 + 12 + 57. I 
5. Wood and furniture 551 2013 + 1462 + 265.3 63 201 I + 138 I+ 219.0 
6. Chemicals 1718 1010 - 708 - 41 .2 141 39 - 102 - 72 .. 3 
7. Sui I ding materials and non-
meta II ic 1877 3198 + 1321 + 70.4 92 153 ) + 61 + 66.3 
8. Meta I work 346 956 + 610 + 176.3 26 73 I + 47 I+ 180.8 
9. M isee I I aneous 35 43 +· 8 + 22.9 7 6 - I - 14.3 
Total 9234 16723 + 7489 + 81 • I 519 902 + 383 + 73.8 
* Electrical machinery and transport equipment repairs subtracted from this group because they were excluded 
from the 1971 census. 
Sources: (I ) Census and Statist i ca I Dept., · Industria t Census of· 1964, Tri poI i i 1965. 
(2) Computed by author from data in I.R.C. tndostrial Establishments Census 1971, Tripoli, 1972. 
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IJl 
76 
This boom in the wood and furniture group has given it the third largest 
share in the industrial structure of the country. It represented about 
6 percent of the country's manufacturing workers in 1964, but by 1971 
this proposition had increased to about 12 percent. As mentioned above, 
the boom of new projects for bui I ding and construction v1as due to the 
changed I iving standards involving new types of building and furniture, as 
wei I as the demand for modern decorations. 
The pub I ic sector had a remkarable expansion in terms of building 
and construction in the last decade. During the 1963-1969 development 
plans, about LD 480 mi I I ion were spent for this sector, including about 
450 large projects, and 15,000 residential dwelling units, besides other 
projects constructed in developing the cities of Beda and EI-Marg. Between 
1969 and 1973 the number of construction and building projects was even 
more remarkable; about 51,681 residential dwel I ing units were constructed 
in various regions in the country. 
Figures which are available show that the private sector witnessed 
the same expansion. In Tripoli, for example, the total bui It area 
constructed per annum increased from 73,416 sq metres in 1956 to about 
(3) * 105,182 sq metres in 1968 Most of the demand for doors, windows, 
decorations and furniture for these units was from local industries. 
Furthermore, I oca I production was cheaper than foreign production, due 
to the ease of importing materials such as wood, plastic, nai Is and other 
materials required by this industry.Carpentry is one of the simplest 
industries which does not require a high capital investment. It is also 
characterized by industrial workers requiring only a I imited education and 
training. The fact that the tot a I imports of art i c I es produced from wood 
* This area excludes the total area. which was completed 
without permission from the Municipality. 
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declined after 1967 (Figure 4.2) indicates that the remarkable growth 
for this group occurred after that date. 
Some of the reasons mentioned previously, besides the increased 
demand for agricultural tools, modern housing articles and furniture, 
also explain the rapid growth of the metal work industry. 
The food, soft drinks and tobacco industrial group ranks third 
with 152 percent grO\'Ith, about twice the national i-ate. The actual 
increase rate for this would have been 158 percent but for the closure of 
four establishments which produced wine, beer and alcohol. They were 
discontinued for rei igious reasons, as Mus I ims are forbidden to drink or 
se I I a I coho I • In 1970 these four establishments employed 180 workers 
and produced more than six mi I I ion I itres of these different drinks. 
This industry in general is labour-intensive and is not heavily dependent 
on highly ski lied workers. 
Although the leather, shoe and clothes group showed a relatively 
rapid growth as a whole, the leather industry was stable, and the shoe 
industry declined, vo~hi le clothes had a high rate of growth : 208 workers, 
67.5 percent of the group's workers joined the clothes industry after 1964. 
The decline in the shoe industry was mainly due to lack of protection, as 
* wei I as to foreign competition. One result was the failure of the Mara 
Shoe Factory in Benghazi and its closure in 1964. 
Bui !ding materials, with a 70 percent growth rate, showed slow 
growth compared with the wood industry. This may be attributed to 
technological change, as the industry became partially mechanized, 
especially in new establishments such as the cement factories in Benghazi 
and Homes. 
* The Industrial Census of 1971 pub I ished in 1973 estimated the 
average price of the leather sho~s produced locally at 
LD 1.400 and those imported at LD 1.470. 
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As far as dec I i ne is concerned, it has been shown that three 
industrial groups experienced a substantial decline during this period. 
This decline would have been more dramatic if one assumed that these groups 
achieved the lowest growth rate, which is 22.9 percent in the miscellaneous 
group. Thus, if each of these groups had achieved the national industrial 
growth rate, there would have been an increase of about 458 workers in 
textiles, 626 workers in paper and printing, and 1392 workers in chemicals. 
Therefore, each group's comparative loss in relation to the lowest growth 
rate is about 192,407 and 1101 workers respectively. In terms of decline 
also, three groups of industries witnessed a decline in numbers of workers, 
while only two groups declined in the case of the number of establishments 
if we exclude the miscellaneous group. 
The chemical group shows a sharper decline in the number of 
establishments than in the number of workers. This may be because new 
establishments tend to be larger and more capital-intensive because smal I 
establishments cannot compete with the new modern ones, and they fai I to 
continue in operation, and because some establishments are affected by 
foreign competition, especially cheap articles from Japan, such as batteries, 
plastic and rubber items. Good examples are the failure of the Nasr 
Battery and the Plastic Shoe factory in Benghazi. 
Although the paper and printing group experienced nearly a one-third 
decrease in the number of workers, the number of establishments increased 
by more than half during this period. This may be attributed to a gradual 
decrease in the size of each establishment, and the growth of new smal I 
ones, combined with a change in operational techniques to become more 
capital-intensive. The expansion of commercial centres may have encouraged 
the Large establishments to set up new smaller branches, since the printing 
industry is considered to be market-orientated. 
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The textile industry was one of the old and common industries in 
Libya, and the change from old traditional establishments to new modern 
capital-intensive ones might be the main explanation for the decrease in 
the number of workers and establishments in this group of industry. 
Although the percentag~of national net establishments and workers change 
by industrial groups over this period (Figure 4.3), it is clear that six 
of the nine groups are clustered within a fairly narrow range of percentage 
change, between -6.2 and 17.2 percent in the case of workers, and between 
-2 and 28.2 percent in the case of establishments. In order to clarify 
the percentage changes for these industrial groups in terms of change in 
establishments and workers, four industrial groupings may be made : 
I. Groups which experience growth in both establishments and workers 
A. Food, soft drinks and tobacco ( I l 
B. Leather, shoes and clothes ( I I I l 
c. Wood and furniture ( v) 
D. Bu i I ding materials and non-metal I ic (VI I l 
E. Metal work (VI I I l 
2. Group which experienced growth in workers and decline in establishments 
A • Pap e r an d p r i n t i n g (IV l 
3. Group which experienced decline in workers and growth in establishments 
A. Textiles ( I I l 
4. Group which experienced decline in both workers and establishments 
A. Chemicals (VI l 
establishments change 
in percent 
w 
• 
60 70 80 
workers change 
in percent 
Figure. 4·3 Percentage of National Net Establishments 
Qnd Worl<ers Change by Industrial groups 
1961.- 1971. 
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B. CHANGES IN SIZE OF ESTABLISHMENTS 
Because of the absence of figures on the proportion of workers in 
each category in the Industrial Census of 1964, the study of the changes 
in the size of establishments in this period wi I I be based on the 
distributional pattern of establishments classified by three categories. 
Those with 5- 19 workers are labelled 'small 1 , those with 20- 49 workers 
'medium', and establishments with 50 workers or more 'large'. Although 
it provides I imited interest, it is obvious from Table 4.2 that there was 
a varied rate of proportional growth among categories. The large and 
smal I categories showed higher than average rates of growth, with a slightly 
greater proportional increase in the case of large categories. Medium-
sized establishments showed a slow growth. However, keeping in mind the 
fact that the I 964 Census inc I uded I 03 estab I i shments dea I i ng with machinery 
and transportation, which the 1971 Census does not include, and most of them 
are small in size, it can be deduced that the proportional growth of the 
smal I category is greater. 
Table 4.2 Change In The Number Of Industrial Establ ishrilerits By Size 
.. In Libya; I 964_;.1 97 I· 
Size of Net total % of total 
Estab I i shment 1964 1971 of shift shift. 
Sources 
Small 508 749 + 241 47.4 
Medium 77 98 + 21 27.3 
Large 37 55 + 18 48.6 
.Tota I 622. 902 + 280 45.0 
(I) Census and Statistical Dept., Industrial Census 1964, 
Tr i poI i, 1965. 
(2) Computed by author from data in I.R.C. 
··Industrial Establ ishmerits CEtnsus 1971, Tripoli, 1972. 
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The growth in the large category in this period may be due to the 
setting up of new government establishments such as the cement factory 
in Homes and the furniture factory in Tripoli. In addition, the government 
encouraged the private sector, making available to them unlimited loans. 
The substantial changes which occurred may also be because some establish-
ments began to take advantage of economies of scale. However, the proport-
ional number of workers for the large ca~egory ln 1971 has been reckoned at 
46.9 percent and for the smal I category as 36.9 percent of the total number. 
In addition, the 1971 Census showed that eleven of the establishments which 
employed more than one hundred workers were set up after 1964. Accordingly, 
one can imagine that most of the expansion in the numbers of workers during 
this period was the large category. 
It is probable that a high proportion of the new smal I establishments 
occurred in the food, soft drinks and tobacco, and wood and furniture groups. 
This is because both of these increased in the number of establishments, 
yet the former showed a decline in the average number of workers per 
establishment, from about 23 per establishment in 1964 to about 22 percent 
in 1971, while the latter sti I I has the lowest average per establishment. 
In these groups, because many have some unpaid members of the family, 
smal I establishments are usually able to remain in operation, and they 
serve smal I local markets (e.g. bakers, dairies, and ice cream merchants), 
or operate as sub-contractors. This type of establishment may have an 
effect on the economy of the country because they operate in an inefficient 
manner and are traditionally organized. Therefore a large number of 
establishments with u low industrial potential should be consolidated. 
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C. CHANGES IN OWNERSHIP 
Table 4.3 reveals that during the period under review sole 
proprietorship recorded the highest increase, of about 94 percent, 
while co-operative companies decreased sharply. State-owned (pub I ic 
sector) and joint-stock companies had a slight absolute increase. 
Keeping in mind that the co-operative and joint-stock companies are 
mainly considered as private, because most of the partners are in8ividual 
traders, it means that the private sector sti II showed a greater increase 
than the pub I ic sector, and the public sector was sti I I very weak. In 
addition, some of these pub I ic establishments were shifted to government 
control due to the departure of the Americans and the ltal ians, such as 
Table 4.3 Change In The Ownership Of Industrial Establishments, 
. 1964-1971. 
No. of Change in no. of 
Estab I i shments Estab I i shments 
Ownership type 1964 1971 No. % 
Sole proprietorship 367 710 343 93.5 
Co-operative company 188 123 - 65 - 34.6 
Joint-stock company 49 52 3 6. I 
State-owned 10 17 7 70.0 
Unknown .8 .8 
Tota I 622 902 280 45.0 
Sources (I) Census and Statistical Dept., Industrial Census 1964, 
Tripoli, 1965. 
( 2 ) Computed by author f rom data i n I • R. C. I n dust r i a I 
Establishments Census, 1971, Tripoli, 1972. 
the milk factory at Auguba Base (Wheelus Base). However, this trend in 
the private sector can be explained by the industrial development pol icy 
before 1970, as wi I I be seen in Chapter five. The data in the table show 
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also that the co-operative and joint-stock company establishments, 
which are wei 1-organjzed in other countries, are tending to disappear in 
Libya, and so the government should encourage this system to incite 
more private capital to enter the sector. 
D. CHANGES IN REGIONAL PATTERNS 
The different regions <Muhafadatl also showed varied types of 
change. In terms of abso I ute numbers of workers, Tab I e 4 • .4· revea Is that 
six muhafadat show an increase,whi le three muhafadat experienced decline. 
The industrial muhafadat which grew the most were Tripoli, Benghazi and 
EI-Zawia Muhafadat, especially Tripoli. These were the only regions to 
gain more than 950 workers. Furthermore, these muhafadat contributed 
a total growth of 5,171 workers, or about 92 percent of the nation's 
total growth. 
The Homes, Gebel Akhdar and Sebha Muhafadat were the regions 
where losses were registered. The largest loss was in Homes where the 
number of industrial workers decreased by 1970, followed by Sebha, 82, 
and Gebel Akhdar, 43 workers. The location of Homes between Tripoli and 
Misurata Muhafadat, the migration of young people from the south, and the 
change of the government headquarters in 1969 from Beda, might be the 
important reasons for these three dec I ines. It may also be suggested 
that there is a direct relationship between the growth of population and 
of the industrial workers in the muhafadat. The area extending from 
Tajora in the east to Zuara and Nalut in the west, including Tripoli; 
Azizia, Ben-Ghashir, EI-Zawia and Sabratha, is the area which had the 
largest increase in industrial workers, about 3675, nearly two-thirds 
of the nation's total growth. 
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Furthermore, Table 4.4 also shows that at the end of this period 
in 1971 the pattern of distribution of the industrial workers was similar 
to the distribution of absolute growth, especially in the first four 
muhafadat. One can conclude that the muhafadat which gained the most 
workers were those which had the largest number of workers. However, the 
various changes in the regions during this period affected the order of 
the regions in terms of numbers of workers; for example, Homes lost its 
third place to EI-Zawia, while the Misurata region moved ahead to fourth 
place behind EI-Zawia, overtaking Homes and Derna which ranked fifth and 
sixth, respectively, in 1971. 
As far as relative growth is concerned, Figure 4.4 emphasizes 
four types of groups : 
(a) those which grew at a high rate 
(b) those which grew at a moderate rate 
(c) those which grew at a rate less than the national rate 
(d) those which lost a number of workers. 
In group (a) EI-Zawia is the nation's most rapidly growing industrial 
region, registering about 325 percent growth in the intercensal period. 
This might be explained by reasons referred to above, and it might also 
benefit from proximity to Tripoli. It is followed by Misurata, with 
210 percent growth. The gradual build-up of state-owned establishments 
in Zletin and Jofra provides the reason for Misurata 1 s growth, and it 
might also be maintained that some industrial workers were moved from 
Homes to Misurata. The regions which had a moderate rate of growth (b) 
are Benghazi, Gharian and Derna, with rates of 86, 96 and 67 percent, 
respectively. Tripoli, with a 35 percent growth rate, is the only region 
whose growth was less than the national rate (c), while the last group (d) 
includes alI the other muhafadat. Moreover, the greatest percentage change 
THE RELATIVE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL WORKERS AMONG THE MUHAFADAT 1964-1971 
Fig.44 
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in industrial workers during the period meant relatively smal I numbers 
of workers, as they took place in centres which had smal I numbers of 
workers in 1964. For example, the outstandingly large percentage 
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increase in EI-Zawia and Misurata represented a smaller number of workers 
than in Tripoli and Benghazi. 
Although the industrial census of 1964 does not give the distribution 
of 't~orkers by i ndust ( i a i ~mups among the reg 1 ons, neverthe 1 ess s i nee 
the highest growth in numbers of workers was in the food, soft drinks and 
tobacco group, and as the table shows that the food group had a high 
proportion of industrial workers in 1971, in EI-Zawia and Misurata, one can 
suppose that the rapid growth in these two regions was mainly in the food, 
soft drinks and tobacco group. 
Comparing the net change in number of establishments with net 
change in the number of workers (Table 4,4) among the various muhafadat, 
it is clear that they are not directly related, largely because of the 
disproportionate influence of more large establishments in some muhafadat 
such as Tripoli and the smal I establishments in other muhafadat such as 
Sebha. One muhafadat, Homes, recorded a decline in both number of 
establishments and workers, and another, Gebel Akhdar, had a stable 
situation in terms of establishment, but a decline in terms of workers. 
Elsewhere, there was an increase in establishments in alI muhafadat, 
including Sebha and Ubari, whose total workers had tal len. The figures 
indicate, also, that Tripoli muhafadat, which recorded an outstandingly 
large increase in number of workers, recorded a relatively smal I increase 
in number of establishments, contrasting with Derna muhafadat which 
recorded a large increase in number of establishments and a relatively 
sma II increase in number of workers. There is no doubt that the 
muhafadat of Tripoli was a major attraction for large establishments. 
Table 4.4 Growth Of· Industry Among The Muhafadat In Libya, 1964~1971~ 
Estab I i shments Workers 
Net shift in Net shift in 
absolute abso I ute 
Muhafada 1964 1971 number 1964 Rank 1971 Rank number 
Tripoli 350 373 23 7,378 I 9,985 I 2,607 
Benghazi 96 238 142 1,850 2 3,446 2 1,596 
E 1-Zaw i a 24 80 56 298 4 1,266 3 968 
Misurata 26 52 26 230 6 712 4 482 
Homes 74 54 - 20 711 3 541 5 - 170 
De rna 23 53 
.30 238 5 397 6 159 
G. Akhdar 13 13 0 135 8 92 9 - 43 
Gharian II 20 9 81 9 159 7 78 
Sebha and Ubari 5 15 10 185 7 103 8 - 82 
Total 622 898 276 II, I 06 - 16,701 - 5,595 
Sources : ( I ) Census and Statistical Dept., Industrial Census 1964, Tripoli, 1965. 
(2) Computed by author from data in I .R.C. Industrial Establishments Census 1971, 
Tri poI i, 1972. 
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Tripoli, Benghazi and EI-Zawia had over 92 percent of the total 
increase in number of workers, and 80 percent of the total increase in 
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number of establishments during 1964-1971. With this in mind, the figures 
indicate that the government should take measures to help the development 
of Homes, Gebel Akhdar and Sebha Muhafadat, particularly to attract an 
equal share of the new employment in the growth industries, and to slow 
the rate of growth in Tripoli and Benghazi ~uhafadat. This continuous 
pattern of concentration of industrial growth in these two muhafadat 
during the 1960s reveals that there was no effective action taken by the 
government to influence the distribution of industry before 1971. 
To summarize, in Libya during the period under study, the food, 
soft drinks and tobacco, and the wood and furniture industrial groups, 
were the largest and the most rapidly growing industries. They boosted 
their share of Libyan industrial workers from about 35 percent and 6 per-
cent to about 49 percent and 12 percent, respectively. These facts refute 
the projection given by a U.N. industrial economist in his study of 
industrial development in Libya. (4 ) The study forecast that alI groups 
of manufacturing industries, with the exception of the textile group, 
would increase by 1973 (Table 4.5). These incorrect projections were 
based on growth of demand and the standard of I iving, and neglected other 
important human, social and political considerations. This reflects the 
difficulty in estimating industrial growth in Libya, and any study dealing 
with this should take alI these factors into consideration. Also, it 
should be emphasized that Tripoli and Benghazi experienced the largest 
growth in terms of the number of workers and establishments, while EI-Zawia 
registered the highest percentage growth. Rates of growth were more rapid 
in the north-western than in the north-eastern parts of the country. Finally, 
there was a higher growth in smal 1-scale industries, and most industries 
were in the private sector. 
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Table 4.5 Change In Number Of Workers, According To Vardjan's 
Projection By Industrial Groups, 1964-1973. 
No. of Projected no. No. of % 
lndustri al Group workers of workers shift workers of shift 
1964 1973 
Food, soft drinks and 
tobacco 3,235 4,960 1, ns 53.3 
Text i I es 565 I ,030 465 82.3 
Leather, shoes and 
clothes 134 290 156 116.4 
Paper and printing 773 I ,410 637 82.4 
Wood and furniture 551 1, no I, 219 221 .2 
Chemicals I, 718 2,760 I, 042 60.7 
Bui I ding materials and 
non-meta I I i c I ,877 4,330 2,453 130.6 
Metal work * 346 I ,260 914 264. I 
M isee I I aneous 35 50 15 42.9 
Total 9,234 17,860 8,626 93.4 
* Electrical, Machinery and transport equipment subtracted from this group. 
Source Vardjan,v: Manufecturirig Sector : T~ntetiV~ D~velo~~~nt 
· Progremm~ 1964...;.1973, Vol.l, Tripoli, March 1969. 
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2. STRUCTURAL CHANGES 
It may wei I be that the I inking of changes in number of workers 
with the change in value added and with workers' wages and salaries would 
produce the most satisfactory indicator of al 1-round growth in industry, 
better than one depending on only one variable, such as number of workers, 
which may not always be useful as a barometer of growth or decline of 
industry. For example, an appearance of stabi I ity in any industrial group 
may be due to change in both number of establishments and number of workers, 
or an appearance of rapid change may result from growth in one establishment 
in an otherwise stable industrial group. Therefore, a study of change in 
number of workers alone does not i I lustrate fully the relative importance 
of these manufacturing groups. 
This study attempts to discuss the relationship between changes in 
some of these variables among the various industrial groups. 
Table 4.6 sets out the data used in this study, while Table 4.7 
represents the relative percentage change in each of the variables under 
consideration. In general, despite the fact that the statistics are in 
current prices, some impression of the national characteristics of the 
industrial groups in terms of these variables can be gained from Table 4.7. 
Firstly, the manufacturing value added grew faster than any of the other 
variables during this period. It grew more than four times faster than 
the number of workers. Secondly, the wages earned increased more than 
the value added per worker, which means that the cost of workers increased 
during this period. This may be because of the degree of capital invest-
ment in some industries which required ski I led workers with high wages, but, 
in addition, the workers' wages and salaries increased threefold. The 
basic wage increased from LD 0.500 toLD I .500 as a result of government 
pol icy. 
Table 4.6 Change In Yalue Added, w:>rkers And \1'ages By lnd~st~ial Groups In libya, 1964-1971 (in_ Lo). 
Value added No. of workers 
Industrial Groups 
Food, soft drinks and tobacco 
Text i I es 
Leather, shoes and clothes 
Paper and printing 
Wood and furniture 
Chemicals 
Bui I ding materials and non-
meta IIi c 
Meta I work 
* 
1964 
2,571,924 
266,597 
35,059 
402,033 
26B, 113 
370,000 
926,744 
190,313 
197! 
12,718,000 
715,266 
146,997 
709 p 171 
2,037,156 
I, 788,504 
3,881,184 
I, 046,973 
1964. 
3235 
565 
134 
773 
551 
1,718 
~877 
346 
Total 5,030, 783 23,043,251 ~199 
Mean 628,848 . 2,880,406 Y.5o 
* Excludes the miscellaneous industry group 
1971 
8,149 
503 
308 
543 
2,013 
I ,010 
3,198 
956 
16,680 
2,085 
Value added 
per worker 
1964 
795 
472 
262 
520 
487 
215 
494 
550 
1971 
l,S·61 
I ~22 , 
477 
1,~306 
lpl2 
1)'71 
1:214 
1,~095 
Wages and salaries 
unit 
1964 1971 
738,428 3,378,151 
156,655 356,232 
27 I 581 I 4 7 I 084 
284,885 402,575 
147,257 1,267,550 
205,233 669,872 
608,926 2,644,451 
145,497 585,068 
3,795 
474 
9,858 2,314,462 9,450,983 
1232 289,308 1,181,373 
I 
Sources:l.Census and Statistical Dept., Industrial Census~ 1964, Tripoli, 1965. 
2.Computed by the authorfrom data in I.R.C. Industrial Establishment Census 1971, Tripoli, 1972~ 
and Industrial Census 1971, Tripoli, 1973. 
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Table 4.7 Percentage Changes In Some Variables In Libya Among 
The Various Industrial Groups; 1964-1971. 
%change in 
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Va I ue 
added 
No. of Value added Wages and salaries 
Industrial Group 
Food, soft drinks 
and tobacco 
Text i I es 
Leather, shoes and 
clothes 
Paper and printing 
Wood and furniture 
Chemicals 
Bui I ding materials 
Metal work 
Mean. 
394.5 
168.3 
319.3 
76.4 
659.8 
383.4 
318.8 
450. I 
358.0 
workers per worker 
151.9 96.4 357.5 
- I I. 0 20!. 3 127.4 
129.9 82. I 433.3 
- 29.8 151 .2 41.3 
265.4 I 07.8 760.8 
- 41.2 . 723.7 226.4 
70.4 145.7 334.3 
176.3 98.4 302. I 
81.3 159.9 308.3 
In terms of change within the various industries, results gathered 
from Table 4.7 point to some interesting and important facts. Firstly, 
there is an extremely wide range of growth rates among the different 
industrial groups. The wood and furniture groups had the highest rate of 
growth of total value added, followed by metal work, and these two groups 
also showed the highest rate of growth in numbers of workers. 
Comparing the different growth rates (by industrial groups) of 
workers and value added, it is obvious that in spite of reduction in the 
number of workers in some industries, they showed a marked increase in 
value added per worker; the chemical group showed a dramatic increase, 
more than three times that of the textile group, and ranked second. others 
that showed a marked growth in the number of workers had a growth in value 
added per worker less than the national rate of growth. 
An analysis of value added per worker and the wage unit among the 
various groups indicates that the chemicals, textiles and paper and printing 
stand in a unique situation. These groups registered both the highest 
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value added per worker, and the lowest growth in wages unit. Groups 
which had the lowest value added per worker registered the highest growth 
of wages unit. The change of wages unit in the wood and furniture group 
is more than three times that of the chemical group, and more than 18 times 
that of the paper and printing group. A comparison of these variables 
reveals several facts. Firstly, the chemicals, textiles and paper and 
printing groups recorded the highest productivity per worker and, secondly, 
since the number of workers decreased in these groups, and they achieved 
the lowest rate of growth in the wage unit, one can presume there was a 
capital-intensive trend in these groups during the period under consideration. 
Meanwhile, the food, soft drink and tobacco, leather, shoes and clothes, 
wood and furniture and metal work groups, with a high change in the number 
of workers, wage and salaries unit, and a low change in value added per 
worker, were sti I I mainly labour-intensive, using the traditional system 
of operation and equipment. 
In order to obtain further insight into industrial growth, and the 
difference between the patterns of growth in this period, it is advisable 
to apply some form of correlation analysis to these industrial variables. 
The results of these correlations are summarized in Table 4.8. It is clear 
from this table that in the case of the changes in value added and in 
numbers of workers, there is a positive correlation during the period. 
Those industries where value added increased more than average tended to 
achieve higher than average change in number of workers, except for the 
chemical group where the number of workers decreased. In contrast, 
industries with less than average increase in value added gained less than 
an average increase in number of workers. 
Turning to the change in value added per worker and in number of 
workers, the table indicates that the correlation is negative, and this 
is significant Cat 0.05). It means that the industries with an above-
Table 4.8 Matrix Correlation Of Changes In Some Variables In Industry 
lri Libya, 1964-1971. 
Value Value added Wages and 
Variables added Workers per worker salaries 
Value added 0.762 - 0.429 0.690 
Workers 0.762 - 0.738 0.762 
Value added per 
worker - 0.429 - 0. 738 - 0.714 
Wages and salaries 
unit 0.690 0.762 - 0. 714 
average increase in value added per worker tended to have a lower than 
average increase in the number of workers. 
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This result tal I ies with the relation between the change in value 
added per worker and wages unit. The correlation is statistically 
insignificant, but most of the industries which increased above the average 
in value added per worker tended to achieve the least rate of change in 
wages unit. It is clear that new production techniques were introduced 
for some industries, and it agrees with the previous results affecting 
industries such as chemicals, textiles and paper. But the benefits from 
technical progress were varied, the chemical group recording more benefit 
than other industries. 
So during this period those industries which achieved above average 
increase in value added per worker experienced below average increase in 
workers and in wages and salaries. On the other hand, industries which 
achieved a smal I increase in value added per worker tended to show that 
their workers and wages increased more than the average growth. 
To conclude, it can be seen that an expansion and growth of 
industry was evident in Tripoli and Benghazi. They were the only areas 
which recorded a substantia I increase in industria I workers, because they 
are in a good position to attract new industrial concerns with good 
growth prospects. The rapid growth of industry in these two muhafadat 
may shed I ight on the concentration problem and the future of regional 
planning (see Chapter nine). The chemical industry was the most 
successful industry during these years, and in spite of the decrease in 
its number of workers, it achieved the highest growth in productivity. 
The wood and furniture, metal work and food, soft drinks and tobacco 
groups, achieved a great increase in terms of workers, but a low rate 
in productivity per worker. These industries are sti II carried on in 
small-scale establishments with a traditional system. tvbreover, in 
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spite of general industrial growth, Libya's industrial growth was sti II 
slow during this period as a result of poor industrial policies. 
Finally, it seems that large establishments have grown rapidly in recent 
years, and this may be expected to continue in any future period of 
accelerated growth. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE GOVERNMENT ROLE FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION 
This chapter discusses industrial development and, in 
particular, the role of the government. The development of local 
industry by the government took two forms. On the one hand, laws 
were made which encouraged industries, and on the other hand, it 
financed and participated directly in production. Each of these 
aspects wi I I be discussed in separate sections. However, before 
discussing them it is important to throw I ight on how the industrial 
development pol icy was carried out during the period of the study to 
show to what degree the government was serious in this pol icy. 
I. MEASURES OF ENCOURAGEMENT 
A. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
The beginningsof Libyan government intervention in the economic 
development of the country date back to 1953,fol lowing the report of a 
U.N. Economic Survey Mission. This involved the expenditure of just 
over LD 18 mi I I ion and was confined to repair of war damage and improve-
ments in the most urgently needed basic faci I ities in agriculture, 
t t h I th d d t . ( I ) ranspor , ea an e uca 1on. In fact, the early years of the 
Libyan government saw I ittle positive action in economic development, 
and particularly in the industrial sector. 
The most important assistance in the industrial sector was 
attempted during the first comprehensive five-year development plan, 
1963-1968. After 1960, due to the increase of the oi I revenue, 
national economic planning began to evolve, but industrial pol icy in 
Libya before 1969 was very different from that since 1969, and this 
is reflected in the industrial development plan. Table 5. I reveals 
the big difference between the two approaches. In the period 1963-
1968 the industrial sector was allocated LD 14,J06,000, with a smal I 
3 percent share of the total planned investment. The table i I lustrates 
that the development plan for industry was directed towards the private 
sector which supported research and training, provided credit, and 
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established industrial estates. The government, as part of a deliberate 
pol icy, aimed at promoting the private sector, except in rare cases 
where it had to undertake a project or participate in it for special 
reasons, as it declared in the first 5-year plan : 
"The basic pol icy of the government is to encourage, 
whenever feasible, the maximum degree of private investment 
in the industrial sector of the economy. When state inter-
vention is deemed necessary, it is firmly held by the govern-
ment that its function is to assist and support infant industrial 
enterprises so that they may in due course become independent 
and self-sustaining undertakings within the private sector, 
functioning without further state intervention other than the 
normal regulatory functions of the state. 
In our country it is recognized that this process 
may require more time and more finance than in other more 
advanced economies, but the process should be the same and 
the final result be a vigorous, self-reliant private industry." ( 2) 
However, although the industrial share of the 1963-68 development 
plan was 3 percent, actual investment was more if we bear in mind the 
benefits which indirectly went to industry from investment in other 
sectors, for example, water supply, electricity and transportation 
(estimated at about LD 10.7 for water and LD 08.8 mi II ions for electricity) 
If we evaluate the development pol icy plan before 1969 we can conclude 
that industrial development was not a major target because in giving 
high priorities to agriculture and the infrastructure, it paid scant 
attention to industrial growth. Moreover, the need to build up 
basic infrastructure by constructing such things as roads, ports, 
airports, pub I ic bui I dings and pub I ic uti I ities greatly affected 
98 
Table 5. I The Industrial Development Plans, 1963-1973, According 
To Projects <LD , 000) , 
Project 1963-68 1968-69 I 969-70 197Q-71 1971-72 197.2_-73 
National Pub I ic Organization 
of Industrialization 6,445 20,700 35,510 
2 Industrial Estates 797 
3 Industrial Research 89 
10,095 
183 
794 
2 I I I 7 
258 
150 340 345 600 988 
4 Industrial Credit 6,000 
100 
195 
89,7 
6,000 II ,500 9,000 8,800 
5 Strengthening Mineral 
6 Fisheries Development 435 I I 698 700 700 
7 Establishing Industries 
8 Developing Traditional 
Industries 
9 Encouraging Industry 
10 Industrial Training 631 .I 00 
725 
80 
280 
92 
400 
570 
430 
620 
2,330 
Total 14,706 7,700 7,860 20,480 32,000 48,948 
Sources: I. Ministry of Planning, ·Industrial Development Plans, 
unpub I i shed. 
2.li.D.C.A.S. Industrial Development Directory 
Arab League, Cairo, 1970, p. 22. 
Libya, 
the allocation of capital expenditure in the development plan. And 
even in the industrial sector the state was not concerned with direct 
participation, and the funds for some projects were spent in other ways; 
for example, the industrial estate allocation was spent on bui I ding 
houses in Benghazi and Misurata for traditional handicrafts. Moreover, 
industrial credit was mostly spent in real estate, as we wi I I see later. 
This might be excusable because of the lack of experience of the 
government in industrialization, and entrepreneurs can realize easily 
which projects are profitable. But this does not seem valid in the case 
of Libya, a state with a large quantity of capital, because depending on 
the private sector, which is unable to promote industrial development, 
wi I I not produce the best result for industrialization. The private 
sector's inadequate investment in industry may be attributed to the 
weakness of the incentive laws and to the great success achieved by 
others in trade and real estate, which do not need ski I led labour, 
and give a high and quick profit. Even private investment may be 
concentrated on one type of industry which has high prot its, wh i I e 
other industries which make use of a valuable natural resource but 
with low profits wi II not develop. Besides, the private sector wi I! 
not be concerned about the social benefit for the region involved, so 
some regions wi I I be neglected. 
It might be said that the government was busy during this 
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period developing an infrastructure and public works for future industrial 
development, but that does not excuse it from neglecting direct aid to 
industry, because it was in a situation to do very much more in the way 
of direct participation in industry, without seriously reducing expenditure 
on infrastructure. Consequently, the private sector played a major role 
in industry before 1969, and particu~arly during the last six years, when 
it sponsored a programme of I iberal credit for private entrepreneurs. 
It can be seen from Table 5. I that after 1969 industrial development 
increased remarkably, and the pub I ic sector began to receive more attention. 
The National Public Organization of Industrialization (N.P.O.I.) was 
established with a large share of the total industrial plan (as we shall 
see), and the Industrial Research Centre ( I.R.C.) was established as well. 
This change in emphasis can be explained on the grounds that the pub I ic 
sector did not receive enough attention during the previous years, and 
as a positive reaction of the government towards industrialization. 
The regime which came to power following the revolution of 1969 
introduced certain measures which had a direct effect on industry. The 
most important changes were in the share of industry in the development plan, 
and i~ industrial pol icy. The share of the industrial sector in the plan 
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was increased from 3 to 10 percent in 1970-71 and to 15 percent in 1972-73, 
thus moving it to first rank in the economic sectors, followed by agriculture at 
14.2 percent. The aim was to achieve progress at a compound rate of 
14.5 percent for the non-oi I economic sector, while the anticipated 
( 3) 
expansion for the mineral and oi I sector was 2.5 percent annually. 
The new pol icy aimed to stress the strong role and responsibi I ity 
of the government in promoting the pub! ic sector. The industria! pol icy 
of 1970 as declared in the official resolution can be summarized as 
(4) 
to I I ows. The public sector was to carry on the essential industries 
and those which required investment on a large scale which only the state 
could provide, as wei I as those medium-size industries which also required 
considerable capital and were of a highly complex nature. Sma I I projects 
producing consumer goods for the demand of the market, and depending on 
Jess complicated machinery, would be left to the initiative and enterprise 
of the private sector. Foreign minority participation was permitted only 
in industries uti I izing the latest technology or producing for the export 
markets. 
Consequently, the pol icy was a mixture of state intervention and 
private enterprise. State control was extended more widely and more 
deeply than would be considered desirable in a capitalist or free-
enterprise type of economy; at the same time, there was a greater 
rei iance on productive activities than would be considered appropriate 
in a socialist society. This means that the government followed the 
same pol icy as many African states, which is described as African 
S . I . ( 5) oc1a 1sm. 
Despite the fact that in a theoretical sense the pub I ic and 
private sectors were complementary, there was not a balance between the 
two sectors. For the private sector, the pol icy sti I I concentrated on 
providing financial loans, at this time limited toLD 60,000, while 
the funds for the public sector are unlimited, and industrial research 
0 
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was avai !able for the pub I ic sector only. It did not show any kind of 
co-operation such as pub I icly supplying standardized components and 
primary materials and leaving the final production to the private sector. 
Some state-owned industries which are now under construction or under 
investigation are similar to some private industries such as tomato 
canning, soft drinks production and flour mi II ing. Moreover, s i nee 
state-owned industries are run on a large or medium scale, and so can 
offer high salaries, they wi I I attract workers from the private sector. 
The adoption of such a pol icy for industrial development may therefore 
lead in the long run to the destruction of the private sector. 
B. EXEMPTION FROM TAXES AND TARIFF PROTECTION 
The first step by the government to stimulate the industrial 
sector in recent years was the Law of 1956 which was amended in 1961. 
It gives grant incentives for existing and newly established industries 
with an instal led source of power of not less than 10 h.p. and employs 
at least 10 workers. (6 ) These incentives were : 
I. The exemption of all industry from taxes, including income tax 
for a period of five years from the commencement of production. 
2. Exemption from property tax for a period not exceeding ten years. 
3. Exemption from duty of the raw materials, machines, equipment 
and spare parts required by the industrial establishment for 
production purposes, for a period not exceeding five years. 
It is obvious that despite this law, with its exemptions, the 
inducements do not amount to much, and could not provide a significant 
or desirable amount of assistance to infant industries. Income tax 
is low, only 13 percent, and, in fact, many establishments do not pay it, 
owing to the lack of a strong administrative system. The exemptions, 
especially from tax, are for a short period of time, if compared with 
the period in Iraq, which is six years, or Kuwait, Mexico and Brazi I, 
( 7) 
where it is up to ten years. It excludes establishments which 
employ less than ten workers. The exemption procedure is complicated, 
requiring applications from each establishment needing exemption, and 
102 
a long time passes from the fi II ing in of the application to the announce-
ment of the government's decision, due to the complicated set of rules 
and procedures. Many entrepreneurs have found themselves paying the 
rates before getting exemption permission. Furthermore, the raw 
materials exemption has been applied within strict I imits in order to 
avoid misuse by the entrepreneurs because some imported materials, I ike 
cement, flour, wood and paper, are semi-manufactured and are used either 
in industry or for final consumption. Up to the middle of the 1960s, 
the taxes and tariffs were very important to the Libyan revenue, and a 
large materials exemption was very costly. 
As for tariff protection, this is a wei 1-known pol icy for 
promoting infant industries in most developing countries. It is 
generally recognized that industry in Latin America and in Asian countries 
has developed in an atmosphere free from competition from imported goods. 
However, in Libya the Tariff Law No. 59 of 1957 was ineffective, due to 
inflationary pressure. Moreover, it appears that the government was 
not serious in its concern to protect industry, as is clear from the 
fa i I ure of many estab I i shments which cou I d not compete with foreign 
production. In addition, some of the leading government officials 
were involved directly or indirectly in the commercial sector and they 
did not desire the progress of industrialization, which would injure 
their businesses. In 1968, Tariff Law No. 38 of 1968 replaced the 
1957 Law. It increased the duties on a number of manufactured goods 
by rates ranging from 5 to 40 percent; some were subject to import 
I icences, and others were banned. Because of this law, a Tariff 
Committee was set up for protection, with the result that others were 
protected in 1971. Even so, some respondents interviewed stated that 
many industries sti I I face severe foreign competition. The manager of 
a new shoe establishment (public) stated that competition with foreign 
products is one of the problems affecting the success of the establish-
( 8) 
ment. This may be partly because tariffs for all imports of 
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industrial goods are relatively low, and partly because of the inflexibi I ity 
of local industrial production. The government was later forced to 
exempt some industries supplying the same goods to the consumer at lower 
prices, such as milk, salt and tomato paste. 
It is doubtful whether without any protection, countries such 
as Libya can succeed industrially and compete with foreign industries 
which have long experience. Any procedural aids for domestic industry 
wi I I certainly be justified, but the question is, which kind of protection 
should industry have? Tariffs, bans, quotas, or a subsidy system? It 
should be bor~ein mind that these incentives have their dangers, under 
conditions such as exist in Libya, where the market is smal I and only one 
or two large establishments can represent the market. 
A tariff system encourages monopolies and exploitation, especially 
when the leading industrialists are wei I known to each other and can very 
easily arrange to maintain high prices with low quality. In a short 
time it might injure other domestic sectors, for example, the high price 
of ferti I izers may affect the cost of agricultural goods. Another fact 
should be kept in mind; introducing a protective tariff for particular 
articles means raising the price to the consumer, whether they are manu-
factured locally or abroad. This system might be acceptable if local 
industry supplied the whole domestic market. But when I oca I industry 
supplies only part of the market, why should the consumers pay a higher 
price for those articles that wi I I continue to be imported? (g) 
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A system banning imports may not improve the quality of production, 
as Adams noticed 
"The phi I osophy of e I i m i nat i ng imports rather than 
working for efficient production and improved quality is 
contagious, and is evident in the private sector of the 
economy also. Private producers come to expect the 
government to protect their market by means ranging from 
high duties to outright prohibition on imported competing 
products. (I 0) 
The Quota system used in many countries to protect industry by 
I imiting the volume of imports can lead to corruption through importers 
who may secure high prices by creating scarcity. Direct government 
subsidy in I ieu of protection, with an equivalent amount paid directly 
to the local manufacturers for each article produced, shifts the cost 
of production from the consumer to the government. This system appears 
to be ineffective in Libya. The subsidy may be higher than the actual 
cost, either because entrepreneurs declare false bi 1 Is or, in the case of 
estimates, the decision of the officers may be affected by considerations 
of fairness and other arbitrary personal prejudices and contacts. 
Despite all of these dangers, there is no alternative and Libya 
should have special protection, suited to its circumstances. One might 
go farther and suggest that it should have two kinds of protection. For 
industries whose productive capacity is sufficient for local demands, 
banning imports seems the most reasonable system. In the case of 
industries where local demand is more than its production capacity, a 
quota system might apply to fi I I the gap. But to avoid the dangers 
of these two systems of protection, a highly qualified committee must 
be set up to control carefully applications for protection. In both 
cases the committee should control the quality and the price of the 
local product and its price level as compared with imported substitutes, 
so as to know whether any protected industry is becoming more or less 
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efficient. In the latter case the committee should project the volume 
which must be imported for each industrial item, after carefully 
estimating further demand and local production of the item. The committee 
should know that efforts at protecting in the short run are not enough for 
some industries since infant industries take time to assimilate new 
techniques and operate them efficiently. 
It is true that such measures can be costly and may lead to some 
waste in capital, but in Libya the supply of capital is elastic, and the 
waste may be absorbed if one considers the l.ong-term benefits of industrial-
ization. The government could compensate for the reduction in tax revenue 
from the industrial sector by increasing taxes on land, real estate, 
commerce and construction. 
C. FOREIGN INVESTMENTS 
Although Libya has enough money for investment, foreign capital 
should be encouraged to enter the country to stimulate private investment. 
This is because Libya is sti II in the stage when it must look to foreign 
companies to carry out some projects affecting industrial development. 
It is obvious that attracting foreign investments to this field brings 
many advantages, such as foreign technical ski I I and experience, and the 
bridging of the gulf between the existing techniques in Libya and those 
attained by highly organized industries abroad. Besides, it would bring 
a new administrative and management system, and could also expand the 
market abroad. 
The government introduced a law in 1958 regulating foreign capital 
investment in the country which was replaced by another in 1968. (I 1) 
The I aw exc I uded the o i I industry, which was the subject of a spec i a I I aw, 
and provided many exemptions for any enterprise with a paid-up capital 
of at least LD 200,000 and with at least 51 percent foreign investment 
I. exemption from customs duties on imported machinery, tools, 
equipment, spare parts and raw materials uti I ized by these 
enterprises for a period of five years. 
2. exemption from income tax for a period of five years. 
In spite of alI this, there is no sound basis for foreign 
capita I invested recent I y in industry. This may be explained by the 
I imitation of the market, and a fear of nationalization such as has 
happened in other countries in the Middle East. The International Bank 
Mission recommended that : 
"The government should do everything possible to 
clarify its intentions with regard to foreign investment (l 2 ) 
and to cla:rrup any prevai I ing doubt or misunderstanding." 
To get benefit from foreign capital, a suitable atmosphere 
must be generated by guarantees, because foreign capital wi I I not enter 
the country unt i I it is certain that the reward w i I I be great. The 
guarantees should refer to : 
(a) The remittance of profits and repatriation of capital. 
(b) No nationalization for a fair period of time, and when 
nationalization occurs, fair and equitable compensation. 
(c) Subsidies for exporting part of the production. 
Such guarantees may manage to attract some foreign companies to establish 
branches in Libya. 
D. THE INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH CENTRE (I~R.C.) 
Research into modern industry is an important factor in its 
growth and development. The role of research is not only important 
in the profitabi I ity of possible new industries and in attracting 
industrialists to start such industries, but it is also a duty of 
government. (I 3) The role of the government in Libya in this field 
wi I I now be evaluated. 
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I.R.C. was created in 1970 in order to improve industrial 
research and technical assistance, and to recommend to the public and 
private sector the best way of developing industry. The creation of 
this centre was another step forward in helping the country reach its 
goal of industrialization. The function of this body is best explained 
. ( 14) by its statutes, which may be summarized as follows : 
(a) Conducting either directly or through other parties researches 
and studies relating to the establishment of new industries, 
including the feasibi I ity of industrial projects, methods, 
and their priority; 
(b) Carrying out the researches and studies necessary for developing 
programmes and submitting to the authorities concerned suggestions 
and recommendations in this respect, whether governmental or 
private; 
(c) providing technical assistance to existing and planned industries, 
covering equipment, operation and management of the establishment, 
improving the productivity and the quality of the production, as 
well as diversifying and marketing their products; 
(d) Studying the quality and quantity of the country 1 s mineral 
resources and the possibi I ity of using them as raw materials 
for industry. 
The centre, during its short I ife, has made a number of 
contributions to industry, such as surveying existing industries, making 
deta i I ed feas i b iIi ty studies for severa I industries in the pl!Jb I i c sector, 
and studying various mineral resources. However, it is clear from 
evaluation of its achievements that it has been used as an investment 
for pub I ic industries, and this is only a I imited objective, other 
objectives being neglected. This may be because it is sti II in an 
early stage, because of the large number of projects planned by N.P.O. I. 
at this time, and because its technical staff is smal I. In these 
circumstances, the I.R.C. cannot play a significant role in the promotion 
of industry. 
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Smal I private establishments cannot afford to spend capital on 
research, but most of the new entrepreneurs in industry are ex-merchants 
who are faced with the problem of not knowing in which industry to invest. 
Besides, in a world where continuous changes occur both in processes and 
products, the adoption of new techniques and products in the Libyan 
environment is as important as developing new raw materials. Leaving 
private industrialists to choose their projects without complete feas-
ibi I ity studies and advice may bring undesirable results. For example, 
they might choose labour-intensive techniques for their establishments 
when capital-intensive methods might be more appropriate. Most private 
investment has been made in industries which have succeeded in the past, 
so that investment in new ones has been I imited. This has tended to 
build up some industries, while others have disappeared. 
Offering services to the private as wei I as the pub! ic sector, 
making market studies for proposed industries, giving technical help and 
advice and helping in many other ways such as in selecting techniques-
a! I this could aid industrial development. 
Besides the incentives mentioned above, many others have been 
provided by the government, such as reducing the electricity rate by 
50 percent, and encouraging fishermen by paying for a large amount of 
new equipment. This addition to financial loans and direct particip-
ation wi I I be discussed in the following section. 
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2. INDUSTRIAL FINANCE AND DIRECT PARTICIPATION 
The aims of this section are : 
(a) to discuss the role of financial institi!Jtions in providing 
industrial finance to the private and the public sectors; 
(b) to analyze the importance of the contribution which the financial 
system might be able to make in the promotion of industrial 
development; and 
(c) to examine whether there has been a satisfactory distribution 
of resources among the different regions and industries. 
At present there are two financial institutions in the country 
besides the commercial banks the Rea I Estate Industria I Bank (R. E. I. B.) 
and the National Pub I ic Organization of Industrialization (N.P.O. I.), 
The study is divided into four parts : 
A. a brief outline of loans by commercial banks to the industrial 
sector, 
B. the role and contribution of the Industrial Development Corporation 
(I.D.C.), 
C. R.E.I.B. of Libya andindustrial growth in the country, and 
D. the efforts of the N.P.O. I. in industrial development. 
A. THE COMMERCIAL BANKS 
The commercial banks are one of the sources of loans for various 
purposes such as commerce, construction, agriculture and manufacturing, 
mostly for short-term credit with a fixed interest rate. In Libya, as 
in other developing countries, commercial banks are the most developed 
form of financial intermediary. Therefore, a quick glance at the 
structure of their credit wi II help to illustrate this point. 
It is clear from Table 5.2 that despite the recent emphasis on 
industrialization in Libya,and the fact that bank advances to industry 
multi pi ied more than twelve times over the period of 1958-70, modest use 
is being made of commercial banks' credit. The credit to the industrial 
Table 5.2 
Year 
I 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
No. of 
loans 
2 
250 
321 
591 
693 
422 
278 
295 
266 
348 
477 
748 
II 19 
849 
Loans Extended By Commercial Banks To Industry, 1958~70 
Tota I va I ue 
of I oans 
3 
933 
I ,470 
1}296 
1,454 
1,988 
I 1 820 
2,235 
2, 368 
4,449 
9,090 
10,450 
12,050 
(in LD, 000 ) •. 
% 
Total Credit 3 to 4 
4 
7,761 
I I I 217 
14,545 
15,126 
18,244 
22,769 
28,733 
35,417 
47,258 
54,431 
73,601 
92,835 
96,079 
12 
13 
9 
10 
II 
8 
8 
7 
8 
9 
12 
I I 
12 
%contribution of 
3 to G. D.P. 
10 
10 
8 
7 
8 
9 
9 
8 
7 
Source Central Bank of Libya, The Economic Research Division, 
Economic Bulletin, Tripoli, Vol. II, No. 5-6. Sept-Dec 1971. 
sector was smal I compared with that to other sectors such as general 
commerce which received about 39 percent of the total credit. This 
meagre extension of credit to the industrial sector can be explained 
by the lack of demand for industrial loans because businessmen are 
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frightened of the financial insecurity of industry. Also, the 
banks prefer to make more profit by concentrating on short-term 
credit. The decrease of the percentage allocated to industry after 
1963 was due to the establishment of the Industrial Development 
Corporation in that year, which began to make loans, in addition to 
those made by the banks which were the only institutions which 
previously granted !oans for industry. 
Moreover, the table shows that the percentage allocated has 
increased since 1967, possibly owing to a shift of many businessmen 
to the commercial banks to avoid the restrictions of the R.E. I.B. 
Loans are more easily and rapidly obtained in the commercial banks, 
because personal surety is accepted and there is simp I icity in the 
routine. 
In order to estimate the share of total bank credit that has 
tal len to industry, the overal I contribution that bank credit resources 
have made to the economic development of Libya as a whole must first 
be borne in mind. Table 5.2 shows that from 1964-1968 the contri-
bution of commercial bank credit as a percentage of the G.D.P. rose 
slightly and fluctuated between 7 and 9 percent. Credit faci I ities 
specifically channel led towards the industrial sector show almost the 
same narrow fluctuation. It is apparent from this almost stable 
percentage for the commercial banks and industrial credit that there 
has been no increase in the share of the commercial bank credits 
directed towards the financing of industrial development. 
In spite of the increase of the total loans from LD 933,000 in 
1958 to LD 12 mi II ion In 1970, the banks have played a relatively 
I II 
small role in the promotion of industry, if account is taken of increase 
of the total credit and of the average size of the loans, which was not 
more than LD 10,000 in 1970. In libya, such a small loan is inadequate 
even for the construction of medium-sized bui I dings, so the loans must 
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be for working capital and for the establishment of smal I workshops 
and traditional industries, especially in the bui I ding materials 
industry, and for the processing of foods. Examples might be 
bakeries, dairies, soft drinks, processing of olive oi I, I imestone 
and bricks. As Figure 5. I shows, foodstuffs and bui I ding materials 
account for half of the total amount of the loans. As would be 
expected, small loans are usually for short periods. Many of the 
traditional and small factories which have small numbers of workers 
have received loans from commercial banks. Unfortunately, there are 
no figures to show what percentage of the loans are used for working 
capital rather than for fixed capital. The higher percentage 
received for foodstuffs and soft drinks can be explained by the fact 
that their processes require working capital more than fixed capital. 
The percentage was lower for processes such as carpentry, printing 
and chemicals, which import their raw materials throughout the year, 
than for foodstuffs, such as olive processing and flour mi I I ing, 
for which in Libya the requirements for the whole year are bought 
during the growing seasons. So short-term loans are used mainly 
f k. . t I h f. d . t I . I I oans. (I 5) or wor 1ng cap1 a , w ereas 1xe cap1 a requires anger 
The new industrial pol icy I imits to LD 60,000 the amount of 
money that can be lent by the R.E. I.B., which is not therefore able 
to promote the growth of larger industries. Entrepreneurs who require 
larger sums of money must turn to the commercial banks, but these wi I I 
only provide short-term loans. The amount and type of capital required 
to finance the establishment and running of manufacturing industries in 
Libya, as in other developing countries, is greater than the commercial 
banks, as they are now constituted, can provide. This is especially 
true in view of the propensity of the banks to concentrate on short-
term lending. 
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One might suggest that the Central Bank of Libya (C.B.L.) 
cou I d have encouraged the commercia I banks, espec i a I I y now that they 
have been nationalized (1970),to provide industry with more credit 
by inducing them to ease their lending policies through the provision 
of generous discount faci I ities, either in the form of lower interest, 
-
or of longer-term loans, where industrial development is concerned. 
It could have adopted even more specific measures so that credit 
extended to certain sectors should not exceed a fixed amount or a given 
( I 6) proportion of the total credit supply. The banks should also 
check from time to time to ensure that money borrowed, supposedly for 
industrial purposes, is not spent on other projects. 
Moreover, it would be better for industrial development if the 
government through the Central Bank authority would not allow the 
commercial banks to give loans haphazardly. The government ought to 
ensure that loans are granted according to the general pol icy of 
industrialization, which should include a priority I ist for industries. 
Before a loan application is accepted, the commercial banks should 
require the entrepreneur to furnish the necessary information about 
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his establishment, and the application should be approved by the Ministry 
of Industry. Such policies might enable the commercial banks to be 
more successful in the industrial development field. It might be 
possible, because the deposits and the I iquid assets of the commercial 
banks have increased. The deposit held with Central Bank rose from 
LD 22.7 mi I I ion at the end of 1970 toLD 120.2 mi I I ion by the end of 
. ( 17) 1971, an increase of 429 percent dur1ng the year. This is the 
result of increasing confidence in the banking sector. But the amount 
of credit, as mentioned before, did not grow at the same rate, as is 
reflected in the increase of the bank 1.s I iquid assets. 
B. THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (I~D.C.) 
Recognizing the problems created by the scarcity of capital in 
the early fifties and following the suggestion of the International 
Bank of Reconstruction and Development (I.B.R.D.), which was : 
"The I ack of an organized capita I market in Libya 
is something of a handicap to industrial development. 
Moreover, there is no institution to which the prospective 
entrepreneur can turn for technical advice in establishing 
a new industry. To remedy these deficiencies, the Mission 
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recommends that the government should set up an agency to 
provide both credit and technical assistance for industry", ( 18) 
the government of Libya established the I.D.C. under the Resolution 
No. 2 of 1963 in order to fi II a gap in the credit system. The main 
objectives were defined by its ordinance as being : 
"to secure loans, to give technical assistance, and 
to study the possibi I ity and participate in the development 
of industry in Libya. " (19) 
The corporation, which was terminated in 1965, was the first specialized 
institution in the country to deal with the development of the 
industrial sector. 
For the first year (1963-1964) its capital was about LD I mi I I ion, 
of which LD 700,000 came from the reserve budget, and LD 300,000 from 
th d I t b d t
. (20) 
e eve opmen u ge • Up to September 1965, the corporation had 
granted financial assistance to 31 privately-owned industrial projects, 
and had allocated about ~D 494,000, as shown in Table 5.3. It shows 
that industries which received most assistance from the corporation 
were those providing I ight consumer goods from local raw material, 
such as tomatoes, wheat, olive oi I, sea products, wool and traditional 
textiles, received about 60 percent of the total loans, and were 
responding to the increased local demand for consumer goods following 
the discovery of oi I i private and pub I ic expenditure on consumer goods 
increased more than 3,20 percent from LD 40.3 mi II ion in 1957 to about 
LD 170.6 mi II ions in 1962. <21 ) 
Table 5.3 Distribution Of Loans By I.D~C. Among Industrial Groups 
.. In Libya, 1963~65 ,· 
Totai;_Rmount % of 
Industrial group No. of . I oans in LD .. the total 
Foodstuffs and soft drinks 6 148,000 29.9 
Text i I es 
Wood 
Chemica is 
Building Materials 
Metal work 
Handicrafts 
Total 
Source I.D.C. 
3 148,000 29.9 
8 8,050 I • 6 
4 36,500 7.5 
5 66,500 13.5 
3 86,050 17.4 
2 I, I 00 .. 0.2 
.31 494,200 . I 00.0 
First Report On Its Activities from May 1963 
to December 1964, Tripoli, 1965. 
According to Table 5.4 Tripoli received more than half of the 
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loans amounting to about one-third of the total credit, the average size 
of each loan being/LD 9,000. In contrast, Benghazi received fewer loans 
but about 43 percent of the total credit, with loans averaging about 
LD 30,000. That does not mean that the loans in Benghazi were for 
larger industries than in Tripoli, since two of the loans to Benghazi 
amounted to LD 180,000. Muhafadat Derna, G. Akhdar, Homes and Sebha 
received only about 8 percent of the total, while Muhafadat Misurata, 
Gharian and Ubari received nothing. For distribution of loans among 
the 'rruhafadat, however, it is not fair to judge the work of the I.D.C. 
over two years, since it was the first specialist institution and 
neither entrepreneurs nor its officers knew what it ought .to do, 
espec i a I I y in deve I oping regions. 
It is clear that there are factors which worked against the 
success of the corporation. As part of its function it was authorized 
to act I ike the ordinary commercial banks, giving loans in order to 
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Table 5.4 The Distribution Of.Loaris sy·I~D~C. Among Muhatadat; 1963-65. 
Source 
Muhafadat. 
Tripoli 
Benghazi 
EI-Zawia 
Homes 
De rna 
G. Akhdar 
Sebha 
No. of 
loans. 
18 
7 
2 
Total 31 
Fieldwork, Summer 1973. 
Amount in % of the 
LD_ .total 
165,.250 33 
210,050 43 
80,000 16 
18,000 4 
4,500 
16,000 3 
400 0 
.494,200 100 
obtain profit from the interest accruing. Also, there was no system 
for the approval of loans, which were affected by the personal influence 
of the borrower. For example, the director approved a loan of 
LD 100,000, about 20 percent of the total loans, to only one establish-
ment in Benghazi, and this was against the regulation of the corporation. 
Moreover, it did not borrow money from non-government resources; it 
continued to be heavily dependent on government finance for its loan 
operations and activities. This dependence meant a certain amount of 
uncertainty as to the avai labi I ity of resources, thus affecting the 
functioning of the corporation. It could not itself achieve anything 
in its object of establishing or taking control of any industry, and 
failed to enter into agreements for establishing new industries or 
expanding existing ones in terms of associate companies. The 25 percent 
share allowed by the ordinance of I.D.c. for participation did not 
encourage entrepreneurs to use I.D.C. loans for new industries, though 
an exception was its participation in the Cement Company. 
Moreover, it lent money without supervision, and despite the 
stipulation of its ordinance that 60 percent of its loans must be for 
smal 1-scale concerns, it made loans to medium and large projects, as 
I 17 
shown in Table 5.5, when loans of more than ~D 50,000 accounted for 
more than half of the total credit. Perhaps it could have achieved more 
if it had had more qualified administrative staff and its capital had been 
increased. 
Table 5.5 The Distribution Of I;D.C; LoahS By Site (In LD). 
Size of loans Total amount of. loans 
less than 10,000 
10,000- 49,000 
50,000- 100,000 
more than 100,000 
Total. 
52,200 
182,000 
260,000 
. . 494,200. 
% of.the total 
I 0.6 
36.8 
52.6 
.100.0 . 
Source I.D.C. First Report On Its Activities From May 1963-
Dec 1964, Tripoli, 1965. 
C. REAL EAST INDUSTRIAL BANK (R.E. I.B.) 
This bank was established in September 1965, replacing the 
former Industrial Development Corporation with the aim of meeting the 
short- and long-term credit needs of housing and industry. The primary 
purpose of this fully-fledged development bank was to encourage the 
housing and the industrialization of the country. In order to achieve 
this, the bank was permitted to make loans to industrial enterprises, 
to participate in the equity capital of industrial companies, and to 
faci I itate the import of machinery and raw materials for industrial 
purposes. It was also permitted to encourage a large number of new 
entrants in the industrial field by providing financial assistance and 
technical, economic and administrative advice, as well as the preparation 
(22) 
of feasibi I ity studies. Thus the framework for this bank is 
broader than the mere provision of capital. It incorporates such 
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activities as stimulating investment through the provision of capital, 
passing judgement on the feasibi I ity of new projects, and developing 
technical and administrative help for the private sector. The 
following discussion examines the role and achievements of the bank 
in industrial development during the first seven years of its operation. 
Table 5.6 itemizes the structure of the industrial bank's 
sources of funds during 1965-73. The paid-up capita I increased more 
than ten times from LD 790,000 to LD 8 mi I I ions. This was due to the 
large sums of money for investment in the industrial sector • which 
r'_,l 
resulted from the government's pol icy of industrializing Libya as 
rapidly as possible. Another improvement was the reduction in the 
percentage unrepaid credit in industrial loans from 45 percent in 
March 1968 to about 18 percent in March 1970, and from 4 percent to 
2,7 percent in the same period for real estate loans. (23 ) It is quite 
clear that the bank was conceived as a government institution. Thus 
the act gives the government, through the Minister of Industry and 
Minerals, the right to appoint the board of directors and the managing 
director of the bank, besides the right to give the board of directors 
instructions of a general character. Resulting from government control, 
its order cancel led the rate of interest for the bank loans from 1967. 
This affected the sources of the bank's capital which can be obtained 
from pub I ic and private corporations, and from private individuals 
besides the paid-up capital from the government. Therefore, the bank 
became completely dependent on government resources. This dependence 
seems to have had a serious effect, in that unnecessary delay is involved 
in distributing the loans to borrowers, thus delaying establishments 
from starting operations on schedule. In addition, owing to the lack 
of resources, the bank cannot meet alI demands. For examp I e, in 
Benghazi, the bank I oaned on I y 48 percent of the app I i cations prior to 
November 1971. (24 ) Most of the loans were never used for industrial 
Table 5.6 The Paid Up Budget Of Re2ll Estate Industrial Bank Up To 
1973 (in LD~OOO). 
Government For For % 
Year Tota I paid up Real Estate Industry 4 to 
2 3 4 
1965-66 790 790 
1966-67 3, 540 3,540 
1967-68 10,095 10,095 
1968-69 6,000 6,000 
1969-70 6,000 6,000 
1970-71 II ,500 I I, 500 8,000 3,500 30 
1971-72 9,000 9,000 8,000 I ,000 II 
1972-73 8,000 8,000 8,000 0 
Sources: I. R.E.I.B. Report Of The Board ·of Directors From·7.9~65 
t631.3.70, Tripoli, 1970. 
2. Ministry of Industry, Achievements Of The Industrial 
Sector Tripoli, 1972. 
purposes, but were spent on real estate. It is clear from Table 5. 7 
that the bank failed from an industrial point of view. It did not 
grant 50 percent of its loans to industry as was stipulated in 
Article 6 of its ordinance. (25 ) In a I I years except 1968-70, when 
the bank's board clamped down on housing loan applications, more than 
90 percent of its loans were given to housing. Two factors may help 
to explain this : 
(a) the simp! icity of making housing loans, and 
(b) the inefficiency of the bank staff employed to examine the 
industrial loans. 
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Although the yearly paid-up amount was increased, and it might have been 
expected that the share of the industrial sector would increase as a 
result of the new attitude of the government, Table 5.7 shows that no 
Table 5.7 · The Distribution Of Th~ Loan~ By R~E~ 1~8. Prior To 1973 
Year 
1965-67 
1967-68 
1968-69 
1969-70 
197Q-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
Sources 
( In LD) . 
Total amount Real estate Industrial % of industrial 
of loans ( I ) .. loans.C2) loans loans to total 
6,573,224 5,981,225 591,999 9.0 
5,436,301 5, I 38, I I I 298,290 5.5 
5,084,455 3,704,519 I ,379,936 27. I 
5,812,432 4,744,618 1,067,814 18.4 
11,133,775 I 0, 091,525 I, 042,250 9.4 
17,483, 134 16,396,468 I, 094,666 6.3 
20,810,115 19,932,826 877,283 4.2 
(I) Ministry of Industry) Achi~vement Of the Industrial 
Sector, Tripoli, 1972. 
(2) R.E.I.B •. , Industrial LOans, 1972..:.73, unpublished paper. 
improvement was made in industrial loans, whose share dec! ined by about 
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20 percent in 1973 relative to the 1972 value. This might be explained 
by the factors mentioned before, or perhaps the bank's board could not 
understand the new pol icy when they provided for industrial loans only 
the amount which was only paid-up yearly from the government for this 
sector from 197Q-71. In the case of real estate loans, the bank 
provided the yearly paid-up amount besides the capital which it had. 
The paid-up capital provided for industry loans decreased from 30 percent 
of the industrial share in 197Q-71 to I I percent in 1971-72, and to zero 
in 1972-73, and so the bank had to start to give loans from its own 
. (26) finances. It might be explained also by the new pol icy itself, 
which defined the amount of the loan, as mentioned earlier, causing the 
bank to concentrate on small industrial loans and to give priority to 
projects with low capital requirements. 
In order to devote more attention to Industry and to secure 
specialization in its operations, the government should separate the bank 
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into industrial and real estate banks, as in many other countries. 
Since the bank is the only specialized financial institution granting 
industrial loans to the private sector without interest, it should 
examine its pol icy,which might dissuade the entrepreneurs from investing 
in medium and large projects. Here the bank is competing with the 
commercial banks. 
There are no data to show the average loan size since 1970, 
but according to the new pol icy the bank should have directed the bulk 
of its financial assistance to smal I and medium sized projects to the 
comparative neglect of larger projects. This concentration on the 
smal I projects may be justified in a developing economy where industrial 
investment may logically be expected to progress from smal I to large 
projects. It may take some time for private investors to gain the 
necessary ski lis and abi I ities to sponsor and finance larger industrial 
projects. 
However, by I imiting itself to these projects involving 
relatively high overhead costs in loan investigation and supervision, 
I 
(27) the bank had to operate at a continual oss. Table 5.8 reveals 
that during the period 1966-69 over 60 percent of the total individual 
investments were of more than LD 50,000. However, the bank authorities 
did not realize the failure of the bank to assist the small industries 
prior to 1970. The administration takes a long time over the routine 
approval of each loan issued by the bank, and the bank's pol icy requires 
every applicant to offer assets as security. It may be that the medium 
and largest size industries receive the greatest percentage of loans 
because they meet the security requirements more easily than the smaller 
investors, particularly if the latter are entering the industrial field 
for the first time. Under these circumstances, it was apparently 
logical for the Real Estate Industrial Bank to change its pol icy, to 
concentrate on the provision of larger loans for the larger industries, 
while the Central Bank should have encouraged commercial banks to provide 
loans for small industries. 
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Table 5.8 The Amount Of Loans Approved By The R.E~ I~B. By Size Of Loans 
Up To 1969 ( In LD). 
1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 Total % to the 
Size amount amount amount amount total 
1- 5,000 25,460 44,576 110,526 I 80,562 8.0 
5,001- 10,000 49,039 26,400 77,910 153,349 6.8 
10,001- 20,000 45,500 16,000 46,500 i08,000 4.8 
20,001- 50,000 94,500 188,814 170,000 453,314 20. I 
More than 50,000 3771500 22,500 960,000 I, 360,000 60.3 
Total 591 I 999 298,290 1,364,936.2,255,225 . 100.0 
Source R.E. I.B. Report of Board of Directors on Period 1965-1970, 
Tripoli, '1970.· 
Regarding the period of the loans, it can be seen from Table 5.9 
that only 36 percent of the total investment was lent for more than 
eight years, whereas 47 percent was for three to seven years. The bank 
loans were thus chiefly for medium terms. This may be explained by the 
fact that the industrial sector in Libya consists mainly of I ight 
industries which have a quick turnover of capital. It can also be seen 
from the table that the share of long loans was very high in 1968-69, 
but this was due to the high proportion of loans of more -t-han LD 50,000 
(see Table 5.8). 
Breakdown of the loans sanctioned by the bank provides more 
detai Is about other aspects of the bank's loan activities. Study of the 
data presented in Table 5.10 reveals that also there is a significant 
diversification among the industries financed. Food processing (mainly 
tomato canning, olive oi I processing, bakery and soft drinks) alone 
claimed about 54 percent of the total amount advanced by the bank, none 
of the remaining industries having received any substantial amount. 
Thus, the bank did I ittle to develop the other, relatively neglected 
industries, which were no less important, since their development would 
Table 5.9 The Amount Of.Loaris Approved By R;E;I;B; By Period 
Of Loaris Up To 1969 · · · ( i ri LD). 
The tota I % of 
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Period 
1966-67 
amount 
1967-68 
amount 
1968-69 
amount. amount. . . the tota I 
- 3 
4 - 7 
more 
Source 
years 81 ,250 20,003 210,899 312,152 13.8 
years 462,249 221,287 448,537 I, 132,073 50.2 
than 8 48,500. 57,000. 705,500 .. 81 i ,000 36.0 
Total 591,999 298,290 I, 364,936. . 2,255,225 . I 00.0 
R.E.I.B. · Report of BOard Of Directors On Period 1965..;.70, Tripoli, 
1970. 
increase Libya's independence. It appears, therefore,that the bank had 
no blueprint for its activities, and its loans were decided on in a rather 
haphazard way. 
On the other hand, most of these loans were for new projects. 
Despite the fact that the bank has I imited its financial assistance to the 
traditional groups of manufacturing industries, it has directed a large 
proportion of its loans to new industrial projects. 
Regarding the regional distribution of the loans made by the 
bank, Figure 5.2 indicates marked inequalities In the distribution of the 
loans made by the bank to industry throughout the country. Thus, of the 
total advanced by the bank up to 31 March 1973, 52 percent went to 
Muhafada·t Tripoli, and 21 percent to Muhafada EI-Zawia <Figure 5.3), and 
was mostly used for food processing, Tripoli and EI-Zawia being situated 
in the best agricultural areas and the central markets of agricultural 
production. Furthermore, appl !cations from eastern muhafadats were not 
rapidly received, and were sometimes deferred unti I the next meeting of 
the bank board in order to query some requirement, while applicants for 
loans duly approved by the Tripoli branch (headquarters) were received 
more quickly, and were therefore granted accordingly. Another possible 
• 
f 
Fig 5·2. REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE AMOUNT LOANED 
BV R.E.I. B. ( 1965 to May 1973) 
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Table 5~10 
Sources 
The Distribution Of R~E~I~B~ ·Loans Amorig.lridustrial Groups 
Up To ·1973 .. (in _LD) 
Industria I group 
Food and soft drinks 
Wood (carpentry) 
Chemicals 
Bui I ding materials 
Metal work 
Industrial services 
Handicrafts 
Miscellaneous 
Total 
Total arrount 
of the I oi:ms 
3,447,097 
234,710 
174,500 
848,307 
80,000 
720,026 
207,293 
640,305 
6,352,238 
% of 
the total 
54.3 
3.7 
2.7 
13.4 
I • 3 
11.3 
3.3 
10.0 
.I 00.0 
I. Ministry of Industry, Achievement of Industrial Sector, 
Tripoli, 1972. 
2. R.E.I.B. Industrial Loans 1972..;.1973, Unpublished paper. 
factor is that before the revolution local loyalties in Libya were very 
strong, the Libyans themselves acknowledging that their ties were first 
to their regions and second to the nation. 
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Industrial activities tend to concentrate in urban centres with 
attractive faci I ities (see Chapter 8). This does not contribute to the 
integration of the internal economy, nor has the government yet reduced 
very much the serious disequi I ibrium in the development of the component 
regions, or the disparity between their production and consumption 
(28) 
capacities. Private investors, presented with a variety of opport-
unities, selected those which assured the highest profits with the least 
organizational effort and minimum Investment. Although this was wise 
investment pol icy from the standpoint of the individuals concerned, it 
did not lead to balanced industrial development from the standpoint of 
(29) the country. 
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The bank's objective should henceforth be to remove economic 
disparity between different regions by assisting less developed regions 
with a view to maintaining a regional balance in industrial development. 
The bank should give priority to rural industries and it might be advant-
ageous for it to put a rate of interest on loans al l~cated tq the cities 
such as Tripoli, while providing interest-free loans for rural areas. 
In terms of participation, the bank has done I ittle. Prior to 
i97i the bank had taken in just one enterprise, a dry battery factory, by 
paying LD 232,000. The failure of the bank is attributable to its )ack 
of technical staff and to the hesitation of the private sector in investing, 
the latter due to lack of confidence in industrial establishments control led 
by companies or by the government. A good example is the cement company 
(Homes Factory) which has failed to encourage private investors, and has 
also been afraid of nationalization. The bank should participate in more 
profit-making industries in order to inspire confidence among the investors, 
and should disregard those industries which are unable to make any sig-
nificant profit. Because the Libyans were, understandably, reluctant to 
invest in co-operative and joint-project Industries, it is necessary to 
encourage more private investment ln industrial establishments, and the 
government should attract the talent of private entrepreneurs. 
The bank has only a smal I technical staff which is unable to 
provide technical assistance or professional advice to industries. In 
1973 the bank carried out preliminary studies into about sixteen projects, 
including electric bulbs, bicycles, crown-cap~electric fittings, metal 
parts in carpentry, sandpaper, barbed wire, cotton, plastic bags and boxes, 
toilet soap, perfumes, chocolate and sheet metal work. However, these 
were not comprehensive studies undertaken by experts in the field. They 
did not consider the location or size of the project, its prospects, its 
profit potentiality or its Importance from the standpoint of the national 
interest. Since the bank is the only organization to deal with this kind 
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of work for the private sector, it should have realized that there is 
more to industrial development than the granting of loans, and should have 
gone further in the provision of technical assistance •. Lewis has stated 
that the mistake of most agencies which deal with industrial development, 
"was not that they lent money, but that they lent money 
without supervision •••• , had the emphasis been more on 
managerial assistance and less on lending money, the result 
would have been different. " (30) 
It is clear that the industrial bank's contribution to industrial 
development and location was I imited as to the amount of loans granted. 
The bank I imited its aid to those establishments with a capital investment 
of around LD 100,000, mostly plants for processing agrjcultural products, 
bui !ding materials and wood products. It did not pay any attention to 
regional location, providing technical information or market research. Its 
role in the(ocation and development of industry was conservative and 
I imited. 
D. NATIONAL PUBLIC ORGANIZATION FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION CN.P~O. 1.) 
It has been stated that private investment has tended to take 
an interest in establishing only those industries in which there was low 
capital requirement and the prospect of earning quick profits, while 
industries with high capital requirement and complicated processes remained 
neglected, Consequently, the government changed its policy of industrial-
ization by establishing pub I ic enterprises. Under Ordinance No. 26 of 
1970 (31 ) it established the N.P.O. I. which is considered to be the major 
organ for implementing the development plan as regards the public sector, 
and is empowered to create industries in which private investors have 
shown I ittle interest in Libya. It prepares industrial development schemes, 
takes necessary procedures for approving the vahi;ous projects, and then 
implements them. 
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The methods by which it is able to discharge its functions are 
stated in (Appendix 5. 1). It took over alI the government factories which 
had been under the control of the various ministries (see Appendix 5.2). 
The capita I of the organization has increased substantia I I y, as shown 
earlier, and its operational activities have increased concentration by 
the government on industrialization through the public sector. Its share 
of the arrcunt of industria! development increased from 32 percent in !970-71 
to about 74 percent in 1972-73. The number of projects has increased from 
five in the first year to eleven in the second year, and to about nineteen 
in the third year. Up to 1980 it wi I I deal with 60 projects, with a total 
capital investment of about LD 486 mi II ions, besides others which are under 
study. Since 1970 the organization has expanded from the stage of merely 
preparing and studying the feasibi I ity of projects to include the actual 
work of bui I ding up the firms. Unfortunately, there are no tables to 
cover the amount spent by the organization during the first and second years, 
but in the third year its total expenditure was about LD 28 mi I I ion, 
79.5 percent of its budget for that year. Delays in the feasibi I ity 
studies, construction, and in choice of location, sometimes postponed 
an establishment, such as a ready-made suit factory in Derna. These 
were the main reasons why the whole share was not spent. Most projects 
received more than LD I mi I I ion from N.P.O. I., eleven more than LD 5 
million, 13 more than LD 10 million, and one received LD 100 million. 
Moreover, most wi II be finished before 1977, and four after 1977, but 
before 1980. Up to the middle of 1974, five projects had been finished 
and started operation (a sardine factory in Jansur, a flour mi II in 
Tripoli, a leather factory in Tajora, a shoe factory in Misurata, and a 
ready-made suit factory in Derna), beside the two animal fodder factories 
which were semi-finished. Table 5. I I indicates that the metalwork and eng-
ineering and bui I ding materials industries have been by far the largest 
/recipients 
Table 5~ II The Number Arid Total Amount Allocated By The N.P.O.I. Among 
* Industria I Groups . 
No. of Projects Investment 
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Industria I 
groups 
Finished 
by 1975 
Finished 
by 1977 
Finished i n LD m i I I ion 
Total 
Food,drinks & tobacco 23 
Textiles & clothes 
Leather and shoes 
Printing and paper 
Wood and furniture 
Chemicals t 
Building material & 
non-metal I ic goods 
Metal work and 
engineering goods 
Total 
4 
3 
2 
5 
13 
.9 
60 
14 
3 
3 
8 
5 
34 
9 
2 
3 
4 
3 
22 
*excluding the petrochemical projects. 
by 1980 Total 
2 
4 
amount 
81 
20 
6 
10 
59 
124 
185 
.. 486 
% of 
total 
16.7 
4. I 
I • 2 
0.2 
2. I 
12. I 
25.5 
38. I 
100.0 
Source Industrial Research Centre, Industrial Census 1971, Tripoli, 1973. 
t notal I the projects are new ones, but some of them are expansions 
of old ones, such as the cement factories in Benghazi and Homes. 
of the organization's funds. This is vitally important for the country 
as the construction of new housing, industrial and agricultural projects 
requires a large production of metal and bui !ding materials. This industry 
has not, so far, been attractive to private investors, due to the large 
investment required. The organization's attitude has been much in I ine 
with the government's general industrial pol icy. The table also reveals 
that the organization has concentrated on projects of foodstuffs, cement 
and bui !ding materials during its early years (by 1975), probably because 
these industries required I imited capital and less campi icated studies. 
Moreover, they are in accordance with the organization's aim of giving 
priority to industries designed either to further development of the 
country's natural resources or to manufacure goods that had previously had 
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to be imported. Finally, new large-scale establishments, such as 
dairying, wire and cables, animal fodder, steel welded pipes, wi I I appear 
in the country for the first time. 
As far as location is concerned Figure 5.4 indicates that 
Tripoli has the greatest share, more than one-third of the total 
investments. It is interesting to note that although Misurata has the 
second-largest anuunt, the number uf projects is not proportionally as 
large when compared to others, such as Benghazi and G. Akhdar, because 
the largest project, a steel factory with LD 100 mi I I ion investment, 
is planned for Misurata. Tripoli and Benghazi have more than half of 
the total investments, a reflection partly of the low level of the infra-
structure and the high cost of construction and raw materials in the more 
remote muhafadat. In Tripoli and Benghazi it is also easier to contact 
the local authorities for information. It should also be noted that 
seven of Tripoli 1 s establishments are located in Jansur, Azizia, Ben-
Ghashir, Garabol i and Tajora, and four of Benghazi's establishments 
are in EI-Gawarsha and EI-Abiar. 
The organization was trying to find the right economic location 
for projects with their distribution among the whole of the muhafadat. 
It has projected new large industries to underdeveloped areas for the 
first time,e.g. ~pottery factory in Gharian, tomato canning and soft 
drinks establishments in Sebha, wool-dyeing in EI-Marg, shoe factory in 
Misurata and ready-made suit factory in Derna. This state-owned 
organization has obviously recognised that . it must give priority to and 
concentrate more on the undeveloped areas. 
Except in a few cases, market and raw materials were the most 
important factors of location for these projects. The food industry is 
distributed among most of the muhafadat, but highly concentrated in 
Tripoli. The higher concentrations of textiles, wood, chemicals and 
bui I ding materials In Tripoli were mainly due either to the market or 
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to the use of imported materials. The location of metal work in 
Misurata was in order to use EI-Shata j 1 s iron ore, chemicals in EI-Zawia 
and EI-Kaleg to use Abu-Kammash salt and Marada potash, pottery in Gharian 
to use local clay, and textiles in EI-Marg to use local wool. The 
location of the paper bags establishment in Benghazi was to serve the 
local cement factory. 
The performance of the organization in the management, 
distribution and marketing of its products has been quite different from 
that in engineering design and construction, where it has scored its most 
conspicuous successes so far. In terms of management, it has failed to 
obtain sufficient ski I led labour for its projects. It has been estimated 
that the first 24 projects created by the organization required about 
1838 ski lied labourers, of whom 163 were of university level. (32 ) From 
Table 5.12 it appears that it could obtain only 66 percent of the required 
number of trained workers, owing to the shortage of technical institutions 
in the country and the undesirabi I ity of labouring jobs (see Chapter 9). 
More than half of these were trained abroad, while the rest were training 
on the job (Appendix 5.3). In addition, there was no co-ordination 
between training of trainees and completion of projects. For example, 
trainees sent to Egypt for the clothing and textile industries finished 
their training a~d returned long before their projects were ready. This 
might have caused them to move to other jobs. The organization must now 
co-operate with the new industrial training centres which have recently 
appeared, so that trainees are produced at the required times. 
Most of the industrial concerns which the organization has 
established are sti I I under construction, and the few which have gone into 
production are still in their first year. Table 5.13 reveals that during 
the period 1966-1967 alI the pub! ic establishments under the Ministry of 
Industry, except the fruit processing factory, worked at a great loss. 
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Table 5.12 The Distribution Of Trained Labour Required By Industries 
OfN.P.O.I. Until 30June 1973. 
Total % Industries 
groups 
No. of workers 
required 
No. trained 
and appointed 
( 2) 
Under 
training 
(3) 
( 4) to ( I ) 
( I ) (4) 
Food and drinks 250 108 41 149 59.6 
Text i I es and clothes 472 179 219 398 84.3 
Leather and shoes 478 5 307 312 65.3 
Paper 24 00.0 
Chemicals 204 46 72 118 57.9 
Bui !ding materials 44 42 42 95.5 
Metal work and 
engineering 366 II 179 190 51.9 
Total - 1,838 349 860 ·1,209. 65.7 
Source N.P.O.I. Statistical Information About Ski lied Labour Requirements 
Unti I 30 June 1973, Unpublished statistics. 
The total loss, amounting toLD 173,868,does not include buildings and 
machinery depreciation or other expenditure like bui !ding rents, profit 
taxes and the like. (33 ) This resulted from a weak management system and 
excessive bureaucracy. It should be realized that the increase in N.P.O. I.'s 
span of control, as more and more industrial units come under its super-
vision, wi II demand extensive organizational readjustments. It is sti II 
too early for a judgement of the operation of the organization, but, to 
avoid failure, it should divide its projects among a number of smal I 
companies, each one specializing in one or more related industries. This 
would have the effect both of encouraging competition between the companies 
and improving their operational efficiency. It is also important for the 
organization to have a different hierarchical management system than in 
the private factories, under which the employers wi II hold well-defined 
responsibi I ities for which they should be accountable to the company. 
Such a system of responsibility for individual projects should affect 
their operational efficiency. Incentives should be introduced; for 
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example, the manager should be given a certain percentage of the net profit 
achieved by his enterprise, in addition to his regular salary. In Egypt, 
distribution of profits in public sector enterprises is governed by specific 
legislation whereby 75 percent of it goes to the state, 5 percent finances 
social and housing services for workers, 10 percent is pooled for central 
social services for the district, and 10 percent represents direct cash 
distribution to labour. (34 ) In Libya, it might be useful to use this 
system, modifying some of the percentages, for example, by decreasing the 
contribution to the state, even to 50 percent, and increasing the other 
categories. 
The previous discussion pointed out that the last two institutions 
deal with different sides of industrial development, loan-making and 
promotion. It was not clear why a separate organization was established, 
and not integrated with the industrial bank. Is it better to have separate 
agencies for industrial development? The government might have been upset 
by the experience of its neighbour, Egypt, whose bank failed, causing 
serious difficulties for its own industrial enterprises. If this was the 
reason, it was an invalid one, since failure of the bank was due to its 
pol icy, and was not relevant to Libya, which has different circumstances 
and a different industrial bank pol icy. In Libya, where coordination is 
weak, both between the different departments of the industrial sector and 
other departments (see Chapter 9), and between the bank and N.P.O. I., it 
is logical to have a combined organization which also includes the 
industrial research centre. It would save time and money, as wei I as 
reduce the duality in planning. Hanson has stated, 
Table 5.13 The Expenditure And Returns Of Pub I ic Factories 1966-67 
Factory 
(LD) 
Total 
Location expenditure 
Total 
returns Discrepancy 
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Date packing factory Hon 101,573,133 34,118,532 -67,450.601 
II II II Tri poI i 5 I , 765, I 30 34,665,926 -!7,099.204 
Rug centre and wool 
washing centre Benghazi 45,207,477 3,659,205 -41 '548. 272 
Gypsum factory Tri poI i 39,158,385 I I , 286, 964 -27,871.421 
Fruit processing 
factory Tri poI i 27' 840,489 37,620,663 + 9,780,. 174 
Centre of Libyan 
handicrafts Misurata 27' 524' 180 I ,044, 910 -26,479,270 
Tannery Tri poI i 14,676,828 9,272,845 - 5,403,983 
Shop of Libyan 
handicrafts Tri poI i 8,779,569 10,993,382 + 2,213,813 
Source 
Total 316, 525, 19 I 142,657,427 -173,867,764 
Vardjan, V. The Present State of Libyan Industries And Their 
Problem 1 Tripoli, 1968. 
"that in some circumstances, particularly where overall 
planning is rudimentary and coordination at top government 
level weak, there may be great advantages in having an 
operational agency capable of surveying the whole industrial 
scene and deciding whether particular parts of it shall be 
developed through direct promotion, through participation in 
share capital, or through the making of loans and advances. 
If the men running it are honest, competent and free from violent 
ideological prejudices, they may succeed in producing a more 
balanced and visible industrial pattern than would be I ikely 
to emerge from the horse-trading that alI too often takes 
place between a number of different agencies with special 
res pons i b i I it i es. 11 <35) 
This new organization then w i I I be respons i b I e for the genera I 
industrial pol icy, and with its special technical staff it should be able 
to see where financial help and direct promotion do most good, and where 
it is I ike I y to be the best. 
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In conclusion, the government's role in industrial development 
before 1969 was indirect, but since then it has adopted a creative role 
of direct and indirect intervention to establish the base for industrial-
ization in the country. Without government intervention, it seems that 
the private sector would have found it difficult to develop industry 
satisfactorily, especially in the early stages of industrialization. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Industrial Location And Structure 
In this chapter an attempt is made to analyse the areas of 
industrial distribution and concentration in the ten muhafadat and their 
mun i c i pa I it i es (regions). The structure of manufacturing industries wi I I 
be studied as they existed in Libya in 1971. Statistical data used for 
each of these studies were drawn from the industrial establishments census 
of 1971, and the International Standard of Industrial Classification (I .S. I.C.) 
was used to divide industries into groups according to type of activities 
involved. 
Before proceeding to analyse the distribution of industry among 
these municipalities, it should be borne in mind that Libya is divided into 
30 main municipalities (Figure 6.1), and due to the lack of a detailed 
administrative map, some minor municipalities are combined with major ones 
Jansur,Tajora and Garabol i with Tripoli; Ben-Ghashl r with Azi zia; Zahra 
with EI-Zawia; Sorman with Sabratha; EI-Jamel with Zuara; Giado with 
Yefren; EI-Gusbat with Homes; Gialo with Ajdabia; Ben-Jaud with Sirte; 
Tocra and Gheminis with Benghazi; Shahat with Beda and Gubba with Derna. 
In 1971, Libya as a whole contained about 902 industrial establish-
ments providing jobs for nearly 16,723 persons, with an average of about 
18.5 persons for each establishment. Employment was not distributed 
uniformly among the establishments and muhafadat. Over three-fifths of the 
establishments employed less than ten workers, and comprised about one-quarter 
of the total workforce. In contrast, twenty-five establishments, 2.7 percent 
of the total, employed about one-third of the total workers. 
. E MAJOR MUNICIPALITIES IN LIBYA Fro6·1. TH 
0 
~<::.® 
.. C~l<!>/@(~® ; 
/ ~ ~ ~ ® i ~ ...... '·-
1 Zuoro 
2 Sabrolho 
3. EI-Zawic 
6 Homes 
7 Torhuno 
8. Zle!!n 
9. Ghar ian 
• I~ \ ~ \. ~ . lc- J"' ·-I "' ~--~- \ (""6 (j c::. ', - i __ 
'· ...... I _, I ~ ' 
A
'\ 'P \ T A \
1 
,... ) Z D -~\5 I R ....... . I ~ \ 'P · ...... _ ''\ ., 
' " /-'·-.} ·- . . ... I
.," ., / ( \..._ \_._. __ 
·. _r._.- ....... _ ./ .'- ·-. -----
\ '·-· E L- S H A T ~--.'\, : \ 
I JOFRA \ i 
\ i ., A '·,. j 
_/ "-----4 \ 
( 1 
.')GHAT j F R A \ 
( z 0 UGH\ K U \ \ M U R j 
'~, : \ 
'•""' i 
··-.. -----··--··-.. 1 I "-·~ : \ 
··'-.. -.....l _j 
................ .. 
. ............._ r 
................. •, \ 
................. .......J 
f 
km 200 
- Muhofodol Boundary 
--- Mumc,pol Boundary 
139 
I. Industrial Location And Specialization 
A coefficient of localization may be used to indicate which 
industries tend to be localized, and which tend to be distributed among many 
municipalities. Following Smith, (I) the coefficients of localization (CI) 
may be expressed by : 
r l N II IOOX. !OOY. 
Cl I I: ! I I j 2 i =I xt yt 
Where X. is the number employed in a given Industry X in the ith areal 
I 
subdivision or employment-exchange area. 
xt is the total regional employment in Industry. 
Y. is the employment in a I I industry in area i. 
I 
yt is the total regional emp I oyment in a II industry. 
The coefficient varies from 0 to 100, with a high number showing high local-
ization and a smal I one showing an even distribution. 
This method has not, as far as is known, been applied previously 
to Libyan Industries. Table 6. I shows the result of this analysis in the 
nine industrial groups. The most highly localized industry group is the 
miscellaneous group, this being due to the fact that it is distributed in 
four municipalities, with Benghazi accounting for about 62 percent of its 
regional workers (see Table 6.4). Except for this group, the coefficients 
are in general fairly low. The highest group is building materials, when two 
municipalities (Tripoli and Benghazi) account for about 83 percent of the total 
regional workers. 
The food, soft drinks and tobacco, wood and furniture groups were 
the lowest values. These are the most widely distributed industries whose 
products are consumed by alI, and these industries are associated with the 
distribution of the local consumers. Industries involving the production of 
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Table 6.1 The Coefficient Of Industrial Localization In Libya, 1971. 
Total number in Coefficient of 
Industrial Group employment I oca I i z at i on 
A. Food, soft drinks and tobacco 8, 149 15.72 
B. Textiles and clothes 711 22.20 
c. Leather and shoes 100 23.61 
D. Paper and printing 543 22.32 
E. Wood and furniture 2,013 15.70 
F. Chemicals I ,010 26.75 
G. Building materials and non-meta I I i c 3, 188 27.20 
H. Metal work 956 19.53 
I. Mi see I I aneous 53 69.67 
Source Computed by author from data in I .R.C. Industrial Establishments 
Census,l971, Tripoli, 1972. 
bread, ice cream, milk, olive oi I and woodwork serve people in direct and 
personal ways. The interesting point is that the textiles and clothes, 
leather and shoes, paper and printing, chemical and metal groups, have relat-
ively very low coefficients too, but they are absent from most of the municipal-
ities, and concentrated just in a few. The leather and shoes group occur in 
two municipalities, the textiles and clothes, paper and printing and chemical 
groups in three municipalities, and metal work groups in six. However, this 
may be explained by the fact that these groups of industries are concentrated 
in the two most highly industrialized municipalities, Tripoli and Benghazi, 
where the proportion of their workers is very low in relation to the total 
number of workers. 
The coefficient of I oca I i zat ion discussed above is usefu I in the 
discussion of any groups and all industry in one region, not for comparing 
141 
groups between different regions. As Barbour stated, 
"The coeff-icients make a single national comparison between any 
part i cuI ar industry and a I I industry in the country. They are therefore 
much less informative than location quotients, which compare the number 
of workers in an industry in any particular region with that region's 
total of industrial workers to reveal whether this is a high or low figure; 
the normal is 1.0". (2) 
Applying location quotients, (3 ) to Libyan industries, Table 6.2 indicates 
that the food, soft drinks and tobacco group is very widely distributed in 
most of the municipalities. In general, except in EI-Abiar Municipality, 
it is very low in the eastern municipalities of Libya, but high in some western 
municipalities such as Sebratha, Tarhuna, Gadames and Zuara. This may be 
because these municipalities have mainly food industries, while in the others 
the percentage of workers in the food industry is less important than other 
industrial groups. The text i I es and c I othes group is tota I I y absent in 2 I 
municipalities, and very small in Homes. The quotient is rather high in 
Benghazi and almost average in Tripoli. For the leather group, the value is 
above average in Tripoli and Benghazi, but absent from the rest of the municipal-
iti es. This is because the group with a low percentage of workers is located 
in municipalities with a large total number of workers. For the paper and 
printing group, the value is high in Tripoli, and slightly average in Benghazi, 
which can be explained by the fact that the activity and consumption of this 
group's production is associated with the concentration of commerce and urban 
centres. For the wood and furniture group 1 Derna, Tobruk, Beda, EI-Marg and 
Sebha have high values, but it is absent in twelve municipalities. The con-
struction of new bui !ding projects, especially in EI-Marg and Beda, and their 
location far from the main ports;makes them dependent on local production of 
wood furniture and bui I ding materials, and the bui I ding materials group has 
very high values in the same municipalities. The high values of the latter 
group in Benghazi and Homes are due to the location of two large cement 
factories in these two municipalities. The values of the metal work group are 
Table 6.2 Location Quotients For Libyan Industries, 1971. 
Major Food, Textiles Leather Paper Wood and Bu i I ding 
Municipalities Soft drinks and and and Furn- Chemicals Mater- Metal Mi see I I an·-
and Clothes Shoes Printing iture ials work eo us 
tobacco 
--
I. Tripoli I. 0 I I. I 0 I. 37 I. 37 0.99 I. 48 0. 73 1.05 0. I 7 
2. Azizia I. 87 0 0 0 0. II 0 0.93 0 0 
3. Benghazi 0.30 1.81 I. I 3 1.09 I. 47 0.76 2.09 I. 82 3.07 
4. EI-Abiar 2.09 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5. EI-Zawia I. 85 0 0 0 0.36 0.29 0.20 0 0 
6. Sab ratha 2.03 0 0 0 0 0 0.10 0 0 
7. Zuara 2.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8. Misurata 1.44 0 0 0 0.55 0 0.98 0.75 0 
9. Zletin I. 94 0 0 0 0.24 0 0. I 3 0 0 
10. Jofra 2.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
II. Homes I. 35 0.49 0 0 0 0 I .69 0 0 
12. Tarhuna 2.03 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13. Ben-U I i d 2.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14. De rna 0.53 0 0 0.80 3.01 0 I. 65 0. 72 0 
15. Tobruk 0.63 0 0 0 3.00 0 I. 49 0. 70 0 
16. Bed a I. 40 0 0 0 2.50 0 0 0 0 
17. EI-Marg 0.43 0 0 0 2.54 0 2.60 0 0 
18. Ghari an I. 35 0 0 0 0.92 0 0.42 0.87 31.45 
19. Yefren 2.04 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20. Gad ames 2.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21. Sebha 0.61 0 0 0 I. 93 0 2.44 0 0 
22. Ghat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 314.3 
23. Ajdabia 3.00 0 0 0 0 0 4. 50 0 0 
+:> 
24. Si rte 2.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N 
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relatively high in Tripoli and Benghazi owing to the need for workshop 
services in urban centres. The very high value in Ghat in the miscellaneous 
group is because the workers who account for this group are few in comparison 
with the total number of workers. 
The above analysis does not give any indication of the degree of 
specialization of the municipalities. Of course, the degree of specialization 
must differ from one municipality to another, and each one probably specializes 
in one or two industries. A coefficie~t of specialization may help to deter-
mine the specialization of the municipalities from the tables of workers used 
before. As lsard says 
"The basic feature of specialization coefficients is the 
comparison of two percentage distributions applicable to given 
set of classification unity". (4) 
( 5) 
The coefficient of specialization (Cs) is stated as 
where 
N l IOOX. IOOY. l Cs I L: I I 2 -i =I xt yt 
x. is the number of workers in industrial category I 
X.t is the total industrial employment in area 
Y. is the regional employment in industry i 
I 
X 
Yt is the total regional industrial employment. 
in an exchange area 
and the limits to the values of these coefficients are 0 and 100. Figure 6. 2 
and Table 6.3 reveal that there is a different degree of specialization from 
one municipality to the other. High coefficients are found in EI-Abiar in 
the east, Sirte and Jofra in the middle, and Tarhuna, Ben-UI id Zuara, Yefren, 
Gadames and Ghat in the west of the country. The urban areas, such as Tripoli 
and Benghazi, which contain alI industry groups and have the largest number of 
industries, have low coefficients. Those with high coefficients are not 
particularly important as industrial regions, because their number of workers 
in industry is relatively smal I, and alI these municipalities have only one 
industrial group, mainly the food industry. For example, Gadames has 16 persons 
engaged in industry, alI of them engaged in the food industry group. Some 
Table 6.3 Coefficients Of Specialization in Libya, 1971, 
Major 
Mun i c i pa I it i es A B c D E F G H I Specialization 
Tri poI i 0.53 0.44 0.23 I. 18 0.09 2.88 5.20 0.29 0.27 5.56 
Azizia 42.42 4.25 0.60 3.25 10.70 6.04 I I. 55 5. 72 0.32 42.43 
Benghazi 34. 19 3.45 0.08 0.29 5.66 I. 40 20.80 4.69 0.65 35.64 
E l-Abia r 5 I. 27 4.25 0.60 3.25 12.04 6.04 19.06 5. 72 0.32 51.28 
EI-Zawia 41.44 4.25 0.60 3.25 7.76 4.20 15.29 5. 72 0.32 41.45 
Sabratha 49.38 4.25 0.60 3.25 12.04 6.04 17. 17 5. 72 0.32 49.39 
Zuara 51.27 4.25 0.60 3.25 12.04 6.04 14.06 5. 72 0.32 51.28 
Misurata 21.71 4.25 0.60 3.25 5.36 6.04 0.35 1.57 0.32 21.73 
Zletin 46.01 4.25 0.60 3.25 9. 17 6.04 16.67 5. 72 0.32 46.00 
Jofra 51.27 4.25 0.60 3.25 12.04 6.04 19.06 5. 72 0.32 51.28 
Homes 17. I I 2. 18 0.60 3.25 12.04 6.04 13.03 5. 72 0.32 30. 12 
Tarhuna 51.27 4.25 0.60 3.25 12.04 6.04 19.06 5. 72 0.32 51.28 
Ben-U I i d 51.27 4.25 0.60 3.25 12.04 6.04 19.06 5. 72 0.32 51 .28 
De rna 22.90 4.25 0.60 0.67 24. 12 6.04 12.31 1.66 0.32 36.44 
Tobruk 17.78 4.25 0.60 3.25 24.47 6.04 9.51 1.75 0.32 33.99 
Bed a 20.97 4.25 0.60 3.25 18.26 6.04 19.06 5. 72 0.32 39.24 
EI-Marg 28.39 4.25 0.60 3.25 18.47 6.04 30.09 5. 72 0.32 48.57 
Ghari an 17.27 4.25 0.60 3.25 1.04 6.04 11.06 0. 72 9.68 26.96 
Yefren 51.27 4.25 0.60 3.25 12.04 6.04 19.06 5. 72 0.32 51.28 
Gad ames 51 .27 4.25 0.60 3.25 12.04 6.04 19.06 5. 72 0.32 51.28 
Sebha 19. 14 4.25 0.60 3.25 II. 43 6.04 27.88 5. 72 0. 32 39.32 
Ghat 48.73 4.25 0.60 3.25 12.04 6.04 19.06 5. 72 99.68 99.69 
Ajdabia 13.77 4.25 0.60 3.25 12.04 6.04 18.44 5. 72 0.32 32.22 
Si rte 51.27 4.25 0.60 .3.25 12.04 6.04 19.08 5. 72 0.32 51.28 
Source : Computed by the author from data in I.R.C. Industrial Establishments Census 1971, Tripoli, 1972. 
-
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municipalities specialize in some industries and they have low coefficients. 
For instance, chemicals and leather and shoes groups are completely restricted 
to Tripoli and Benghazi which have low coefficients. The coefficient of 
specialization gives only a broad indication about the geography of industrial 
spec i a I i zat ion. 
Table 6.4 gives the number of workers by industry in the various 
regions. It is obvious that Tripoli, with 9,386 persons engaged in industries 
in 1971, is notable for its high numbers in all industry groups; more than 
56 percent of the total workers is employed there. Each industry group in 
Tripoli employs more than 40 percent of the total number of workers in that 
industry group. Benghazi also figures high in most of the groups, but lower 
than Tripoli. In EI-Zawia, Misurata, Homes and Azizia, industry is dominated 
by the food groups. In Derna, Tobruk and Sebha, the main industries are 
bui I ding materials and wood production. In other municipalities, most ind-
ustries are unrepresented and people are engaged only in the food industry. 
The general conclusion that we may draw from the above analysis is that Tripoli 
and Benghazi Municipalities contain all industrial groups, but the others are 
highly specialized in one or two groups. 
2. The Regional Distribution Of Industrial Activities 
A. General Distribution Features 
The next step is to identify and explain the regional location of 
various aspects of industry which so far have been considered at the national 
level. Table 6.5 indicates the location of the industrial establishments and 
workers among the major municipalities. When the distribution of establish-
ments and workers in them is considered, industry is seen to be widely scattered 
and exists as points in widely scattered regions. However, the table shows a 
marked concentration in certain localities. The distributions of both vari-
ables emphasise the concentration mainly in the north-west and north-east 
municipalities. 
Table 6.4 The Structure Of Employment In The Industrial Groups By Municipalities, 1971 
Food, soft Text i I es Leather Paper Wood 
Major drinks and and and and and Chemicals Building Metal Mi see II- Total 
Mun i c i pa I it i es Tobacco Clothes Shoes Printing Furniture Materia Is work aneous 
Tri poI i 4,624 440 77 416 I, 123 837 I ,300 564 5 9,386 
Azizia 546 - - - 8 - 45 - - 599 
Benghazi 493 261 23 120 600 156 I, 351 353 33 3,390 
EI-Abiar 56 - - - - - - - - 56 
EI-Zawia 862 - - - 41 17 36 - - 956 
Sab ratha 259 - - - - - 5 - - 264 
Zuara 46 - - - - - - - - 46 
Mi surata 305 - - - 29 - 81 18 - 433 
Zletin 198 - - - 6 - 5 - - 209 
Jofra 70 - - - - - - - - 70 
Homes 318 10 - - - - 155 - - 483 
Tarhuna 50 - - - - - - - - 50 
Ben-UI i d 8 - - - - - - - - 8 
De rna 70 - - 7 98 - 85 II - 271 
Tobruk 39 - - - 46 - 36 5 - 126 
Bed a 23 - - - 10 - - - - 33 
EI-Marg 12 - - - 18 - 29 - - 59 
Gha ri an 66 - - - II - 8 5 10 100 
Yefren 43 - - - - - - - - 43 
Gad ames 16 - - - - - - - 16 
-Sebha 29 - - - 23 - 46 - - 98 Ghat - - - - - - - 5 5 
-Aj dab i a 10 - - - - - 6 - - 16 S i rte 6 - - - - - - - 6 
Totals 8, 149 711 100 543 2,013 I ,010 3, 188 956 53 16,723 
Source : Computed by author from data in I.R.C. Industrial Establishments Census 1971, Tripoli, 1972. 
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Looking at individual muhafadat, the leaders in both variables 
are Tripoli Muhafada (41.4 and 59.7 percent respectively), and Benghazi 
Muhafada (26.4 and 20.6 percent), followed by EI-Zawia (8.9 and 7.6 percent). 
The least important muhafadat are EI-Kaleg Co.4 and 0. 7 percent), Sebha 
( 1.6 and 0. 7 percent) and G. Akhdar ( 1.5 and 0.6 percent). 
Turning to the distribution of workers in industry, Tripoli 
iVluhafada, with 59.7 percent, has almost three times as many workers in industry 
as Benghazi Muhafada, and more than eight times as many than the other 
muhafadat. In terms of number of establishments, Tripoli has not twice as 
many establishments as Benghazi, but more than four times as many as any other 
muhafada. Most of the industries are located in the largest urban settlement 
in the region. It is apparent that some municipalities, Murzough, Mizda, 
Nalut, EI-Shati, Ubari and Kufra are without any kind of industry. It is 
clear that the roughly triangular area in the north-west of the country, 
extending from corners at Misurata, Yefren and Zuara, is the major industrial 
area. It contains about three-quarters of all the workers and more than 
60 percent of the total establishments. 
In addition, the table shows there is no close relation between 
these two variables. AI I the municipalities, except Tripoli, Azizia and 
Jofra, have a low number of workers and a high number of establishments, whi 1st 
the latter ones have a high number of workers and a low number of establishments. 
The average number of workers per establishment varies from one municipality to 
another. For example, only three have more than the national average, Jofra, 
70 workers per establishment; Azizia, 33; and Tripoli, 26. The others have 
less; Benghazi, 14.5; EI-Zawia, 16.5; Derna, 8; and Ajdabia about five. 
The reason in the case of Jofra is that this region has only one large 
estab I i shment. Tripoli's high number is a reflection of the fact that most 
large and medium establishments are located in Tripoli Municipality. 
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Table 6.5 Regional Distribution Of Establishments And Persons Engaged 
In Manufacturing Industries In Libya In 1971. 
No. of 
Major No. of persons 
Muhafada Mun i c i pa I it i es Estab I i shments % engaged % 
Tripoli Tripoli 355 39.36 9,386 56. 13 
" Azizia 18 2.00 599 3.58 
Benghazi Benghazi 235 26.05 3,390 20.27 
" E l-Ab i ar 3 0.33 56 0.33 
EI-Zawia EI-Zawia 58 6.43 956 5.71 
" Sabratha 16 I. 78 264 1.57 
" Zuara 6 0.67 46 0.28 
Misurata Misurata 38 4.21 433 2.59 
" Zletin 13 I. 44 209 1.25 
" 
Jofra 0. II 70 0.42 
Homes Homes 49 5.43 483 2.88 
" Tarhuna 4 0.44 50 0.30 
" Ben-U I i d 0. II 8 0.05 
De rna De rna 34 3. 77 271 1.62 
" Tobruk 19 2. II 126 0.75 
G.Akhdar Bed a 6 0.67 33 0.20 
" E 1-Marg 7 0. 78 59 0.35 
Ghari an Gharian 14 1.55 100 0.60 
II Yefren 5 0.55 43 0.26 
" Gadames 0. II 16 0.10 
Sebha Sebha 14 1.55 98 0.59 
" Ghat 0. II 5 0.03 
E 1-Ka I eg Aj dab i a 3 0.33 16 0.10 
" 
Si rte 0. II 6 0.04 
Total 902 100.00 16,723 100.00 
Source Computed by author from data in I. R.C. Industrial Estab I i shments 1971, 
T ..... inf""'.l i 107')-
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Figure 6.3 is a ratio map showing the various relationships 
between the number of the workers engaged in industries in 1971 and the 
total population in 1973. It is evident that they coincide to a certain 
extent. From this figure it is clear that the ratio varies from the 
maximum of 15 workers per thousand persons in Tripoli Municipality to zero 
in Ajdabia, Sirte, Ben-UI id and Beda municipalities. Comparing these var-
lations with the national average, which is 7 workers per thousand persons, 
one can distinguish two main different groups. The first group contains only 
four municipalities with a ratio number above the national average; Three 
in the north-west; Tripoli 15, Azizia 8, and EI-Zawia 7; and one in the 
north-east; Benghazi I I; while the second group includes alI the other 
municipalities, where the ratio is less than the national average. The conc-
entration is highest in Tripoli Municipality, where the city itself has more 
than 550,000 inhabitants, and adjoining towns are large; Jansur with 30,630, 
Garabol i with 14,546, and Tajora with 34,449 inhabitants. 
Indeed, from the above characteristics of distribution, one 
can make the following observations : 
I. The municipalities which have larger cities have greater concentration 
of industry. Tripoli, Benghazi and EI-Zawia Municipalities have, between 
them, about 72 percent of the total establishments, and about 82 percent of 
the total number of workers engaged in industry in 1971. The same also 
holds for the number of the workers in relation to the total population. 
This is generally higher in these municipalities and lower in others far from 
Tripoli and Benghazi, especially the southern regions. 
2. There is a strong correlation between urban areas and the concentration 
of the industries. Urban areas tend to be the main poles of concentration 
of the number of workers engaged in industry. The distribution of industry 
i I lustrates that each activity of the municipality tends to be concentrated 
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in or around the main town. In general, the distribution of industry 
in Libya is both polarized and dualistic, because it is concentrated mainly 
in two poles, in the north-west and north-east of the country, and because 
it is concentrated in the north of the country, while there is nothing in 
the south. 
B. Distribution By Establishment Size 
Having studied the distribution of the industries among the 
municipalities, the census data may also be used to give some insight into 
the industrial character in terms of the size and structure of the establish-
ments. From Table 6.6, which i I lustrates the distribution of the industries 
among three groups, certain conclusions may be drawn. Only 55 large establish-
ments (with 50+ workers) employ 46.9 percent of the workers, while 749 smal I 
establishments (with 5-19 workers), 83 percent of the total number, employ 
36 percent of the total workers. But this tendency for large establishments 
is not present in a I I the mun i c i pa I it i es. 
Furthermore, the table shows that the industries are to be found in 
all major municipalities, except the six mentioned earlier (see p.l47 ). 
Large establishments are present in nine municipalities located mainly in the 
north of the country, whi 1st small industries are found in most municipalities 
except in Jofra (Misurata Muhafada). Medium size industries are present in 
only eight municipalities. 
As is reasonably plain from the table, differences in the scales of 
manufacturing in municipalities are marked. Tripoli, Benghazi and EI-Zawia 
have the largest number of smal I establishments, 513, or about 69 percent of 
the total number of smal I establishments, whi 1st Ghat; Ben-UI id, Gadames 
and S i rte have I ess than two estab I i shments in any group. This is partly 
due to the nature of the industries existing there. Other regions having 
a significant number of smal I establishments are mainly confined to the 
north, such as Homes, Misurata, Derna and Tobruk. 
Table 6.6 Regional Distribution Of Manufacturing Industries And Employment By Major Municipalities, 1971 
Sma II Medium Large Total 
Major No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of 1\lo. of No. of 
Municipal-;- Estab I ish- workers Establish- workers Establish- workers Estab I ish- workers 
ities ments ments ments ments 
Tripoli 259 2,158 57 I ,698 39 5,530 355 9,386 
Azizia 10 86 7 184 I 329 18 599 
Benghazi 204 I, 71 7 25 697 6 976 235 3~390 
EI-Ab tar 2 13 I 43 - - 3 56 
E 1-Zaw i a 50 462 5 110 3 384 58 956 
Sabratha 14 98 - - 2 166 16 264 
Zuara 6 46 - - - - 6 46 
Mi surata 36 277 I 36 I 120 38 433 
Zletin 12 79 - - I 130 13 209 
Jofra - - - - I 70 I 70 
Homes 48 339 - - I 144 49 483 
Tarhuna 3 30 I 20 - - 4 50 
Ben-UI id I 8 - - - - I 8 
De rna 34 271 - - - - 34 271 
Tobruk 19 126 - - - - 19 126 
Bed a 6 33 - - - - 6 33 
E 1-Marg 6 37 I 22 - - 7 59 
Ghari an 14 100 - - - - 14 100 
Yefren 5 43 - - - - 5 43 
Gad ames I 16 - - - - I 16 
Sebha 14 98 - - - - 14 98 
Ghat I 5 - - - - I 5 
Aj dab i a 3 16 - - - - 3 16 
Si rte I 6 - - - - I 6 
-
\.Jl 
Total 749 6,064 98 2,810 55 7,849 902 16,723 
Source : Computed by the author from data in I .R.C., Industrial Establishments Census I 9 71 , T r i poI i , 1972. 
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In terms of the large groups, Tripoli is the dominant Municipality. 
Thirty nine out of 55, about 71 percent of the total group, are located there, 
while only a very smal I proportion of the establishments remain outside the 
Tripoli Municipality. 
Another important aspect of the size of the establishments is the 
way in which workers in the nine groups are divided among these categories 
( F l gu re 6. 4) • It is obviously clear· thai' Libyan industrial groups -t-end to 
fall into three different categories, with the leather, paper and miscell-
aneous groups standing rather distinctively outside this. The first 
category contains the wood, furniture and metal work industrial groups which 
are chiefly characterised by small establishments whose workers account for 
more than 52 percent of the total number of workers, whi 1st their large 
establishments have a low proportion of the total workers. The second 
category contains the food, soft drinks and tobacco and textile and clothes 
groups, characterised by large establishments whose workers account for more 
than 56 percent of the total number of workers, whi 1st the smal I and medium 
establishments contain relatively low proportions of workers. The third 
category comprises the bui I ding materials and chemicals groups which are not 
carried on exclusively in any one size of establishment, but tend to have a 
fairly low proportion of smal I establishments and similar numbers of large-
sized workers. The paper and printing group has few middle-sized establish-
ments, but mostly smal I and large-sized ones. The leather and shoes group 
also has mostly middle-sized establishments with few smal I establishments 
and no large ones. The miscellaneous group has mainly smal I establishments. 
The distribution of different sized structures of all industrial 
groups among the various major municipalities throws I ight on several issues. 
First, in terms of large establishments, Tripoli is the dominant region for 
a I I g ro up s o f the i n d us t r i e s • In the food, soft drinks and tobacco group, 
six municipalities have large establishments. Tr i poI i is by far the most 
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important municipality, with 3,776 workers, which is nearly ten times the 
number in EI-Zawia, the second municipality, and about forty times the number 
in Benghazi. The paper and printing, wood and furniture, and metal work 
groups, are almost confined to Tripoli Municipality. None of the other 
municipalities has any establishment of large size in these groups of 
industries. Tripoli and Benghazi are the only municipalities with large 
estabi ishrnents ln the chernicai anu i"ex"li ie gr-oups. Benghazi leads in H1e 
textile group with 53 percent of the total number of workers, whi 1st Tripoli 
has more than six times as many workers as Benghazi in the chemicals group. 
There are no large establishments in the leather and shoes groups in any of 
the municipalities. Excluding the food, soft drinks and tobacco groups, 
Homes is the only municipality outside Tripoli and Benghazi which has a large 
estab I i shment. 
( F i g u re 6 • 5 ) • 
It has one bui I ding materials establishment with 144 workers 
Secondly, the distribution of workers in medium-sized establishments 
show a certain similarity to the distribution for large ones. Except 
in the groups concerned with food, soft drinks and tobacco and bui I ding 
materials, alI medium-sized establishments are concentrated in Tripoli and 
Benghazi. Food, soft drinks and tobacco and bui I ding materials establish-
ments are more widely distributed, each is found in six municipalities. 
For example, in the case of the former group, the municipalities are Tripoli, 
Benghazi, Azizia, EI-Zawia, EI-Abiar and Tarhuna, with Tripoli contributing 
about 40 percent of the total number of workers. In the case of the latter, 
they are Tripoli, Benghazi, EI-Zawia, Azizia, Misurata and EI-Marg, with a 
high concentration in Tripoli (43 percent) and Benghazi (42 percent) 
( F i g u re 6 . 6 ) . 
Thirdl·y, the distribution of small establishments is completely 
different. The food group figures in 22 municipalities to varying degrees, 
but Tripoli is sti I I the leading municipality with about one-quarter of the 
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total number of workers, followed by EI-Zawia. The building materials 
industry in this size is distributed in 14 municipalities, but Benghazi 
I eads with about 42 percent of the tot a I, fo I I owed by Tr i poI i . The wood 
and furniture group is distributed in twelve regions, and metal work in six, 
with Tripoli leading in the former, and Benghazi in the latter. Other groups 
in this size are mainly concentrated in Tripoli and Benghazi (Figure 6.7). 
The cone I us ion to be drawn from the above discussion is that riost 
of the large and medium-sized establishments for alI groups are located in 
Tripoli and Benghazi, while smal I establishments for most of the groups are 
distributed in most of the regions. In terms of the number of establishments, 
the wide distribution of smal I factories is mainly associated with potential 
consumer demand and local raw materials. They include establishments 
producing perishable items, or goods which gain weight, and hence have 
relatively high transport costs, such as drinks and some bui I ding materials. 
It seems that small-scale industry is ubiquitous in most of the municipalities, 
whi 1st medium and large are more localized. 
C. Regional Distribution By The Type Of Ownership 
A range of the data can be examined to give some crude index and 
measure of the type of ownership in industries. Considering the co-operative 
and joint-stock companies as the private sector, it is evident from Table 6. 7 
that in 1971 most of industry was control led by the private sector, with 
about 87 percent of the total workers. However, as separate groups, it is 
clear that sole-proprietorship dominated the scene, accounting for about 
45 percent of the total number of workers, more than twice the number in the 
joint-stock companies, which come next with about 21 percent of the total. 
The state-owned is the smallest group, with about 13 percent, and of this 
about half are engaged in one establishment, the tobacco industry. 
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Table 6.7 Distribution Of Workers By Industrial Groups Among Ownership 
Industry 
Food, soft drinks and 
Textiles and clothes 
Leather and shoes 
Paper and printing 
Wood and Furniture 
Chemicals 
Bui I ding Materials 
Metal work 
Mi see I I aneous 
Types iri 1971. 
tobacco 
Total 
Sole 
Proprietor-
ship 
3, 192 
565 
32 
276 
I, 435 
229 
I ,244 
553 
48 
7,574 
Co-op 
erati ve 
companies 
I, 294 
146 
5 
142 
408 
338 
758 
204 
5 
3, 300. 
Joint-
stock 
companies 
I, 937 
18 
125 
443 
912 
199 
3,634 
State-
owned 
I, 726 
45 
170 
274 
2,215 
Source Computed by author from data in I. R. C. Industria I Estab I i shmerits 
Census 1971, Tripoli, 1972. 
The table shows that sole-proprietorship dominates in all industrial 
groups, with the exception of the leather and chemicals groups. Sole-
proprietorship and co-operative companies are found in all the groups, but 
mainly in food, soft drinks and tobacco, wood and furniture and bui !ding 
materials, which together account for 77.5 percent and 74.5 percent of the 
total workers in each ownership type respectively. State-ownership is 
involved in only four groups: food, wood, leather and building materials. 
Joint-Stock companies are concentrated mainly in the food and bui I ding 
materials groups, which account for more than three quarters of the total 
workers in this type. The food group accounts for 78 percent of the total 
workers in state-owned industries. In the leather group, state-owned 
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factories employ the highest proportion of workers, probably because alI 
tanneries in Libya are state-owned. In contrast, in the chemical group 
joint-stock companies predominate, followed by co-operative companies. 
Furthermore, detailed analysis indicates that sole proprietorship 
establishments are numerically important. The general picture is indicated 
by Figure 6.8 which shows both the marked numerical dominance of sole-
proprietorship establishments in the industrial ownership structure, and its 
contribution made to total workers. It contains about 45 percent of the 
total workers, with 81.4 percent of the total establishments, whi 1st the state-
owned, in contrast, accounts for 2.6 percent and 13.3 percent respectively. 
With regard to the distribution of these types among the different 
municipalities, Figure 6.9 reveals that 21 out of 24 regions have sole-
proprietorship type industry, but this is highly concentrated in Tripoli and 
Benghazi Municipalities, with about 69 percent of total workers in this type. 
Thirteen municipalities have co-operative company types, but Tripoli 
Municipality comprises about three-quarters of the total workers, and more 
than five times the number in Benghazi. Joint-stock companies are concentrated 
in only five municipalities, where there are cities and large populations. 
This can be attributed to the fact that alI partners are involved in commerce, 
which is concentrated in the main cities, and, naturally, joint-stock companies 
are looking for high profits. Three of these five (Tripoli, Benghazi, El-
Zawia) provide the best market and amenities in the country. State-owned 
industries are located in ten municipalities, mainly western ones, but the 
high concentration is in Tripoli Municipality, with 72.7 percent of the total. 
In addition, the figure shows that six municipalities have only sole-proprietor-
ship establishments; Ghat, Sebha, Tobruk, Sirte, Gharian and Zuara. Ben-UI id 
has only one co-operative company, whi 1st Gadames and Jofra Municipalities 
each have one state-owned establishment. 
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D. Distribution By Type Of Industry 
The distr-ibution of number of establishments and number of workers 
among the nine industrial groups is shown in Table 6.8. This emphasises 
the fact that three of the groups comprise about four-fifths of the number 
of establishments and the workers. Another important feature also indicated 
from the detailed structure and distribution of industry in the table is the 
tendency for industrial concentration in one industrial group, food, soft 
drinks and tobacco. The importance of this industrial group is clearly 
apparent. It is widely regarded as a pioneer industry in the process of 
industrialization. It accounts for more than 48 percent of the total number 
of workers and about 40 percent of the total establishments. In second 
position is the bui I ding materials group, with 19 percent of the total workers, 
followed by the wood and furniture group with 12 percent of the total. Other 
groups have a very low proportion, varying between 7 and 0.3 percent of the 
tot a I, and apart from the mi see I I aneous group, the I eather group has the 
I owest proportion. 
The production of durable consumer articles is sti I I a significant 
contribution in the industrial sector. The industry is sti I I at the primary 
stage of development. Its accent unti I 1971 ·was on the uti I ization of 
simple locally-produced and semi-manufactured materials, hence the emphasis 
on food canning, olive oi I, processing of cement and manufacturing cigarettes, 
matches, wood, plastic, aluminium and simple leather articles. 
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Table 6.8 The Distribution Of The Establishments And The Workers Among 
The Industrial Groups In 1971. 
No. of No. of 
Industry Estab I i shments % Workers % 
Food, soft drinks and tobacco 364 40.36 8,149 48.73 
Textiles and clothes 27 2.99 711 4. 25 
Leather and shoes 6 0.67 100 0.60 
Paper and printing 33 3.66 543 3.24 
Wood and furniture 201 22.28 2,013 12.04 
Chemicals 39 4.32 I ,0 I 0 6. 04 
Bui I ding materials 152 16.85 3,188 19.06 
Metal work 73 8.09 956 5. 72 
Miscellaneous 7 0.78 53 0.32 
Total. 902 100.00 I 6, 72 3 I 00. 00 
Source Computed by author from data in I.R.C. Industrial Establishments 
Census. 1971, Tripoli, 1972. 
3. Industria I Groups And Their Sub-Groups 
The nine Industrial groups wi II now be examined in detai I in order 
to understand the differences between their distribution. Which kind of sub-
groups does each major industry have? Which sub-groups are most widely 
distributed? To answer alI these questions each of these major groups, with 
its industrial sub-groups, wi I I be discussed separately. 
A. Food, Soft Drinks and Tobacco 
This group involves processes which are mainly dependent on local 
agricultural products, or, in some cases, on raw materials which are imported 
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and which are obviously more economically produced locally. But, in general, 
the industry is not well-developed, especially those industries which depend 
on local agricultural goods. This is partly because these commodities are 
mostly consumed fresh. Within this group, the 1971 Industrial Census 
recognises and gives detailed characteristics for only fifteen items; ice 
cream, milk products, coffee, animal fodder, fat, fish canning, tomato canning, 
fruit juice, olive oil, flour, bread, sweets, macaroni, soft drinks and 
tobacco. Table 6.9 indicates the distribution of these industries among 
the various regions. 
01 ive oi I processing and tomato canning are the leading industries 
in this group, employing about 20 percent and 18 percent of the workers of 
the group respectively. 01 ive oi I processing provides a clear example of 
the duality which exists in Libyan industry between traditional mi lis 
and modern factories. Except in Tripoli, the olive oi I establishments are 
smal I and have only I imited market areas. Generally they have less than 
10 workers, and they tend to be seasonal in operation. The establishments 
are distributed in 12 municipalities, mostly in the north-west of the country. 
EI-Zawia is the main region, with about 29 percent of the total workers of 
this process. The wide spread of numerous smal I establishments producing 
olive oi I in the western municipalities is largely due to the scatter of 
olive oi I production there, and its scarcity in other parts, and because 
olives are affected by long transportation. Besides, the traditional process 
is not complicated, and does not need high capital investments. AI so, o I i ve 
oi I is much used in the daily I ife of the people. Therefore, it is more 
convenient to have it processed near the raw materials than to transport 
them. But with the improvement of transport faci I ities, new large ones wi II 
be more and more located in large towns. 
Tomato canning occurs in seven large establishments with very 
modern machinery. These are located in three municipalities; Tripoli with 
about 55 percent, Azizia, 22.5 percent, and EI-Zawia, 22.5 percent of the 
total of the workers. 
Table 6.9 Regional Distribution Of Workers In The Food, Soft Drinks And Tobacco Groups By Sub-Groups, 1971. 
Main Ice Mi I k Tomato Fish 01 i ve Flour Maca- Animal Fruit Soft Tab-
Municipal- cream Prod- Can- Can- Oi I Mi II Bread Sweets ron i Coffee Fodder Fat juice drinks acco 
ities ucts ning ning 
Tri poI i 62 29 806 50 305 171 293 544 340 I I 53 - 80 680 I ,200 
Azizia - - 329 - 177 - 5 - - - - - - 35 
Benghazi 10 5 - - - 109 242 60 14 - - 6 - 47 
E l-Ab i ar - - - - - - 13 - - - 43 
EI-Zawia - - 330 - 468 - 64 
Sab ratha - - - 166 68 - 25 
Zuara - - - - 46 
Misurata - - - 120 96 - 89 
Zletin - - - 130 37 - 31 
Jofra - - - - - - - - - - - - 70 
Homes - - - - 280 - 33 5 
Tarhuna - - - - 44 - 6 
Ben-U I i d - - - - 8 
De rna - - - - - - 57 - - - - - - 13 
Tobruk - - - - - - 39 
Bed a - - - - - - 23 
EI-Marg - - - - - - 12 
Ghari an - - - - 61 - 5 
Yefren - - - - 36 - 7 
Gadames - - - - - - 29 - - - - - 16 
Sebha 
Aj dab i a - - - - - - 10 
S i rte - - - - - - 6 
Total 72 34 I ,465 466 . I ,626 280 989 609 354 II 96 6 166 775 I ,200 
-
Source : Computed by the author from data in I.R.C. 0\ Industrial Establishments Census 1971 Tripoli 1972. 0 
' ' 
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Bakeries with 12 percent of the total food group workers have 
the greatest scatter among the municipalities, being located in 19 municipal-
ities, though more than half are concentrated in Tripoli and Benghazi. The 
distribution of bakeries is related to the high daily consumption of bread, 
the wide spread of the market, and the perishable nature of the product. 
Besides, this industry does not need ski I led workers, and in most cases it 
remains essentially traditional, with smal I bakeries supplying the various 
towns and communities in the large cities. 
Canning of sardines and tuna accounts for about 5.7 percent of the 
total workers and is mostly located on the western coast. This industry is 
found in four regions, with Sabratha leading with 35.6 percent of the total 
number of workers, followed by Homes, Misurata and Tripoli Municipalities. 
The eastern municipalities show a very clear lack of this type of activity, 
because the only establishment bui It in Benghazi by the Ita I ians was 
destroyed during the Second World War and no Ita I ian businessmen remained in 
the eastern part, unlike the situation in the western regions. In addition, 
there is a shortage of fish due to the permission to use the national waters 
given to the Greek trawlers by the former Cyrenaican government and continued 
unti I recently. In the recent and early development of this industry en-
couragement was given to the western regions by the bui I ding of cold storage 
and the development of some trawlers, and the fisheries were helped through 
their co-operative societies. 
The manufacture of macaroni is one of the oldest industries 
founded by the Ita I ians in the country. Its location in Tripoli and Benghazi 
is adjacent to flour mi I Is and urban markets. Sweets, milk, coffee and ice 
cream manufacture are also concentrated in Tripoli and Benghazi, which com-
prise alI the workers involved in these processes, reflecting a strong I ink-
age with the urban population consumption. Macaroni and sweets industries 
have large establishments, and their production is transported to other 
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municipalities in Libya. For example, most of the sweets consumed in 
Tripoli, Misurata and Homes come from the Benghazi establishments, and the 
macaroni consumed in Benghazi, Misurata and Homes comes from Tripoli 
estab I i shments. 
The flour industry operates in two different ways : Large 
establishments which buy grain, mi II it, and sell the finished products, and 
in smai i towns and rural areas smal i traditional mi lis to which people bring 
grain for mi II ing and then take the flour for their subsistence, or to shops. 
Fruit and vegetable canning and animal fodder production are not 
wei !-developed because of the large consumption of fresh fruit and vegetables 
and the lack of raw materials for fodder. The two animal fodder establish-
ments depend mostly on imported raw materials. 
Soft drinks, with about 9.5 percent of the workers in this group, 
are concentrated in four municipalities; Tripoli, with about 87 percent of 
the total workers in this industry, is the important region. The Pepsi Cola 
establishment in Tripoli is the largest soft drinks factory in the country, 
employing more than 500 workers. Its market location is expressed in the 
origin of its raw materials, which are mainly imported from Europe, only water 
being locally derived. Elsewhere, the soft drinks processes are I imited, 
except in Benghazi, Derna and Azizia Municipalities. 
Up to now, Libya has only one tobacco establishment located in 
Tripoli, and it is the largest factory in the country, employing about I ,200 
workers in 1971. 
state-monopoly. 
It was set up by the ltal ians and it was, and sti II is, a 
The establishment produces five types of production : 
cigarettes, cigars, tobacco, chewing tobacco and snuff. Its location is due 
to the proximity of the only growing area, because tobacco production is 
restricted by the government to western areas. 
Finally, the contrast between the traditional and modern is sti I I 
apparent in this group of industries. Production sti II comes mainly from 
smal I establishments, but some large-scale production has developed in 
recent years. 
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B.· Textiles And Clothes 
Textiles are generally acknowledged to be a pioneer in the 
process of industrialization, along with the food industry. Text i I es have 
survived as a traditional industry with different types of articles in each 
part of the country. The domestic handicrafts industry is carried out 
exc I us i ve I y by fer11a I es, as pa r'·J·-t i me work, espec i a I I y in ·J·he inter' i or, 
producing coarse clothes for rural people- Barracans, woollen traditional 
dresses, and carpets are made by using vertical or horizontal weaving frames. 
The modern textile industry employs 503 workers, and the establish-
ments have long existed in two main cities, where Tripoli and Benghazi contain 
about 98 percent of the workers CTable 6. 10). The industry depends heavily 
on imported materials, such as thrown silk yarns, wool yarns, cotton yarns, 
flex yarns, and synthetic fibres. None of the 17 establishments specialize 
in one type of production; alI produce a combination of articles, such as 
ridas, foulars and ferrashias. Other branches of this industry, I ike 
knitted goods, are absent in the country. 
Table 6.10 Regional Distribution Of Workers In Textiles And Clothes 
Groups By Sub-Group in 1971 
No. of workers % No. of workers % 
tvlun i c i pa I i ty in text i I es in clothes 
Tripoli 232 46. 12 208 100.00 
Benghazi 261 51.89 
Homes 10 I. 99 
. Tota I 503 100.00 208 100.00 
Source Computed by author from data in I. R. C. Industrial Estab I i shments 
Census 1971, Tripoli, 1972. 
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The respondents of the textile establishments ranked the city 
amenities as the important factor for location, largely because this industry 
depends mostly on female labour which is available only in the main cities. 
Proximity to the market and power supply is also very important. The clothing 
industry is a new industry in Libya, entirely located in Tripoli Municipality, 
and is carried on in smal I establishments, mostly tailoring. 
C. Leather And Shoes 
The leather industry forms a very small element in the present 
industrial structure of the country. Only four establishments occur and are 
concentrated in the large cities, but recently a new factory has been 
established in Tajora to produce large quantities of leather for the shoe 
factory in Misurata. The location depends largely on locally-produced hides 
(derived from nearby slaughterhouses), salt and water supply. 
The leather industry employs 55 workers who work mainly in tanning 
rather than dressing. Traditional shoes are produced in two establishments 
with 45 workers located in Tripoli Municipality, where the market and raw 
materials are available; production is especially for the tourist. The 
largest is the Tajora shoe factory with about 27 workers. However, in spite 
of the absence of a modern shoe industry in Libya (the new modern one in 
Misurata started operation only in September 1974 and is not at ful I capacity), 
cobbling is one of the main handicrafts in the rural interior. This does not 
mean that previously there was never a modern shoe factory; as stated, early 
in the 1960s, one was established in Benghazi, but this closed down (see 
Chapter 4). 
D. Paper And Printing 
The location of paper and printing establishments forms a clear 
spatial pattern. The paper industry, with about 41 percent of the total 
workers of the group, is located in two regions, Tripoli and Benghazi, while 
165 
the printing industry, with 59 percent of the total, is located in three 
regions; Tripoli, Benghazi, and Derna. This may be because of the strong 
I inks between the paper and printing industries, on the one hand, and between 
printing and urban and commercial centres, on the other. The main products 
of the paper industry are commercial paper bags and roller papers, while 
those of the printing industry are largely stationery, bi I Is, posters, 
commerciai forms and the i ike. Other printing processes, such as publishing 
and periodical printing, are sti I I absent in Libya. 
E. Wood And Furniture 
Wood processing employs about 89 percent of the total workers of 
this group. It is widespread in 12 municipalities, but more than four-
fifths of the total workers are in Tripoli and Benghazi Municipalities. 
Derna, EI-Zawia and Tobruk Municipalities are next in importance. This type 
of activity produces wooden articles such as construction timber, doors, 
windows, and similar items for house-bui I ding, and its location is mainly 
related to the market. 
The furniture industry had 218 workers (Table 6. I I) working in 
three establishments, two of them of large size. This is due to the fact 
that the profit in this industry is not very great in smal I establishments. 
Martin estimated that the most profitable size of establishments is probably 
(6) 
one within the 50 to 100 worker range. However, the industry is sti I I 
in its early stages, and its main articles produced are wardrobes, tables, 
chairs, desks, and some decorative items. The major location factor in the 
furniture industry in Tripoli is the market, due to the I ink with the head-
quarters of the government department dealing with the buying of furniture. 
Table 6. I I Regional Distribution Of Workers In Wood And Metalwork 
Groups By Sub~Groups in 1971-
Stee I Meta I 
Municipality Joineries Furniture Workshop Furniture 
Tripoli 905 218 39 180 
Azizia 8 
Benghazi 600 218 15 
EI-Zawia 41 
Misurata 29 
Zletin 6 
De rna 98 II 
Tob ruk 46 5 
Bed a 10 
EI-Marg 18 
Ghari an I I 5 
Sebha 23 
.Total 1795 218 278 195 
Sheet 
metal 
320 
120 
18 
458 
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A I umi n i um 
workshop 
25 
.25 
Source : Computed by author from date in I. R. C. Industria I Estab I i shments 
F. Chemicals 
Census. 1971, Tripoli, 1972. 
Within this group come II distinct sub-groups : industrial gases, 
paints, terti I izers, soaps, matches, tyres, rubber, batteries, perfumes, 
plastic and dri I I ing mud production. Table 6.12 reveals that the paint and 
industrial gases branches are the leading industries, with 20 percent and 
17 percent of the total workers respectively. The industry is markedly 
concentrated in Tripoli; the only other centres are Benghazi and EI-Zawia. 
Tripoli is the major municipality for all chemical manufacturing except for 
dri II ing mud, which is used only for petroleum exploration, and Benghazi is 
the closest place to the oi I fields. 
Table 6.12 Regional Distribution Of Workers In The Chemical Group 
By Sub-Groups in 1971· 
Mun i c i pa I i ty 
Industry 
Industrial Gases 
Fedll izer 
Paint 
Perfumes 
Soap 
Tyres 
Matches 
Rubber 
Plastic 
Batteries 
Dri I I i ng Mud 
Tripoli 
137 
35 
198 
67 
93 
15 
70 
125 
48 
49 
Benghazi 
35 
8 
5 
12 
96 
EI-Zawia 
17 
Total 
172 
35 
206 
67 
110 
15 
70 
125 
53 
61 
96 
167 
Source Computed by author from data in I.R.C. Industrial Establishments 
Census 1971, Tripoli, 1972. 
In Benghazi there are only five types of chemical industries, 
while EI-Zawia has only one sub-group, a soap establishment. In other 
municipalities the industry is absent, because it is largely dependent on 
imported raw materials which come mostly by sea. 
G. Bui I ding Materials 
This group has four types of industries : cement, cement products 
(bricks, pipes and prefabricated elements), lime and gypsum, and marble and 
t i I es. From Table 6.13 it is obvious that cement production has the largest 
employment, with about half of the total workers, followed by marble and 
t i I es processing with 3 8 percent of the tot a I . 
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Table 6.13 Regional Distribution Of Workers lri Building fv1aterials 
Group by Sub-Groups, 1971. 
Marble and 
Mun i c i pa I it i es ti I es Lime 
Cement 
Products Cement 
Tri poI i 729 571 
Azizia 39 6 
Benghazi 344 5 743 259 
EI-Zawia 36 
Sab ratha 5 
Mi surata 41 40 
Zletin 5 
Homes II 144 
De rna 85 
Tobruk 12 24 
EI-Marg 29 
Ghari an 8 
Sebha 46 
Aj dab i a 6. 
Total 1,21 7 5 1,563 403 
Source Computed by author from data in I.R.c.· Industrial Establishment 
Census 1971, Tripoli, 1972. 
Cement brick processing is the main branch of the cement production 
industry, and it occurs in about half of the municipalities, but principally 
in Tripoli, and Benghazi, with more than 84 percent of the workers of this 
sub-group. The same can be said for the marble and tiles industries. The 
manufacture of cement is carried out in two large modern establishments. 
Libya's first cement establishment was opened at Homes in 1967, and more than 
60,000 tons yearly were produced domestically, but following the increase in 
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domestic consumption another was opened in Benghazi in /972, with an average 
yearly production of 200,000 tons. But they sti I I produce less than half 
of the total consumption of the country. 
The concentration of these industries in and around the urban centres 
is because of the construction of new bui /ding projects, whi 1st in the interior, 
by contrast, mud, timber and zinc were unti I recently used for bui I ding. 
Table 6.13 shows that the marble and tiles industry is concentrated 
in the western municipalities where bui /ding projects are larger; in the east, 
it is found only in two municipalities, Benghazi and Tobruk. Natural stone, 
quarried in large quantities in EI-Zawia region, has been largely used in 
the western municipalities as bui I ding materials, whereas cement products 
have tended to be located in the eastern municipalities, due to the unavai 1-
abi I ity of the natural stone. Vardjan stated, 
"Stone quarrying plays an important part in providing raw 
materials for construction. This quarrying is (due to the concentration 
of natural resources) concentrated in the Mugata of EI-Zawia. In 1964, 
according to the Industrial Census, 79 establishments employing five or 
more workers were reported to be engaged in stone quarrying in the whole 
country. Of these, as many as 62 were located in Mugata EI-Zawia." (7) 
H. Metal Work 
There is I ittle metal working, production being mainly carried on in 
small workshops and smithies, and it can be further divided. into four types 
of industries : metal furniture, sheet metal working, steel workshops, and 
aluminium workshops. The activities are mainly in the main towns (see 
Table 6.11), and, in general, all the establishments are small, and deal with 
wrought iron, producing many articles for the new Libyan houses, such as iron-
work gates, window frames and gri I Is, tanks, rai I ings and banisters. The 
location is I inked to the city amenities and services, as well as the market. 
Imported raw materials and the products are bulky and expensive to transport. 
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To summarise, the following major conclusions can be drawn. 
Industrial location in Libya is mainly concentrated in the north of the 
country, particularly in two poles in and around Tripoli and Benghazi. 
The municipalities which have the main urban centres are the most 
attractive locations. These two municipalities also have the largest 
establ ishrnents, while the establishments which tend to be distributed over 
the other municipalities are small. Tripoli, with a I imited number of 
exceptions, is the major centre for any particular industry. The food 
group is the leading industry in terms of number of establishments and 
workers. F i n a I I y , most of the man u fact u r i n g est a b I i s h men t s d u r i n g the 
period under study were smal !-scale establishments and private ownership 
p rev a i Is. The discussion of the distribution and structure of industries 
does not include the detailed reasons which affect location, and these 
wi II appear in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Factors Affecting Industrial Location 
In a study of the industrial distribution in Libya, one must take 
into account the influence of industrial location factors. They are 
important in dtermining which attributes a region must have to attract 
industry. It is clear from the previous chapter that there are variations 
of industrial concentration among municipalities in Libya. Therefore the 
main objective of this chapter is to study the industrial location factors, 
with an emphasis on their influence on industrial location in the 
municipalities. 
It is important to keep in mind the assumption that the location 
decision is generally a two-step process. The first step is the selection 
of the region of location. The second is the selection of a site within 
that region. (I) Consequently, the discussion in this chapter is mainly 
concerned with the regional decision, while Chapter 8 wi I I be concerned 
with the choice of site within the main cities. 
Industrial activity in general is seldom, if ever, found evenly 
spread over the earth's surface, or distributed in an apparently random way. 
Some places and regions have a wide range and high density of industrial 
concentration, whi 1st others may have only a I ittle industry. Although 
industry may be dispersed in a fairly regular manner throughout whole 
regions or countries, with no area standing out as particularly important, 
other countries may have a high concentration, perhaps largely confined to 
. •t t . t• f . ( 2 ) one reg1on, one c1 y, or even cer a1n sec Ions o a reg1on. 
Regions have different degrees of industrial concentration and 
industries adopt different patterns. The distribution pattern of industrial 
establishments in any region is the result of an exceedingly campi icated 
series of inter-relationships, likely to involve each diverse decision-
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making processes as the logical analysis of economic factors, the judgements 
of powerful executives, the persuasive influence of government agencies, and 
the broad planning of strategic decentralization. (3) This means that there 
is no single factor capable of completely explaining industrial location. 
The existing location is the composite effect of many and diverse socio-
economic factors, which include market, transportation, workers, raw 
materials, amenities, suitable bui I ding area and government policies. 
The relative importance of the various location factors in the 
country can be assessed by examining the results obtained from the answers 
to question No. 46 of a questionnaire which was designed to sample some 
62 establishments located in different places in the country. The answers 
I ist basic factors that affected the decision where to locate particular 
estab I i shments. Respondents were asked to rank the factors of importance 
in regard to "Why this precise estab I i shment' s I ocat ion was chosen." 
The results of the answers are shown in Table 7. I, which is arranged accord-
ing to the number of times a particular factor was marked as a dominant, 
secondary, third, or fourth factor. 
The result which appears clear from the table is that the 
amenities and services of the city stand out definitely as the prime 
locational influence, transportation second, market third, while land 
avai labi I ity was in fourth place. Although ranked third as dominant factor, 
the market had the highest rating as the third factor, followed by labour 
supply as second. So, although in terms of the percentage of average 
weight, the ranking appears from the table to be not very dissimilar from 
that of the dominating factor, the market moves to second rank, the trans-
portation factor to third place, and labour supply takes over the fourth 
rank from the land avai labi I ity factor which ranks fifth. Other factors 
of importance occur with less regularity than do the preceding five 
factors. Some factors, such as government policies and capital avai labi I ity, 
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Table 7.1 Industrial Location Factors Due To Questionnaire According 
To Number Of Times Ranked. 
* as as as as Total Percent 
dominant second third fourth Points of aver-
Factors factor factor factor factor age weight 
City amenities and 
services 15 12 10 7 123 19.8 
Transportation 13 I I 8 9 110 17.7 
Market 10 10 18 7 113 18.2 
Land availability 9 9 2 5 72 I I . 6 
Raw materia Is 7 5 4 13 64 10.3 
Labour supply 5 8 12 12 80 12.9 
Power 4 8 8 40 6.5 
Persona I choice 2 3 18 3.0 
Total 62 62 62 62 620 100.0 
* 4 points to dominant factor, 3 to second, 2 to third, and I to fourth. 
Source : Fie I dwork, Summer 1973. 
do not show much importance as location factors, and it is clear that the 
amenities of the city, market, transportation, labour supply, land, raw 
materials, power and personal choice were the main factors of industrial 
location in Libya. An element of purely personal choice appears to be 
significant. Two establishments indicated personal choice as the leading 
factor for their locations. But it is worth noting, that its importance 
varies from industry to industry and from one region to another. 
D.M. Smith maintains that : 
"The various factors affecting plant location are 
wei 1-known, but it is often very difficult to determine 
their relative importance in specific instances, and it 
is quite impossible to put alI the factors together into 
some kind of mathematical model which could adequately 
predict the trends which have been observed." (4) 
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He also adds that alI that can be attempted in this case is to examine each 
of the main influences in turn, in the hope of arriving at some reasonable 
(5) 
conclusion. To obtain a complete understanding, it is valuable to study 
these factors individually in detail before discussing their relative sig-
nificance as location factors. Some other factors were not mentioned in 
the table by respondents as factors of location, such as some physical factors, 
governmental poi icies and historical factors, because they do not have a clear 
direct effect for the respondents, but in general they have an indirect 
effect, and therefore the situation may be made clearer by studying these 
factors as wei I as those I isted before. The factors are examined according 
to their importance in the table. 
A. City Amenities 8nd Servi~es 
In some countries the amenities and services in the city have 
probably done more than any other factor to attract industries into the 
cities. In Libya, the foregoing table indicates that this factor has been 
very significant for industrial location in the country. Fifteen respond-
ents out of 62 indicated this factor as a dominant one in their location, and 
twelve ranked it as a secondary factor. Moreover, in terms of the percentage 
average weight, it is clear that it ranked highest among the factors, though 
only marginally so. So this factor has been the most compel I ing one in 
industrial location in Libya in recent years. 
One might wonder why a location in Libya in or near a large city 
appears to have a certain attraction for industry. This may be explained by 
the imbalance in the number of amenities and infrastruction between the regions 
and agglomerationsm and the smal I scale of manufacturing. 
The main advantages of the large cities for industrial location 
in Libya arise from their relatively wei !-developed services and infra-
structure. For example, water services are inadequate in areas outside the 
large cities, and establishments located outside the main cities have had to 
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dri II their own wells. Most smal I Libyan establishments are probably not 
able to do so, and, besides, wei I water is not of good quality. In answer 
to questions No. 39 and 40, it appears that 40 establishments required water 
for both processes, as raw materials and in cleaning. The quantity consumed 
was between 300 I itres and 750,000 cubic metres per day, and it differed from 
one type of industry to another. Pub I ic water systems are I imited to the 
cities, so a I I factories which cannot have their own we! ! s have to be I ocated 
near to the major cities. In Tripoli and Benghazi, places have been made to 
develop water systems which wi I I meet these cities' demands in the future. 
Tripoli and Benghazi are also the only two cities which have 
urban transportation, covering most parts of the city, thus making it 
relatively easy for workers to reach their jobs. Communication faci I ities 
are generally inadequate elsewhere. The telephone and postal systems in 
Libya need more development. Establishments located at some distance from 
the main cities, such as Ben-Ghashir near Tripoli, or EI-Abiar near Benghazi, 
have difficulty with communication. 
Other amenities such as ports, airports, commercial faci I ities 
(banks, trade unions, chambers of commerce, insurance companies), educational 
institutions, cinemas, health services and workshops for maintenance, do not 
exist, or are less-developed in other areas. This might appear rather 
obvious in the case of a young nation such as Libya, but even the major 
cities, Tripoli and Benghazi, are sti II facing problems in some service 
faci I ities such as sewerage, as well as inadequacy of urban transportation. 
Furthermore, smal 1-scale establishments, which dominate in Libya, 
are also unable to provide special services for their workers if they are 
located far from the main cities. The answers to questions No. 16 and 17 
in the questionnaire showed that the only faci I ities given by establishments 
to their workers were loans, a breakfast meal, and some safety clothes in 
some cases. Only nine respondents stated that they provided housing for 
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foreign technical workers,and eight that they provided transport faci I ities, 
but the establishments which provide these faci I ities are the largest ones. 
None of the respondents, for example, stated that their establishments 
provided housing, recreation pools, schools, clubs, or health centres. 
In addition, as we shall see later on, most of the ski lied workers engaged 
in Libyan industry are foreigners who, of course, prefer city I ife. 
The advantage which a new establishment derives from a location 
among other establishments engaged in the same activity is fairly obvious. 
An existing industrial concentration may contain a pool of labour with 
particular ski lis, or special educational institutions geared to the needs 
of the industry in question, both of which help the establishment to reduce 
the cost of training its workers. Factories may also join together to 
develop a research institute, a marketing organization, and other collective 
faci I ities that individual manufacturers would be unable to provide for 
themse I ves. ( 6 ) 
B. Influence Of The Market 
The proximity to the market is a very important factor affecting 
the location of the manufacturing industries. It has been recognized to be 
the most dominant of all location factors in the classical location theories. 
There is a general tendency for some industries to be located in or near the 
market, as they cannot operate economically far from the market. These 
industries, considered as 'market-orientated', are those whose finished 
products are costly or difficult to transport, because they are either bulky 
or breakable. Such industries are of three main types. Some make perish-
able products, such as bread, ice cream or newspapers, which must be processed 
near the place of consumption, as they are I iable to go stale if not delivered 
quickly to the consumer. Some, such as tailoring, printing and maintenance 
services, require personal contact with the consumer. Others are I inked to 
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the market because of increase in the bulk or weight of the final products, 
as in the case of furniture and metal work, where the weight of the products 
to be distributed exceeds the total weight of materials transported. For 
example, the distribution of soft drinks production throughout the country 
simply reflects the high cost of transport. Such manufacturing is to be 
found every~tlhere, therefore,more or less in proportion with population and 
( 7) income. 
Soft drinks, some food industries, such as bread and ice cream, 
printing, bui I ding materials and metal work are therefore generally the most 
widely distributed establishments. The question which arises here is how 
does the market affect particular industries in Libya? If the structure of 
the industry has a large number of small establishments, they wi II be scattered 
throughout many parts of the country, according to the distribution of the 
population and its income. But if the structure is on a large scale, the 
market may only give scope for one or two establishments throughout the 
whole country. 
To answer this question, three types of studies have been used 
to i I lustrate the relation between the market and the location of manufact-
uring industries in Libya : (a) analysis of the questionnaire, (b) study 
of the relation between the market and general population distribution, and 
(c) study of the coefficient of I inkage between the different groups of 
industries and the market. 
The questionnaire answers show the market factor to be much more 
important than any other attraction except city amenities and services. It 
was stated as the dominant location factor by 10 respondents, the second 
factor by 10, and the third factor by 18. Comparing the location with the 
market reveals several interesting points. The answers to question No. 45 
make it clear that the bulk of the output of the majority of the industrial 
establishments is orientated to the local market (original muhafada). But 
some of these establishments had a proportion of their total sales outside 
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their local muhafada, including tobacco, tomato, olive oi I, macaroni, 
furniture and sweet establishments. These are mainly larger establishments 
with more than 50 workers. For example, the ten large establishments which 
are located in Tripoli and market in Benghazi accounted for about 20 percent 
of the total workers in Tripoli. The results obtained for establishments 
situated in Tripoli and Benghazi indicate that most of them marketed in more 
than one muhafada. Markets tended to be concentrated in muhafadat near to 
the factories and therefore easily accessible from them. Of twenty establish-
ments in Tripoli, 18 stated that they had markets in Homes and Misurata, 12 
in EI-Zawia, 10 in Gharian, 10 in Benghazi, 5 in Sebha, 3 in EI-Kaleg, and 
2 in De rna and G. Akhdar. From Benghazi I 0 stated that they had markets 
in EI-Kaleg, and 7 in Derna and G. Akhdar, whi 1st only 2 gave Tripoli as a 
market for a portion of their products. However, even for these establish-
ments, the marketing beyond the periphery of the local muhafada is sometimes 
quite unstable, varying with the avai labi I ity of transportation and the 
amount of production. 
One can deduce that only few establishments have a national 
market, and any establishment which attempts to achieve national distribution 
for its product from a location in Tripoli, Benghazi or Sebha must tackle 
the economic handicap of distance. So the local establishments tend to 
dominate the local market for their product. This might help to explain 
why the greatest population and most of the buying power in the country are 
concentrated on two poles agglomerated around two widely-separated cities, 
with a distance of about a thousand kilometres between them. For example, 
when 'Pepsi Cola' was produced only in Tripoli, before the Benghazi branch 
had opened, it cost 5p in Benghazi, whi 1st in Tripoli it cost only 3p. 
The answers to question No. 57 show that most Libyan establish-
ments depend on personal contact for sel I ing their product. Only 18 respond-
ents stated that more than 50 percent of their products were sold to the 
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wholesaler, while 37, according to Table 7.2, stated that more than 50 
percent were sold to retailers and consumers directly. Only three sold 
most of their production to other establishments to be used as raw materials; 
these were those which produced olive oi I and flour. None stated that they 
sold their products abroad. Table 7.2 reveals that 34 of total factories 
interviewed sold between 75 to 100 percent of their goods direct to 
retailers and consumers. These are grouped under wood and furniture prod-
uction, chemicals, building materials, metal work and some food industries. 
It is clear that the very nature of these industries is such that the bulk 
of the produce should be directly sold to consumers. From the answers, 
Table 7.2 Distribution Of Establishments By Proportion Of Total Sales 
Direct To Retailers And Consumers By Units. 
Industries 
Food, soft drinks 
Text i I es 
Paper and printing 
Wood and Furniture 
Chemical Production 
Bu i I ding Materia Is 
Metal Work 
Less 
than 
25% 
Source Answers to Questionnaire. 
25% 
to 
50% 
2 
50% 
to 
75% 
2 
75% 
to 
100% 
7 
12 
3 
8 
3 
there appears to be a high degree of correlation between the industries which 
reported a high proportion of products sold beyond their local muhafada, and 
those which marketed through wholesalers. For example, the ten establish-
ments in Tripoli which market in Benghazi, and the two which market from 
Benghazi to Tripoli, do so through wholesalers. The I imited number of 
Fig. 7·1 RANK CORRELATION COEFFECIENT BETWEEN POPULATION INI 1973 AND 
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wholesalers and the difficulty of making personal contact with the widely 
distributed market may be the reason why the greater part of industrial 
production is unable to reach remote muhafadat. 
The second way to explain the relation between the market and 
industrial location is through a study of the distribution and density of 
population. This study might be more accurate if it were I inked with the 
per capita income or household expenditure in the different regions. There-
fore the study wi II be concerned with the size of the market, comparing the 
total population distribution in the various localities with the total number 
of workers in establishments which employ more than five workers. The 
question which should be answered here is whether or not the distribution of 
the factories is in any way related to the general distribution of the popul-
at ion. Spearman's rank correlation coefficient Crs) between the distribution 
and number of workers in different regions reaches a level of 0.76 (Figure 
7. I), showing that there is a significant relationship between the population 
concentration (market) and the industrial location CTable 7.3). The import-
ant areal market differences find a reflection in recent population trends 
and density (Table 7.4). Figure 7.2 shows that between 1964 and 1973 
Tripoli's Muhafada increased its population by more than 300,000, and 
Benghazi and E 1-Zaw i a ~~luhafadat by more than 80,000 each, wh i I st other 
muhafadat increased by less than 50,000. There was a decrease only in 
Gharian Muhafada, of about 26,000. These population trends increased the 
capacity of the Tripoli, Benghazi and EI-Zawia markets. 
Density differs in varying regions. The most densely-populated 
areas are the northern developed regions, especially in the Muhafadat of 
Tripoli, EI-Zawia and Benghazi, where the great towns and main cities are 
situated. In 1973, in Tripoli Muhafada, there were about 236 persons per 
square ki lometere, in EI-Zawia 35, and in Benghazi 19. The higher mountain 
regions and south are very thinly populated, often having less than 8 persons 
per square kilometre in the mountain regions and less than one per square 
kilometre in the southern desert regions. In the case of the municipalities. 
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Table 7.3 Total Population (1973) And Number Of Workers Employed In 
Establishments With More Than Five Workers (1971) In 
Different Municipalities. 
Total Population ( 1973) Total Industrial Workers 
Mun i c i pa·l i ty ( 1971 ) 
Tripoli 
Azizia 
Benghazi 
E l-Ab i ar 
EI-Zawia 
Sab ratha 
Zuara 
Misurata 
Zletin 
Jofra 
Homes 
Tarhuna 
Ben-UI i d 
De rna 
Tobruk 
Bed a 
E 1-Marg 
Ghari an 
Yefren 
Gadames 
Sebha 
Ghat 
Aj dab i a 
Sirte 
Sources 
631' 102 9,386 
78,015 599 
31 I, 531 3,390 
17,659 56 
138,556 956 
58, 166 264 
47,630 46 
103,302 433 
59,309 209 
16,705 70 
89,695 483 
53,894 50 
19,084 8 
64,528 271 
58,869 126 
75,739 33 
55,332 59 
65,439 100 
48,097 43 
6,210 16 
35,389 98 
6,926 5 
65,533 16 
30,312 6 
I. Ministry of Planning and Development, Census and Statistical 
Department, Population Census 1973 <Preliminary Result), 
Tripoli, 1974. 
2. Computed by author from data in I.R.C. Industrial 
Estab I i shments Census 1971, Tri poI i, 1972. 
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Figure 7.3 reveals that the density is rather more. For example, Tripoli, 
EI-Zawia and Benghazi Municipalities have more than 400, 61 and 21 persons 
per square kilometre respectively. 
The centralization of population in a few cities makes them 
economically the most active focal points and markets. The sizeable 
increase in population in Tripoli, EI-Zawia and Benghazi, and their expected 
future gr'Owth, was found to affect closely the entrepreneurs' location 
decisions. Besides, the migration of people from rural areas to urban centres, 
especially into the large cities, has increased the concentration of buyers, 
which has favourably affected the market for industrial goods. 
An attempt wi I I also be made to study the coefficient of I inkage 
between the market and the distribution of different industry groups. (8 ) 
In order to show this, Table 7.5 shows the regional distribution of the 
different industry groups in 1971 compared with the distribution of the 
population in 1973, while Table 7.6 shows the coefficients of I inkage between 
the different industrial groups and the market. It can be observed from 
Table 7.6 that the industry groups alI have a different coefficient of 
I inkage. It is clear that two groups have a coefficient of I inkage with 
the market of over 0.60 
materials group at 0.62. 
food industries stand at 0.64 and the building 
Other industrial groups have more than 0.45, with 
the exception of miscellaneous industries, though the leather and shoes group 
has a coefficient of only 0.46. This group is highly concentrated in 
Tripoli and Benghazi. Figure 7.4 indicates that Tripoli, with the exception 
of a miscellaneous group, has a plus deviation for all the groups; those 
with the highest plus deviation are the chemical group 51.5, the leather and 
shoes group 45.6, and the paper and printing groups 45.2. 
In Benghazi, building materials stand at 27.6, the textile and 
clothes group at 22.0, and metal work at 22.2. In other muhaf~dat, only 
EI-Zawia and Derna have a plus deviation, except in the case of the 
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Table 7.4 Area, Total Population And Population Density By Muhafadat, In Libya, 1964-1973 .. 
Area 
Muhafada Thousands % Thousands of Persons %of the total Population Density 
of square No. per 100 square Kms 
Kms 1964 1973 1964 1973 1964 1973 
Tripoli 3 - 406 709 26 31 13,533 23,633 
Benghazi 17 I 225 331 14 15 I, 324 I, 94 7 
EI-Zawia 7 - 164 244 I I II 2,343 3,486 
Misurata 148 9 130 179 8 8 88 121 
Homes 25 I 137 163 9 7 548 652 
De rna 103 6 84 123 5 5 82 I 19 
G. Akhdar 17 I 91 131 6 6 535 771 
Ghari an 150 9 181 155 12 7 121 103 
Sebha 559 32 67 I 12 4 5 12 20 
E 1-Ka I eg 720 41 80 108 5 5 II 15 
Total I, 740 100 I, 565 2,255 100 100 189 129 
Sources : I. Ministry of Planning and Development, Statistical Abstract 1970, Tripoli, 1972. 
2. II II II II Census and Statistical Dept., Population Census 1973 <Preliminary 
Res u It), T r i poI i , 1974. 
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Table 7.5 Regional Distribution Of Industry Groups And The Population In Libya~ 
Percentage of persons employed in various industries 
Total pop. % of % of food, text i I es leather wood printing chemicals bui !ding meta I mi s-
in 1973 the persons ' soft and and and and mat- work ce I 1-
total employed drjn~ & clothes shoes furn- paper eri a Is aneous 
in. 1971 . tobacco iture .. 
A B c D E F G H I J K 
Tripoli 709, I 17 31.4 59.8 63.5 61 .8 77.0 56.2 76.6 82.9 42.2 59.0 9.4 
Benghazi 331,180 14.7 20. I 6.7 36.7 23.0 29.8 22. I 5.4 42.3 36.9 62.3 
EI-Zawia 244,352 10.8 7.6 14.3 - - 2.0 - 1.7 1.3 
Misurata 179,316 7.9 3.3 7.0 - - 1.8 - - 2. 7 1.9 
Homes 162,673 7.2 4.3 4.6 I. 5 - - - - 4.8 
De rna 123,397 5.5 0.6 I. 3 - - 7.0 1.3 - 3.9 I .7 
G. Ahkdar 131 ,071 5.8 I. 0 0.5 - - I. 4 - - 0.9 
Gharian 155,162 6.9 2.4 I. 5 - - 0.6 - - 0.3 0. 5 18.9 
Sebha I 12,318 5.0 0. 7 0.4 - - I. 2 - - 1.4 - 9.4 
E 1-Ka I eg 108,451 4.8 0.2 0.2 - - - - - 0.2 
Total 2,257,037 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source:: !.Computed by author from data in I.C.R. Industrial Establishments Census 1971, Tripoli, 1972. 
2.Ministry of Planning and Development, Census and Statistical Dept., Population Census 1973 (Preliminary Result), 
Tripoli, 1974. 
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Table 7.6 The Coefficient Of Linkage Between The Different Industry Groups And The Market In Libya 
Muhafadat 8-A C-A D-A E-A F-A G-A H-A 1-A 
Tripoli +28.4 +32. I +30.4 +45.6 +24.8 +45.2 +51. 5 + 10.8 
Benghazi + 5.4 - 8.0 +22.0 + 8.3 + 15. I + 7.4 + 0.7 +27.6 
EI-Zawia - 3.2 + 3.5 -10.8 -10.8 -8.8 -10.8 - 9. I - 9.5 
Misurata - 4.6 - 0.9 - 7.9 - 7.9 - 6. I - 7.9 - 7.9 - 5.2 
Homes - 2.9 - 2.6 - 5. 7 - 7.2 - 7.2 - 7.2 - 7.2 - 2.4 
De rna - 4.9 - 4.2 - 5.5 - 5.5 + I. 5 - 4.2 - 5.5 - I .6 
G. Ahkdar - 4.8 - 5.3 - 5.8 - 5.8 - 4.4 - 5.8 - 5.8 - 4.9 
Gha ri an - 4.5 - 5.4 - 6.9 - 6.9 - 6.3 - 6.9 - 6.9 - 6.6 
Sebha - 4.3 - 4.6 - 5.0 - 5.0 - 3.8 - 5.0 - 5.0 - 3.6 
E 1-Ka I eg - 4.6 - 4.6 - 4.8 - 4.8 - 4.8 - 4.8 - 4.8 - 4.6 
Deviation 33.8 35.6 52.4 53.9 41.4 52.6 52.2 38.4 
0.34 0. 36 0.52 0. 54 0.41 0.53 0.52 0.38 
Coefficient of Linkage 0.66 0.64 0.48 0.46 0.59 0.47 0.48 0.62 
J-A 
+27.6 
+22.2 
-10.8 
- 6.0 
- 7.2 
- 3.8 
- 5.8 
- 6.4 
- 5.0 
- 4.8 
49.8 
0. 50 
0.50 
K-A 
-22.0 
+47.6 
-10.8 
- 7.9 
- 7.2 
- 5.5 
- 5.8 
+12.0 
+ 4.4 
- 4.8 
64.0 
0.64 
0.36 
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miscellaneous group. In EI-Zawia there is a plus 3.5 in the food group 
and in Derna a plus 1.5 in wood production. Other muhafadat have a minus 
density for alI the industrial groups. These plus deviations in most of 
the industry groups in Tripoli and Benghazi and minus deviations in other 
muhafadat may be partly explained by the fact that the populations of these 
latter muhafadat need less industrial production than the populations in 
urban areas, because of their lower standards of I iving. 
It may be concluded that most of the industrial groups are 
definitely market-orientated, since one can see that more than 80 percent 
of them are concentrated in the two muhafadat (Tripoli and Benghazi) which 
have the highest populations. Therefore the above analysis shows clearly 
the strong relationship between the distribution of the market and the 
distribution of the manufacturing industries in Libya. 
C. The Influence Of Transportation 
Transport serves to connect centres of production with one 
another and with centres of consumption. In so doing it I inks various 
parts of a country into one market, or different markets. Its changes have 
a major effect on both the cost of raw materials and that of the finished 
product. Therefore the difference in transport cost is regarded as one of 
the most important location factors for factories engaged in industrial 
activities. As it concerns raw materials and the market, some locational 
theories focus their attention on it almost exclusively. These theories 
maintain that a location where transport costs can be minimised wi I I be the 
most suitable, although this depends on whether the industry involves high 
costs of raw materials or finished product. The lowest transport costs for 
both reduce the cost of production of the manufactured goods, and hence 
increase the economic advantage of industrial location. So good transport 
faci I ities can be a great benefit to an industry and can be an important 
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factor for its location, especially for modern industry which has a large 
production and demands a large quantity of raw materials. 
To understand the influence of transportation on the present 
location of establishments in Libya it is necessary to discuss two points 
(a) the distribution and the system of transportation and (b) the degree 
of industrialization, keeping in mind the answers to questions designed to 
discover the effects of transportation. 
With regard to the first point, distribution of the markets and 
raw materials in different places increases the importance of transport. 
With reference to transportation faci I ities, the main problem is caused by 
the lack of transportation between different regions. This lack is partly 
caused by natural obstacles. The mountain chains running para I lei to the 
coast in the north-east and west, and the extent of desert in most parts of 
the country, pose great transport difficulties which have sti I I not been 
solved in these parts. This inadequacy of the transport system has been a 
matter of concern in Libya, as it tends to preserve the existence of regional 
economies rather than an integrated national one, thus impeding not only 
industrial development, but the whole economic development of the country. 
Motor transport is the dominant type in Libya. There is no system 
of ra i I ways or water-ways. The railway services, which started early during 
the period of ltal ian influence, and reopened in 1948 with 131 miles of track 
in Tripolitania and 104 miles in Cyrenaica, were closed in the early 1960s on 
the recommendation of I .B.R.D. experts, because they were operating at a loss 
and were unable to compete with road transportation. 
The early modern surfaced roads were bui It by the Ita I ians during 
their occupation of Libya. They repaired old tracks and, whenever necessary, 
bui It ways through mountain passes and erected bridges over wadis, but all 
f t . II "l"t t (9 ) these works were o an essen 1 a y m1 1 ary na ure. In 1937, the coastal 
roads were bui It, adding over I, 100 miles of surfaced roads. In 1959 a 
motorway to the southern part of the country was started and completed in 1962. 
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It follows roughly the track of the old road, and I inks Sebha with the 
coastal motorway. Later, in 1966, the construction of a modern motorway 
paral lei to the old coastal road was started and it was finished in 1970. 
This is the most important motorway in Libya, and it runs for about 1,822 
kilometres from the west to the eastern borders, connecting the major cities 
of the coastal frgine. In addition, many other roads were constructed 
connecll ng srna I I towns with the rna in cities and the coast a I motorway, 11 ke 
EI-Abiar-Benghazi and Gharian-Tripol i roads. 
In 1972, Libya had in alI some 6,669 kilometres of asphalted roads, 
and more than two-thirds of these roads were constructed between 1962 and 
1971. In addition, there were 328 Km under construction and I ,363 Km out 
(I 0) 
to tender or under design. Figure 7.5 shows the road network and ports. 
It can be seen that the greater part of this network is concentrated in the 
north of the country, which accounts for about four-fifths of the total road 
mileage. The network has only one first class road which follows a lateral 
axis in the north. Many second class roads, which serve as feeders to it, 
are accessible from a large number of towns. Because of the expense and 
difficulty of constructing roads in the south there are only two second class 
roads, one connecting Sebha, and the other Jaghboob with the axis motorway. 
The sharp contrasts in population distribution and the low average density 
in the south mean that the roads have to pass for long stretches through 
uninhabited areas, and their construction entai Is high initial costs. Most 
second class roads have been laid to faci I itate transport towards, or away 
from, Tri poI i in the west, and Benghazi in the east. 
The number of lorries in Libya increased four times and the goods 
capacity more than three times between 1963 to 1973 <Figure 7.6). Unfort-
unately, there are no available figur-es for the recent traffic volumes on 
main routes in the country, but the traffic density on Libyan roads in 1964 
projected forward to 1972 by Doxiadis Associates (Table 7.7) might throw 
some I ight on this. It is noted that 31 percent of the vehicles are goods 
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. (II ) 
vehicles. The traffic density is concentrated around the two cities, 
Tripoli and Benghazi. It was expected that about 16,800 vehicles per 16 
hours would flow to West Tripoli; 7,000 to East Tripoli; 7,000 to West 
Benghazi; and 6, 200 to East Benghazi. In Sebha, Zuara and some parts of 
Sirte Gulf, the roads would have less than 500 vehicles per 16 hours. The 
flow pattern is concentrated on the coastal area, especially south of 
Tripoli in the agricultural regions of EI-Zawia, Zuara and Homes, and 
diminishes further east and south. Many areas are not connected with any 
kind of asphalt road; in Kufra, for instance, the lack of transportation 
faci I ities inhibits the use of some of its local raw materials (crop and 
animal production) in the sphere of industry. 
If the distribution of the road system in Figure 7.6 is compared 
with the current population and the recent distribution of the establishments, 
it does not take much imagination to see the basic relationship between them. 
One can deduce from this the fact that alI cities which have a high cone-
entration of manufacturing industries, such as Tripoli, Benghazi, EI-Zawia 
and Misurata, have good access to transportation routes, and alI highly 
mechanized establishments which need good road faci I ities for their manufact-
uring are bui It with access to main roads, such as the cement factory on the 
Homes Road, The Arab Plastic Company on the Suani-Tripol i Road, and the 
International Industrial Company for Metal on the EI-Zawia- Tripoli Road. 
In terms of traffic, the open sea otters the easiest way of 
reaching world ports and moving the materials of foreign trade at least cost. 
There are about eight ports in Libya, but only two, Tripoli and Benghazi 
(Figure 7. 7), have extended their faci I ities during recent years. Even they 
are sti I I comparatively smal I, and can generally provide only for medium-
sized ships, but the new port extensions and modern faci I ities in these two 
ports wi II provide for larger ships. 
Fig 7-7 NUMBER OF COMMERCIAL SHIPS ENTERING LIBYAN PORTS 1963-197~ 
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Table 7. 7 Traffic Volume On Main Routes In Libya <One Day- 16 Hours 
Counting On Both Directions). 
Station 
Tripoli - west 
Tripoli - Azizia 
11 
- Ben-Ghashir 
11 
- Tajora 
Azizia 
Benghazi - west 
11 
- east 
11 
- Bnina 
EI-Zawia (Cross Bir-Ghanam) 
Zua ra - Border 
Yefren- (Cross Bir-Ghanam) 
II 
- Rumi a 
Misurata- west 
II 
- east 
Bu-Gren 
Homes (Cross) 
Ta rh una 
Derna - East 
Tobruk - west 
11 
- east 
Beda - west 
11 
- east 
EI-Marg - west 
11 
- east 
11 
- south 
Fa i d i a (Cross) 
Lam I uda (Cross) 
Gharian-Bu-Zeian 
Ajdabia- west 
11 
- east 
Marsa-E 1-Brega 
S i rte 
No. of a I I 
vehicles in July 
1964 ( 1 ) 
4,553 
2, 121 
I, 385 
I ,630 
699 
2,294 
I, 343 
I, 989 
I, 195 
94 
I ,001 
I, 160 
790 
594 
58 
650 
683 
136 
190 
644 
I ,028 
I ,049 
806 
536 
228 
399 
970 
I ,283 
135 
470 
419 
370 
Projected No. of 
vehicles in 
1972 (2) 
16,800 
8,200 
5,800 
7_.000 
3,600 
8,400 
6,200 
5,400 
2.200 
400 
2,000 
2,200 
3,000 
I ,600 
I ,200 
4,000 
I ,800 
700 
I ,200 
I ,000 
4,600 
4,400 
3,000 
2,400 
600 
500 
2,600 
3,000 
500 
I ,200 
500 
I ,000 
Sources I. Doxiadis Associates, Transport in Libya :A General Survey 
And Study Of The Means Of Communications, Vol. 2, pp.486-487. 
2. Computed from projected map of traffic volume 1972, 
(Same Source), pp. 279-280. 
As far as the second point is concerned, the degree of industrial-
ization, the answers to questions, introduce some interesting points regarding 
transport as an important factor of industrial location for various industries. 
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Respondents were asked about the means of transport they use to carry raw 
materials and finished products. In the answers to question No. 51, the 
dominance of sea transport was revealed by the fact that 38 respondents 
stated it to be of the greatest importance in the transporation of their 
raw materia Is. Nine used both sea and air transport. Road transport was 
used by only five factories, while three used both road and sea transport. 
For transporting finished products, as alI of the production is consumed 
locally, roads were the principal means of transport for all of them. 
According to the anwers to question No. 52, it appears that trucks and smal I 
vans were the significant means of transportation; 16 quoted trucks and 
7 smal I vans separately, while 28 quoted both of them as means of transport-
ation for their products. In contrast, none of the respondents quoted carts, 
bicycles or porters as individual means of transportation. 
In terms of responsibi I ity for the transport of products, answers 
to question No. 53 show that 31 respondents indicated that the factory was 
responsible, and 15 the consumer and wholesale buyer, while 12 stated both 
of them. According to the answers to question No. 55, out of 58 factories 
only 28 respondents indicated that transport costs do not have any effect on 
the sale price in other muhafadat. Such is the Animal Fodder Factory in El-
Ab i a r. It may be stated that transport costs have their effect when the 
transport of the products is the responsibi I ity of the buyer without any 
price reduction from the estab I i shments. Produce transported by the manu-
facturer to the buyer w i II have a better se I I i ng price than in the case of 
transportation by the buyer. For example, articles produced in Tripoli, 
such as textiles, and transported by the wholesaler, are more expensive in 
Benghazi than in Tripoli, whilst articles transported by the manufacturers, 
such as tobacco, biscuits, tomatoes and olive oi I, are the same price in 
Tripoli and Benghazi. Thus, on the whole, it would appear that the trans-
port costs of many factories are greatly affected as a result of moving 
goods. 
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From alI the facts examined above, one can conclude that it may 
be possible to relate Libyan industrial location to the transport network 
which was initially responsible for the evolution of the greater part of 
the existing pattern of industrial location. 
D. The Influence Of Labour 
In many cases the labour force plays a large part in the 
distribution of the manufacturing industries. The quality and quantity of 
labour required depends on the type of industry. In Libya, the labour force 
was stated as the fourth most important factor for industrial location, on 
the evidence of its average weight in Table 7. I. Labour was I isted as a 
dominant factor by five respondents, as a secondary one by eight, and as a 
third priority by 12. The influence of labour on industrial location in 
Libya is important because the country has an adequate labour supply. A 
high percentage of ski I led workers are foreigners. Foreigners account for 
about 25 percent of the total labour force and for about 60 percent of the 
total ski I led labour force (see Chapter 9). Therefore the labour force is 
a factor favouring Tripoli and Benghazi because of the relatively large amount 
of labour avai !able, and the concentration of foreigners in cities. There 
is also a supply of ordinary labour owing to the high rate of population 
growth and migration from rural areas. 
The number of immigrants from other areas to the city is higher 
than the emigrants from the city (Table 7.8). Most of these immigrants come 
to Tripoli from rural areas. The pre I iminary population census of 1973 
reveals that the country is experiencing rapid urbanization, and although 
there are no detailed figures published yet, it seems that growth rates 
of urban centres have been more rapid than those of rural areas in recent 
years, reflecting the attraction of the cities. It may be that rural areas 
around Tripoli, such as EI-Zawia, Gharian, Homes and Misurata, provide the 
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highest percentage of immigrants in Tripoli. A study of 213 migrants to 
Tripoli, undertaken during 1967 and 1968, indicated that a high proportion 
of immigrants who had settled down in Tripoli recently came to find employment 
in oi I companies, industry, construction, trade or government departments. 
A very smal I proportion of immigrants who were questioned stated that they had 
come t T . I . t . . th . f . I . ( I 2 ) o r 1 po 1 o J o 1 n e 1 r am 1 1 es. Socio-economic forces are the 
main stimulants of movements of the rural population. 
Since the spatial distribution of the labour force is in part 
determined by the distribution of the population, and because most of the 
factories have an urban bias, the urban concentration of population in some 
regions dominates the distribution of labour-orientated manufacturing 
industries. Besides this, most of the new training centres and the erner-
gency vocational training programmes were established in the main cities. 
Moreover, the labour unions are more active in the main cities than in any 
other area. The labour force in the cities is also more stable than that 
of rural areas where there is a high labour turnover and a high percentage 
of absenteeism owing to seasonal fluctuations according to the agricultural 
seasons. Besides, the answers to question No. 31 show that a high proportion, 
about 46 percent of alI the workers in the establishments interviewed, come 
from a distance of less than one kilometre, about 27 percent from between 
one to five kilometres, and the same proportion from further than five 
k i I ometres. 
AI I the evidence stated above indicates that the labour force has 
a dominant influence on location choice, and this appears to apply to many 
factories which have become established in Tripoli, EI-Zawia and Benghazi 
Mun i c i pa I it i es. 
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Table 7.8 Tripoli City In And Out Migrants (Libyans) 
1958 To 1967. 
No. of in Average No. of out Average 
Year Migrants per month Migrants per month 
1958 2_, 388 199.0 315 26.2 
1959 3,641 303.4 257 21.4 
1960 4, 115 342.9 686 57. I 
1961 5,147 428.9 909 75.7 
1962 5,260 438.3 863 71.9 
1963 5,081 423.4 711 59.2 
1964' 4,943 411.9 821 68.4 
1965 5,971 497.5 855 71.2 
1966 5, 730 477.5 I, 899 158.2 
1967 5,351 445.9 I, 74 7 145.5. 
Source Statistical Dept., Municipality Of Tripoli, 1968. 
E. The Influence Of Raw Materials 
The avai labi I ity of raw materials is considered another of the 
most important factors for industria I I ocat ion. In Libya, in spite of the 
fact that only seven of the respondents interviewed stated that raw materials 
were their dominant location factor, and that another five stated it to be 
a secondary one, it is a major location factor for many establishments. 
The raw materials used by the Libyan manufacturers come from two 
sources, according to answer-s of questions No. 36 and 37 : (a) imported 
materials which are primarily semi-finished or finished products, such as 
cotton, timber, rubber, wood pulp, pig iron, metal, artificial and natural 
spun silk; (b) local materials which are essentially raw materials, in 
particular, wheat, olive oi I, fruit, sardine and I imestone. The influence 
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of these materials on location is firstly related to the cost and weight of 
the raw materials, and secondly to the perishabi I ity and type of the materials. 
The industries which use high-cost raw materials in relation to the gross 
value of the finished products, or heavy and bulky raw materials which lose 
weight in manufacture, or perishable materials, are mainly located near the 
source of the materials and near the ports in the case of imported materials. 
When this fact is applied to Libya, it can be seen that there is a strong 
correlation between it and the location of many industries. The answers to 
question No. 33 in Table 7.9 make it clear that Libyan industry is heavily 
dependent on large supplies of bulky imported raw materials. The table shows 
that 42 of the establishments, accounting for 68 percent of the total inter-
viewed, stated that more than three-quarters of their materials are imported. 
Nine only stated that more than three-quarters of their materials came from a 
local muhafada, while one obtained its materi.als from other muhafadat. Be-
sides this, some materials I isted by the latter as local materials were really 
imported ones, such as flour, paint, dyes and yeast. Although Table 7.10 
supports the above results, it is clear that the percentage of the imported 
raw materials to the total raw materials used in 1971 for industrial processes 
is very high, and in some cases it is more than four-fifths of the total 
material. 
Table 7.9 The Percentage Of Imported And Local Raw Materials Used By 
A Stated Number Of Factories, 
Percentage of Raw Number of Establishments Using Raw Materials from 
Materials used abroad Local muhafada Other muhafadat 
100 31 6 
75 - 99 II 3 
50 - 74 3 5 
10 - 49 5 9 5 
less than 10 3 2. 
Source : Results Of Questionnaire. 
Table 7. 10 The Percentage Of The Imported Raw Materials To Total 
Source 
Materials Used For Industrial Processes, 1971. 
Industries 
Food, soft drinks and tobacco 
Textiles and clothes 
Paper and printing 
Wood and furniture 
Chemicals 
Bui I ding Materials 
Metal work 
Percentage of 
raw materia Is 
73.3 
93.3 
90.9 
70.0 
87.6 
69.0 
87.8 
I.R.C. Industrial Census 1971, Tripoli, 1973. 
It is worth noting that in the answers to question No. 38 
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respondents stated that their materials lost weight during the industrial 
process, and 30 of them lost more than 15 percent of the weight of raw 
materials. Some who depended on imported materials such as furniture and 
metal work lost more than 20 percent of their raw materials. Keeping in mind 
the fact that most of the imported raw materials are transported by sea, as 
mentioned before, proximity to the coast and faci I ities for hand I ing imports 
provide an important factor in the location decision. Therefore industries 
depending mostly on imported materials are attracted to the ports or to places 
within easy reach of them. Furniture, paper, textiles, chemicals and metal 
work are located in the Tripoli and Benghazi Muhafadat, and this may be 
partly explained by their good port faci I ities. 
Many other industries which mainly depend on local materials are 
strongly influenced by their distribution. The first reason is that they are 
valuable, or that they lose weight and bulk in the manufacturing process and 
it is easier to transport the finished product. In this case transport costs 
on useless waste are avoided. The best examples of this are the location of 
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cement factories in Homes and southern Benghazi, the glass factory in Azizia, 
and the pottery factory in Gharian. Secondly, if the raw materials are 
perishable, the location must be close to their source in order to avoid 
destruction through travel or transport. The location of tuna and sardine 
processing factories in various places along the west coast, and olive oi I, 
tomato and fruit processing plants in many regions in the north-west of the 
country are naturally due to the source of supply. The concentration of 
olive oi I processing in many muhafadat in the western part accounts for the 
location of the majority of food establishments in these muhafadat. For 
examp I e, they account for 14 of the food estab I i shments in Mi surata, 31 in 
Homes, 52 in EI-Zawia, and II in Gharian Muhafadat. Table 7.11 indicates 
that in 1971 these Muhafadat had more than 93 percent of the total olive-
bearing trees in the country. 
Table 7.11 The Distribution Of 01 ive-Bearirig Trees in Libya, 1971 
No. of bearing 
Muhafada trees % of total 
Tripoli 910,000 27.5 
Benghazi 50,000 I. 5 
EI-Zawia 915,000 27.6 
Misurata 350,000 10.6 
Homes 710,000 21.5 
De rna 100,000 3.0 
G. Akhdar 50,000 I. 5 
Ghari an 220,000 6.7 
Sebha I ,000 
E 1-Ka I eg 4,000. 0~ I 
Total 3,310,000 100.0 
Source Census and Statistical Dept. ; Statistical Abstract 1971, 
Tr i poI i, 197 3. 
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F. The Influence Of Power 
In spite of the fact that only one respondent stated that power 
was a dominant factor, and only eight stated it to be a third priority 
factor, it seems that it also constitutes one of the important factors in 
industrial location in Libya. The answers to questions 22 and 24 reveal 
that 31 factories depended on electricity for power, 24 on electricity and oi I, 
two on electricity and gas, and only one on oi I. Forty-two of the establish-
ments which use electricity obtained it from public power stations, I I obtained 
it from public and private power stations, and only four had their own power 
station. This means that the great majority of Libyan establishments depend 
on electricity for power, and they obtain it mainly from public power stations. 
In the answers to question No. 50, 23 respondents stated that their locations 
were mostly restricted by the I imitation of electricity. It seems that 
Libya is st i I I poor in power resources in many parts of the country, and the 
power system serves to intensify the regional inbalance of industry in Libya. 
However, it is true that there has been a considerable increase in the area 
served by electricity and in power provision. Power production increased 
from about 40 mi I I ionKi lowatts in 1954 to about 351 mi I I ion in 1971, and 
electricity is now provided throughout most of the country, but most of the 
stations outside the main cities are of smal I capacity and are both tech-
nical ly and economically unsuitable for serving large industries (Figure 7.8). 
Unfortunately, there are no data available for electricity al lo-
cated for industry, but the distribution of the total production of electricity 
* from major public power stations in the country in 1972 can be seen in 
Table 7.12. Regionally the largest aggregate of potential electricity 
* This excludes the electricity produced lrr the oi I terminals and the oi I 
company camps scattered through the desert. 
DISTRIBUTION,BYCAPACITY,OF POWER STATIONS IN LIBYA 1972 
F"~g 7·8 
CAPACITY in Kwll 
~ morelhon 100,000 
• 21,000-68,000 
Iii 2,500- 12PQO 
0 400-750 
£:,. lenthon300 
N 
t 
0 km 
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production is found in the major cities, mainly Tripoli, Benghazi and 
EI-Zawia, where there is the largest individual endowment. Outside the 
main cities, production is too smal I to stimulate any investment in large 
industry. About 84 percent of its total potential is used in Tripoli, 
Benghazi and EI-Zawia, and except for these municipalities it has been 
inefficiently organized. There is no doubt that the concentration of the 
high potential of power in these areas helps to make them the most attractive 
municipalities of the country for industrial location. 
The Gurgi Mi I I, for example, stated that its electricity 
consumption was about 1,700,000 Kilowatts yearly. If this is compared 
with the total electricity produced <Table 7. 12), one can see that some 
municipalities have a lower electricity production than that needed for such 
a factory. So, for example, three of these types of factory would consume 
alI of the Gharian electricity and almost half of the electrical power at 
Mi surata. This means that industries using electricity wi I I be located 
around the main cities. 
G. The Influence Of Personal Choice 
Recent studies of industria I location stress that other 
factors influence location, apart from the traditional ones. According to 
the rep! ies to the questionnaire, it seems that personal choice is less 
significant in industrial location in Libya than the factors mentioned so far, 
but it is sti I I an important factor. Two of the respondents indicated that 
their reason was that their factory was located in the place where they lived. 
Another three indicated personal choice as a secondary reason for their 
location. 
The rep! ies to question No. 47 indicated that alI of those 
who I isted personal choice as an important factor had their establishments 
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located in their home town. There is no information available to establish 
whether these entrepreneurs considered one or more alternative locations 
before deciding to locate their businesses in their home towns, or whether 
they showed no interest at alI in locating their businesses at a distance 
from their homes, but the latter seems to be a more acceptable explanation 
for their decision. This may be because Libyans in general are not foot-
ioose in terms of shifting their homes. Most of the recent industries in 
Libya are in the private sector and are smal 1-scale establishments. Many 
entrepreneurs seek a location close to their home town in the period of 
in fancy of their factory, because their estab I i shments, wh i·ch perhaps cannot 
afford adequate means of advertising, can easily depend on existing human 
relationships for marketing their products. Moreover, the entrepreneur may 
expect more trust and encouragement from his home town environment than from 
a town where he is a stranger, though this is not so important in the case 
of large establishments, which are able to maintain a location anywhere in 
the country by virtue of an established reputation for quality or depend-
( I 3) 
abi I ity. Factories indicating personal choice as a main factor of 
location include two manufacturing clothes, two manufacturing furniture, and 
one for the manufacture of marble products. These are factories which depend 
on private orders for their production, and they need complete trust from 
their consumers. Therefore the establishment is located in an area or town 
where the entrepreneur knows most of the inhabitants, or where he has himself 
been in commerce as a wholesaler·or retailer, and thus has good contacts with 
local wholesalers and retailers, which means that he is operating a factory 
in a friendly environment. This may give him the advantage of having 
regular customers, besides which he may also receive fewer complaints, if 
his product causes inconvenience to them, than in any other area. However, 
because urban inhabitants are the greatest consumers of industrial items, 
ar:d in general have a more industrial mentality, than rural inhabitants,the 
establishments which are located under this factor are I ikely to be in the 
towns, especially in Tripoli and Benghazi. 
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Table 7.12 The Distribution Of The Power Stations And Their Production, 
1972 (in Kilowatts) 
Location Production 
Tripoli 382,738,840 
Garabo I i 5,478,790 
Benghazi 238,610,340 
Bni na I , 815,430 
E l-Ab i ar 4,250,100 
Zahra 142,735,016 
Zuara 2,476,590 
Misurata 9,243,120 
Zletin I ,081 I 888 
Hon 780,490 
Wad dan 577,960 
Homes 21 15971 180 
Tarhuna 1,895,010 
Ben-UI i d I I 736,490 
De rna 12,002,922 
Tobruk 9,339,200 
EI-Adam 4,544,460 
Bed a 28,887,933 
EI-Marg 2,221 I 326 
Lam I uda 20,414,700 
Gharian 5,345,030 
Jado 1,845,940 
Rumia 2,026,880 
Nalut 749,650 
Gad ames 476,160 
Sebha 917291 116 
Ghat 414 I 140 
Murzough 713,095 
Brak 1,319,910 
l:Jbari 336,180 
Aj dab i a 5,456,300 
S i rte 2,796,690 
Sources I. Pub I ic Organization of Electricity CP.O.E.l; Productions 
1972-73, Tripoli, 1973. 
2. Personal Communication with P.O.E. in Benghazi, 1973. 
H. The Influence Of Physical Features 
Some physical features of Libya, such as size, structure, rei ief 
and climate, may have some influence on industrial location in the country. 
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In brief, these features are not of great significance in themselves, 
but in relation to population size they have a bearing upon the size of the 
market. ( 14 ) This may explain the absolute lack of establishments in most 
parts of the country, especially in the south, centre and north-east, and 
their relative scarcity along the north coast. 
In general, Libya has two main economic regions; the coast and 
northern mountains, and the semi-desert and desert regions. Except for the 
two narrow ribbons of coastal plain and the mountain ranges of the north-
east and north-west, Libya is mostly semi-desert or desert; only above five 
percent of the total land area of 658,000 miles is economically useful, and 
about three percent is regarded as suitable for permanent cultivation. 
Although climate ordinarily plays I ittle part in industrial 
location, except in the narrow area along the coast and the two mountain 
regions, Libya is seen as a very undesirable place to I ive from the stand-
point of the climate. Between the Mediterranean Sea in the north, and the 
Sahara Desert in the south, the country has five climatic zones which are 
as follows : 
(a) The Maritime Zone encompasses the coastal strips between Zuara and 
Misurata in the west, and between Benghazi and Derna in the east, with a 
width varying between 8-25 Kms. This zone is under the predominant 
influence of the Mediterranean Sea. The average yearly rainfal I varies 
from 200 to 600 mms, with the heaviest amount tal I ing around Tripoli. 
In general, it only rains during the winter, from October to March. During 
this period the winds are mainly from the West to North-West and bring rain 
clouds. In spring and autumn the area is affected by southern winds, the 
Ghibl i, which carry dust and raise the temperature along the coast. 
{b) The Steppe Zone comprises the western part, a smal I area around Homes 
and Misurata, a smal I strip along the Gulf of Sirte, and the area between 
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the Gebel and the coast in the west and east. The zone is influenced 
less by the Mediterranean but is greatly influenced by the southern winds. 
The average rainfall is less than in the first zone. 
(c) The Mountain Zone includes Gebel Gharbi and Gebel Akhdar. The 
average temperature on both Gebels is lower than in the first zone, but 
the average amount of rain is higher, about 330 mms at Gharian, and even 
higher on G. Akhdar, especially around Shahat, where it is about 580 mms. 
(d) and (e) The Semi-Desert and Desert Zones cover most of the area of 
Libya, especially south of the highlands, where I ife is possible only around 
the oases or in smal I centres where underground water permits modest veget-
ation and I imited cultivation. Temperature variation in these zones between 
day and night is very considerable. During the day the average temperature 
0 52°C, but during the night, in the the minimum may reach 50 even summer, 
temperature may fa II to below I 0°C. ( I 5) Rainfall is infrequent that in so 
some areas 15 or 25 years have passed without any rain. 
Manufacturing industries need a favourable environment with 
faci I ities which are already available or which may readily be created. 
Most of Libya is covered by desert, and except in some cases, is econom-
ical ly disadvantageous, due to high overhead costs for transportation and 
power, and the lack of social benefits. This must be weighed against the 
. ( 16) 
advantages in deciding the 1ssue. In addition to the differences 
described, those of climate influence the people's I ife and their outlook. 
It is true that industry may be located in a desert area, but in the case 
of Libya, it may be costly in an unpopulated area with lack of transport-
ation and infrastructure, especially for smal I establishments. 
I. The Influence Of The Government 
In recent years government pol icy has clearly been an important 
determinant of the location decision of manufacturers in many countries. 
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In other countries, governmental bodies have provided industrial estates 
and industrial projects in order to improve some under-developed regions, 
or have directed industries towards certain locations. 
As we saw, up to 1970, the Libyan government had no strong stated 
pol icy for overall industrial development, nor did it interfere in any way 
with the location of industrial development. Its role was both as owner 
of some pub I i c estab I i shrnents under the contra I of the Ministry of Industry, 
which were mainly located in Tripoli and Benghazi, and as promoter of 
industrial investment through the Industrial Bank, without direction to any 
particular area. 
The uncertain pol icy for industrial location may be accepted at 
this stage in Libya as an incentive to private investors to become involved 
in manufacturing industries. The supply of entrepreneurial abi I ity was 
mostly I imited to the two large centres of economic activities because 
financiers who were residents of the~e cities preferred to keep activities 
close to their homes, in places where there was more infrastructure. More-
over, as there was a concentration of offices of financial assistance in 
Tripoli and Benghazi, such aid tended to be only available to establishments 
in this a rea. This may have encouraged the location of industries within 
them. The amount of the industrial loans approved by the Industrial Bank 
(see Chapter 5) may give some idea of how they were appl Jed, and how they 
might have influenced the pace of industrial growth. The loans have helped 
the two cities, and even their surroundings, to become important industrial 
areas in the count'ry, and have restricted growth in other parts. 
At the present time some social and political factors, rather than 
economic considerations, appear in the cases of the state-owned establish-
ments, to have determined locations in accordance with the new industrial 
plan (see Chapter 5). 
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J. The Influence Of History 
The present distribution of manufacturing industries in Libya, 
as explained by the previous factors, does not show how the present pattern 
is related to the past distribution. Since the state of industry in Libya 
was induced by the Italians, a recapitulation of I tal ian pol icy would have 
provided a useful background for tracing the historical development of the 
distribution of Libyan industries. Unfortunately, there is no information 
available about their policies, but it was noted in Chapter 2 that most 
establishments owned by Ita I ians were located in Tripoli and that there were 
some in Benghazi and Misurata. As previously ,mentioned, this was because 
net~r-5 
the foreign en'trepreltended to serve primarily the ltal ian communities 
which were concentrated near the headquarters of administration, and points 
of contact with Italy. It can be said that the ltal ian regime had a far-
reaching influence on the evolution of the existing general pattern of 
industrial location, and the towns, and Tripoli in particular, greatly 
benefited by the concentration thereof both the Ita I ians' private and 
governmental capital. This concentration of capital improved the cities' 
infrastructure and the other attractive industrial location incentives, 
which have had an important influence on present industrial location patterns. 
K. other Considerations 
As regards location, there are sti I I other factors to be considered, 
although they are much less important, such as the promotional activities of 
local bodies, the concentration of management, and the avai labi I ity of capital, 
commercial banks and government departments, alI of·which have some appl ic-
ability. 
Finally, it can be concluded from the above methods of analysis 
that they lead to a clear picture of the factors underlying the existing 
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industrial location patterns. In most cases, urban centres function 
as a potent local ising force for industries because of the avai labi I ity 
of industrial components, such as labour, a relatively large market, •••• 
etc. These advantages, which stand in contrast to what obtains in rural 
areas almost devoid of such faci I ities, tend to attract industries to 
urban centres. 
Industrial Location Theories And Industrial Location In Libya 
After studying the influence of various industrial location factors 
this section wi II discuss whether there is any relation between general 
location theories and industrial location in Libya. The I iterature on the 
theory of industrial location is extensive and complex, and yet, despite the 
great deal of work done on the subject, it can hardly be said that there is 
a well-established theory, especially for developing countries, so this study 
wi I I concern itself only with the main theories. Most location theories 
which deal with industrial location discuss a number of characteristics that 
account for the location of factories. They tend to be deductive in method 
( 17) 
and deterministic in approach. The characteristics which affect loc-
ation are mainly transport, the market of raw materials, the labour force, 
and land avai labi I ity. · Their arguments rest upon a number of simp! ifying 
assumptions, but the most important of these assumptions is that entrepren-
eurs are motivated by the desire for maximum profit. (IS) This means that 
entrepreneurs seek to increase profits or minimise costs in a suitable 
environment. 
(19) (20) (21) The location theories of von Thunen, Weber, Palander, 
( 2 I ) .. ( 22) ( 23) ( 24) Hoover, Losch, Greenhut, and lsard, are different in their 
premises and propositions, and in the kind of characteristics which these 
authors thought dominated the location decision. Some theories are based 
on just one or a few selected relationships, while other elements are taken 
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as given (a partial equi I ibrium theory). Other theories are based on 
more than one relationship (a general equi I ibrium theory). For example, 
von Thunen formulated his famous theory, which was concerned with the 
location of agricultural land, on the basis of the transportation cost 
and land rent. 
In 1909, Alfred Weber wrote the first comprehensive theory to 
recognize the possibi i ity of a general theory for industrial location. His 
framework for the selection of the right location "the least-cost" by any 
individual entrepreneur was mainly focused on micro-economic considerations. 
His work initially depended on three factors, two of which were described as 
general regional location factors, namely transport and labour costs. His 
third factor, which is an agglomeration of many small factors, including 
proximity to auxi I iary industries, avai labi I ity of better market faci I ities 
and similar advantages, he regarded as a general locational factor. He 
realized that the cost of raw materials and fuel differed from place to place, 
so he considered this under the transport cost. 
According to his theory, the location which provides the lowest 
transport cost is the most suitable location. In deciding the proximity 
of the location to the area of consumption, there is an important factor 
to be considered, which is the nature of the product. For instance, raw 
materials which lose an essential amount of weight in the manufacturing 
process attract factories to the location of the raw materials. It is 
understandable that if the raw materials gain some weight in manufacturing, 
then this encourages a close proximity of the factory to the market areas. 
But in the case of more than one raw material being used in the process, 
then the choice of location wi I I favour a location that provides the least 
transportation cost. 
Nevertheless, he did not give unqualified support to the assumption 
that transport cost is the main factor in selecting a location. He assumed 
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instead that labour cost is also an important factor that cannot be omitted, 
especially in the situation where an industry is moved from a region of low 
transportation cost to a region of high transportation cost 
saving in labour cost surpasses the higher transport cost. 
because the 
The third factor is that of the concentration in dispersion of 
industries. It is concerned with the choice of having factories close 
together, or widely dispersed. Benefits can be obtained from a close 
proximity to secondary industries, and good marketing outlets can encourage 
the centralization of industries in one area. Other factors in favour of 
dispersion may discourage centralization. 
Weber's theory also paid attention to other factors such as rate 
of interest, banking, insurance and taxes. It considered them as related 
to special economic systems, and not important enough for a general location 
theory. According to his theory, a location which achieves the best inter-
action of the three factors is the best site for an industry. 
Other significant contributions have come from Paland.er, Hoover, 
Losch and Greenhut, who have improved the genera I i ty of the I east cost 
approach by their more realistic consideration of the market factor, but 
each to a different degree. Tord Palander's approach to industrial location 
was based on Weber's work, but there are things in Weber that he could not 
accept. Weber's analysis of agglomeration is criticised on the grounds 
that no factory would move away from the lowest transport cost location to 
a potential agglomeration point unless it was sure that others would do the 
(25) He also looks at transport in terms of costs of movement rather same. 
than the weight to be transported. He concerned his analysis in terms of 
transport surfaces, lines and points, and by including variations in transfer 
rateswith distance. 
Furthermore, since Weber's theory was translated into English in 
1928, there has been a growing interest in location theories, especially in 
America, bui I ding on the work of pioneers in this field. A number of 
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geographers and economists have modified and developed theories. Edgar 
Hoover based his work on two groups of factors with transportation costs 
and production or extraction costs as the determinants of location. The 
first group includes the cost of obtaining raw materials and the cost of 
transporting finished products, whi 1st the second group includes agglomer-
ation and institutional costs. Hoover was much more concerned with the 
characteristics of freight costs. He stressed the fact that the cost of 
. (26) transfer does not increase proportionately with distance. These 
theories mainly concentrated on transportation and production costs, so 
the major criticism of them is their omission of the demand factor. 
Losch rejected the lowest cost location of Weber and his followers. His 
theory considered that alI factories sel I to a spatially continuous market 
instead of the punctiform pattern assumed by Weber, and the right site in 
his view is the location with the maximum profit. Greenhut and lsard 
also paid special attention to the demand factor as wei I as other basic 
variable locational factors, such as power, labour, transportation and cost 
of the agglomeration. Greenhut also gave ful I weight to the influence of 
purely personal considerations, introducing to location theory the concept 
of "psychic income" as a measure of the non-pecuniary satisfaction that a 
(27) particular choice of location may offer to individual manufacturers. 
Losch thought this consistent in the theory as long as personal choice of 
location was not more important than the pecuniary profit. 
In addition, during the last decade, many others have improved 
and modified this approach. Many attempts have been made to combine 
classical location theories with the more general economic theory of equi 1-
ibrium. Smith stated that, 
"spatial variations in total cost and total revenue 
create an optimum location at which profits may be maximized, 
and also a spatial margin beyond which profitable operation 
is not possible. Within the margin the firm is free to (2S) locate anywhere, providing profit maximization is not required." 
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Indeed, his approach was against the concept of the traditional theories, 
which search for some optimum course of action based on the maximization 
of financial profits, in favour of an approach which stresses the economic 
I imitations imposed on the freedom of locational choice. (29 ) 
Recent approaches have bui It on the penetrating criticism of 
previous theories, and have been based on the argument that the choice of 
the entrepreneur and the behaviour of the organization shal I count as 
factors in location decisions. t~re recent work has examined the social 
and business I inks between managers, bankers, financiers, government 
officials and administrators, and the manner in which information flows 
(30) between different administrative personnel. 
The theoretical framework of the theories summarized above has 
been developed on the basis of economic factors, and has neglected other 
factors which are very important in location, especially for developing 
countries. It may be that these location theories were drawn only from 
the industrialized nations and so they have omitted the experience of 
developing countries. AI I the evidence has resulted in a general recog-
nition of the failure so far of alI researchers to produce a valid general 
theory to explain and provide guidelines for the solution of the problems 
of industrial location in the different situations existing in different 
countries. 
Because location theories are based on a host of assumptions, 
the difference from country to country has failed to be recognized. For 
. ( 31 ) instance, Weber used the following assumptions. 
I. equal transport costs of alI products; 
2. many consumption centres; 
3. equal costs of raw materials in alI departments; 
4. unequal distribution of raw materials. 
And assumptions such as these support the idea that the entrepreneurs would 
want the establishments to be situated at the point of lowest cost, and that 
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they would favour the production site which enabled them to gain the 
highest level of profit. This assumption may be right in a country where 
there are government activities everywhere in the whole country, where alI 
regions of the country are developed to the same degree, and where there 
is a more or less even distribution of development, population and infra-
structure, and it is assumed that the entrepreneur has much information 
about the cost in each alternative location which can help him to choose 
the site at which he would obtain most profit. But in developing countries, 
and in Libya in particular, there is a lack of such information and most 
development is concentrated in a few regions. These economic factors have 
an important influence on the location decision for many industries in 
Libya, but it is a country with traditional and small-scale establishments, 
where there is no strong competition between them, where there is an in-
adequate supply of information, and where other non-economic factors are 
important for industrial location, for example, the amenities of the city, 
services, personal contact, geographical factors and government influence. 
As Tiebout has noted, 
"Location theory is not in a condition to predict 
at the fine margin this analysis requires." (32) 
The general pattern of concentration of industries in the 
municipalities of Tripoli and Benghazi is largely due to cost factors. 
The location of some industries which depend on imported raw materials such 
as chemicals, textiles, paper and metal work, is near the points where raw 
materials enter the country. Other industries are located close to their 
sources of local raw materials, if they are bulky or lose weight in processing, 
or if the goods are perishable. They save costs which would be greater if 
the establishments were located a long 8istance from the port or source of 
raw materials. This, in fact, indicates the importance of the transport 
cost mentioned by Weber and Hoover. 
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In terms of the demand factor (the market) indicated by 
Losch, Greenhut and lsard, the previous study shows the importance of the 
market in Libya as a factor of location. The concentration of population 
in two areas, and the greater wealth of people in these regions compared 
with those in the underdeveloped areas is one of the main factors influencing 
industrial location. 
A number of factors have been suggested by the theories for 
industrial location. But strangely enough no mention has been made so far 
of external economies, often considered the major factor for location. The 
concentration of industries in the Tripoli and Benghazi municipalities is 
not only a result of the cost of transportation and the demand factor, but 
also of the advantage gained by a number of external economies, which have 
undoubtedly affected industrial location in Libya. The infrastructure, 
social amenities and services, the benefits of proximity to government, the 
repair and service of establishments, and banking insurance faci I ities, are 
alI most easily avai !able and best developed in these two cities. Some 
entrepreneurs who have small establishments may not select the ideal location 
from the point of view of the cost factor, because that location is inadequate 
in necessary faci I ities, such as water, electricity and land. In Libya, 
the locations of many establishments are affected in this way. Moreover, 
some entrepreneurs seek to establish their establishments in their home 
environments, rather than in another place, even one providing a better 
location. 
Besides, governmental influence, direct or indirect, which 
was omitted from the location theories, has also had an effect in recent 
years. By establishing factories under the public sector, some social and 
political factors have affected the decision on location. Some of the 
recent state-owned establishments were located for social and political 
reasons. For instance, the site of the ready-wear suit factory in Derna, 
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the shoe factory in Misurata, and the furniture factory in Beda, have very 
I ittle economic justification. The raw materials are transported from 
Benghazi for the first and the third, and from Tripoli for the second, and 
the final products are sent to the markets in Tripoli and Benghazi. The 
location was chosen in order to develop these areas and provide jobs for 
people so that they would not emigrate to the major cities. 
Broadly, the establishment of industrial estates in the future 
in a country which is sti II developing, I inked with a government concern 
in industrial development, is found to affect the industrial location in 
some areas and perhaps reduce the volume of migration to the main cities. 
The social aim in locating establishments in these areas prevai Is and, 
later, by attracting other supplementary and complementary industries, 
housing and social amenities may provide a new infrastructure for these 
0 
areas. 
Finally, from the above study it can be concluded that 
industrial location in Libya is not due solely to economic factors. The 
development of some external economies in a I imited number of cities is 
an important reason in this instance. Industrial location results from 
a combination of many factors, social, political and physical, as wei I 
as economic, and the application of a general location theory may be 
restrictive for any analysis of the industrial location in such a country. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Industrial Location In The Main Towns 
The previous chapter has analysed industrial location within the 
ten Libyan Muhafadat and their regions, using these as the basic units for 
the campi lation and plotting of information. This has facilitated the 
handling of large masses of data without obscuring the differences between 
urban, rural and desert muhafadat and municipalities. It has been observed 
that there is a high degree of concentration in some of the municipalities. 
Within these municipalities are to be found the main towns whose industrial 
structures incorporate most of the industries found in Libya. Therefore 
this chapter discusses industrial diversity and location within the two 
largest towns in the country. 
According to the industrial census of 1971, Tripoli and Benghazi 
were the most important industrial cities in the country, containing about 
73 percent of all the establishments with more than 10 workers, and employing 
about 84 percent of the total workers. The types of industries present in 
the two towns, the elements of their structure, and other considerations such 
as which has the more rapid growth and industrial expansion, are the concern 
of this chapter. 
The reason why Tripoli rather than Benghazi is called the industrial 
town of Libya becomes evident when the industrial structure of the two towns 
is examined. More factories are located within the contiguous area of 
Tripoli and, in addition, the establishments of Tripoli are larger and 
employ more people. 
It is difficult to determine the extent to which diversification 
has increased in the two cities since 1956, and to compare the diversification 
of establishments in the two towns with that in Libya as a whole, because 
there are no annual statistics for industry in these two cities. Therefore 
this study examines all the factories I isted in the 1971 Industrial Census, 
Fig. 8·1 LORENZ CURVES FOR INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS IN TRIPOLI AND 
BENGHAZI 1956, 1966 AND 1971 
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and excludes alI those which closed before 1971. But it must be remembered 
that the number of establishments in Libya in 1971 was few, and the number 
which closed previously must be fewer. For this comparative study the 
diversification of the establishments has been calculated for these two 
cities, and for Libya as a whole. Table 8.1 presents data illustrating 
the percentage of factories in 18 branches of industry for three time periods, 
1956, 1966, and !971. Comparing Tri poI i and Benghazi, Figure 8. I shows that 
Lorenz Curves for each successive time period I ie closer to the diagonal in 
the case of Tripoli than in that of Benghazi, and it can be concluded that 
the industrial structure of Tripoli has become more diverse than that of 
Benghazi. During these three periods the industrial structure of Libya has 
undergone major changes, most of which are reflected in the diversification 
( I ) indices. 
Although the changes in the country as a whole have been important, 
those occurring in Tripoli have been more so, as is illustrated by Figure 8.2. 
The 1956 diversification index for Tripoli was 15.0 and for Benghazi 17.0, 
as compared with a value of 21.0 for the whole of Libya in that year. In 
1966 the index for Tripoli had risen to 40.0, a large increase of 25.0 
during ten years, and in Benghazi it had mounted to 35.0, a rise of 18.0. 
During the same time the national index had increased by only 15.0. By 1971 
the Tripoli index had risen to 45.0, an increase of 5.0, while the national 
index was 37.0, an increase of only 1.0. The figure for Benghazi had dropped 
by I .0 to about 34.0. In other words, while diversification over the whole 
country was rising by a I ittle less than 75 percent, that of Tripoli had 
trebled and that of Benghazi had doubled. It is quite clear that industry 
has been diversifying much more rapidly in Tripoli than in Benghazi, or in 
Libya as a whole. The value for Benghazi and Libya during the period 1966-
1971 has remained virtually static, while in Tripoli the tendency is for 
diversification to continue to increase, but at a slower rate. It is clear 
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Tab I e 8. I Percentage Distri_bution Of Industrial Establishments In 18 Major BranChes in Tripoli, Benghazi and 
Lib:ia in 1956, 1966, and 1971 
Libya Tripoli Benghazi 
Industry 1956 1966 1971 1956. 1966 1971 1956 1966 1971 
Food processing 53. I 41.4 32.3 63.2 36.0 21.0 33.3 20.9 17.0 
Soft drinks 6.2 2.6 I • 9 - - I • 8 16.7 4.7 2.0 
Tobacco 3. I 0.7 0.3 5.2 I • 3 0.7 
Textiles 3. I 5.3 3.6 - 8.0 4.8 16.7 4. 7 4.0 
Clothes - 0.7 I • 9 - 1.3 4.2 
Leather 3. I 0.7 0.3 5.2 I • 3 0.7 
Shoes - 0.7 0.6 - I • 3 0.7 
Carpentry 3. I 9.2 15.5 - 6.7 15.6 - 16.3 20.0 
Furniture - 1.3 0.8 - 2.7 I • 8 
Paper 3. I 1.3 I. 5 5.2 2.7 2.4 - - I .0 
Printing 12.6 7.9 3.8 10.6 8.0 4.8 33.3 13.9 6.0 
Chemicals 12.6 6.6 5.8 10.6 8.0 9.0 - 6.9 4.0 
Rubber - I. 3 1.6 - 2.7 3.6 
Plastic - 0.7 0.6 - I • 3 0.7 
Cement - - 0.6 - - - - - I. 0 
Cement products - 3.2 6.9 - 1.3 3.0 - 4.7 12.0 
Other bui I ding materials- 10.5 13.2 - 12.0 15.0 - 16.3 19.0 
Metal work - 5.4 8.8 - 5.4. 10.2 - I I. 6 14.0 
Total 100.0. 100.0 . 100.0 100.0 100.0 . 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source : Computed by author from data in I.R.C. ··Industrial Establ ish~ents Census 1971, Tripoli, 1972. 
N 
-
\!J 
220 
that Tripoli is the most highly-diversified and most important industrial 
c i ty i n Li by a. Moreover, according to the 1971 Industrial Census, Tripoli 
contains about 46 percent of alI Libya's industrial establishment& which 
employ more than 10 workers, alI of them located within the city, whi 1st 
Benghazi has about 29 percent of the total, some of which are located in 
adjacent areas such as EI-Gawarsha and EI-Hawari. 
There are several possible explanations of this. The increase in 
the importance of Tripoli for highly diversified manufacturing has been for 
historical, economic, geographical and political reasons. It has grown to 
be the largest metropolitan area in Libya, covering about 33 square miles. (2) 
From an historical point of view most of the Ita I ian establishments were in 
Tripoli (Chapter 2). Some of these remained after the !tal ians had left 
and were taken over by Libyans, whose success in operating them encouraged 
other Libyans to establish new ones and renew old ones. Moreover, the con-
urbation with its present population of about 454 thousands is by far the 
most significant urban centre of production and consumption in Libya, as 
indicated by the concentration of ski I Is and of high incomes. Table 8.2 
shows that the total consumption expenditure of 1970 is nearly 10 percent 
higher in Tripoli than in Benghazi. The concentration of large numbers 6f 
people within a large city forms a market not only for mass-produced goods, 
( 3) but also for more esoteric products. 
The new functions of the city as the capital of the country and centre 
of most of the government administration, banks, insurance companies, oi I 
companies, and of industrial research, cause it to receive more government 
investment than any other urban area. Concentration of economic activities 
carried out by either the national or international agencies, which moved from 
Benghazi and Beda, acts as a strong pul I ing factor in Tripoli. Labour i·s 
a I so more eas i I y ava i I ab I e in Tr i poI i than in Benghazi. Even if there is 
no unemployment, workers can be attracted from other establishments, besides 
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Table 8.2 Consumption Expenditure On,Some Consumption Items in Tripoli 
And Benghazi, 1970 (In LD; 000) 
Consumption items Tripoli Benghazi 
Food 31 0 565 29,820 
Consumer goods (other than 
food) 2, 776 2,596 
Clothing, textiles, 
furnishings 6,368 4,884 
Household equipment and 
durab I es 6,896. . .. 6,041 . 
Tota I 47,605. 43,341. 
Source Census And Statistical Dept. Statistical ·Abstract· 1970, Tripoli, 
1972. 
which there are also some faci I ities available for training ski I led workers. 
Tripoli close tc/largest industrial training centre (Nasr El Din Ghami lnst-
itute) and Faculty of Engineering, while in Benghazi there is only vacat-
ional training, and the training centre was transferred to Tobruk (see 
Chapter 9). 
Industry is also attracted by the various external economies made 
possible in Tripoli by the more adequate services and uti I ities, such as 
electricity. Tripoli has the largest power station in the country, with 
a production of about 351,000 thousand Kilowatt hours in 1969. It also has 
the main airport and port, its airport being deeper and with more faci I ities 
than that of Benghazi. Table 8.3 shows the great importance of the 
Tripoli port and airports. Furthermore, Tripoli has developed as the trans-
port node for the whole western muhafadat. A large number of buses daily 
serve areas containing at least three-quarters of the western Muhafadat's 
population. Moreover, its location gives Tripoli two further advantages 
over Benghazi. Firstly, it is closer to the western countries, making raw 
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Table 8.3 Percentage Of Ships, Planes, Loaded And Unloaded, Tripoli 
Port And Airport, 1971 
Libya Tripoli % 
Classification ( I ) ( 2) (2)-(1) 
Number of commercial ships entering ports 4,513 2,439 54.0 
Goods unloaded in ports ( in thousand tons) 3,009 I ,801 59.9 
II loaded " " " " 
II 20 10 50.0 
Number of planes landing at airports 6,706 3,941 58.8 
Goods unloaded at airports ( in tons) 12, I I I 9,810 81.0 
Goods loaded " " " 2, 41 I I, 879 78.0 
Source Census and Statistical Dept. Statistical Abstract. 1971, Tripol'i, 
1973. 
raw materials, machines, techniques and spare parts cheaper and easier to 
import. Secondly, it is located in the centre of a terti le hinterland 
which maintains about two-thirds of the Libyan population. Four of the 
main cities in Libya CMisurata, EI-Zawia, Homes and Gharian) are located 
within 130 miles of Tripoli and the development of a new motorway system 
has extended its market as wei I as the supply of raw materials. Moreover, 
the urban settlements of this area perform as central places, serving areas 
within the city's market region. 
A. Industrial Distribution And Location ·In Tripoli 
The previous section has shown that Tripoli is the major 
industrial city. This section wi I I study the distribution and location 
pattern of the manufacturing industries within the city and its 18 districts. 
Table 8.4 gives a detailed analysis of the number of establishments arranged 
by size. The table shows that 45 percent of the establishments within the 
city in 1971 were small (employing only 10-19 workers). The food, soft 
drinks, building materials and carpentry industries accounted for about 
Table 8.4 Distribution Of Establishments And Workers By Industry 
In Tripoli, 1971 
Type of Industry 
Food processing 
Soft drinks 
Tobacco 
Textiles 
Clothes 
Leather 
Shoes 
Carpentry 
Furniture 
Paper 
Printing 
Chemical products 
Rubber 
Plastic 
Cement 
Other bui I ding 
materia Is 
Metal work 
Total 
No.of establishments by size 
of workers 
10-19 
15 
4 
4 
13 
6 
3 
4 
3 
9 
7_ 
72 
20-49 50 and 
over 
7 14 
2 
3 
2 
8 
3 
7 4 
2 
2 
12 3 
8 
52 36 
Total 
36 
3 
8 
7 
22 
3 
4 
7 
14 
6 
6 
24 
16 
-- _160 
Tota I number 
of employment 
2, 178 
674 
I ,200 
222 
186 
22 
18 
477 
218 
210 
140 
582 
117 
16 
265 
645 
_445. 
7,615 
223 
% of 
total 
28;6 
8.9 
15.8 
2.9 
2.4 
0.3 
0.2 
6.3 
2.9 
2.8 
I .8 
7.6 
I. 5 
0.2 
3.5 
8.5 
- 5.8 
100.0 
Source Calculated by author from data in I.R.C.- Industrial Establishment 
Census 1971, Tripoli, 1972. 
57 percent of alI establishments and of the total of workers. It is obvious 
that most of the industries in the city of Tripoli are sti I I traditional. 
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The most important branch of industry, measured according to total 
number of workers, is food processing, which accounts for 29 percent of the 
total persons employed. A detailed breakdown shows that 1,158 workers, or 
53 percent of the total number of food workers, were connected with six 
estab I i shments, and that 688 workers, 32 percent of the tota I in this category, 
were connected with three tomato canning establishments. The area surrounding 
Tripoli to the south is the greatest centre for tomato production. In 1969 
Tripoli and EI-Zawia Muhafadat produced about 1,200,000 tons which accounted 
for about 93 percent of the country's total production. The establishments 
buy the produce during the harvest season from the farmers who bring it to 
them. The number of workers in these factories is not stable. There is a 
high seasonal peak in the summer, but numbers decline to about 40 to 60 
during the rest of the year. This contrast is due solely to the nature of 
the work. At the height of the season, the work does not require experience, 
nor is it physically demanding, but a large number of workers are needed. 
During the rest of the year, however, the tasks are physically more taxing, 
and therefore strong and expert men are more desirable as workers. (4 ) 
Bui I ding materials, and the manufacture of cement, bricks, flag-
stones and lime products are the next important industries by total of workers. 
The construction boom in the city has a great deal to do with the continued 
growth of this industrial category. Chemical industries, such as gas 
cylinders, toiletries, soap, perfumes and paints, can be related to the change 
in people's way of I ife, and the increased demand for more sophisticated 
articles. 
As far as the location of these establishments within the city is 
concerned, it has been stated earlier that there··was no formal pol icy for 
industrial location, either between the regions or within the cities. 
Therefore industrial sites within Tripoli were selected in the city by the 
entrepreneurs themselves, who sought somewhere close to the port, to the 
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C.B.D. and to their own homes. In 1968, the Municipality of Tripoli set 
aside special zones for the location of new establishments within the city, 
and asked the old establishments to move wherever possible in order to 
reduce industrial problems such as smells and pollution. After this, most 
new establishments were established in some of these zones, but others were 
I ocated e I sew here for reasons which w i I I be discussed I ater. In spite of 
the municipal or·der· for' old establ ishrnen-1-s to rnove, and the incr'ease of the 
land values in C.B.D., only a few establishments complied. Of the 40 
establishments interviewed (24 percent of the total establishments in the 
city), 33 were established before 1969, but only 6 establishments (18 percent) 
had moved from previous sites. The main reasons for re-locating establish-
ments were the increased space required to gain economies in production and 
the desire to organize production techniques in favourable economic circum-
stances. Those ·establishments which have moved had either been unable to 
obtain space near their former sites or had wished to construct new bui I dings. 
The industrial establishments in Tripoli are widely scattered 
throughout the city and to give a clear picture of their distribution the 
coefficient of location is very useful, since it indicates the degree of 
concentration of each type of industry. It is also an aid in finding out 
the industrial diversity within each of the 18 districts of Tripoli 1 s city. 
To examine the coefficient of localization of the industries within Tripoli 
(used in Chapter 6), one should keep in mind the following classification 
originated by Sargent Florence : {5 ) industries with a value between 40 and 
60 are moderately localized, those with lower values are fairly wei I spread 
over the region, and industries with values above.60 may be taken as heavily 
localized. 
Tables 8.5 and 8.6 show the distribution of workers and the co-
efficients of location of 17 industrial categories in the 18 districts of 
* the city. Most of the industries are heavily localized. This is either 
* The classification of the districts was due to the classification of the 
Tripoli Master Plan, final report of 1969. 
Table 8.5 Distribution Of Industrial Workers By Industries For Each District In Tripoli, 1971 
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Table 8.6 Coefficient Of Localization Of Industries In Various 
Districts Of Tri poI i, 1971 
The Coefficient of 
Industry Loca I i zat ion 
Food 45 
Soft drinks 78 
Tobacco 76 
Textiles 66 
Clothes 84 
Leather 76 
Shoes 93 
Carpentry (wood) 40 
Furniture 69 
Paper 63 
Printing 66 
Chemicals 36 
Rubber 57 
Plastic 79 
Cement products 75 
Other bui I ding materia Is 51 
Metal work 42 
because there is only one factory and 100 percent of its labour is therefore 
in one district (e.g. the tobacco and leather industries in Omar Muchtar 
Districts, shoes in Sidi Kal ita, and plastics in Hadbah EI~Khadra District), 
or because most of the factories with large numbers of workers are located 
in one district. For example, two large establishments with 97 percent of 
the total workers in the soft drinks industry are in Hadbah EI-Khadra; four 
clothing establishments employing 61 percent of this industry's total workers 
are in Central District; and one establishment with 78 percent of the 
furniture industry's total is located in the Forest En-Nasr District. 
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Table 8.7 Industries Arranged According To Concentration In Each 
District 
Centra I 
Omar Muchtar 
Garden City 
Sid i Ka I i fa 
Sug Talatha 
Georgompopo I i 
East Gu rg i 
Forest En-Nasr 
North Sug EI-Jumaah 
Sug EI-Jumaah Central 
Fornaj 
University 
Hadbah EI-Khadra 
West Gurgi 
Garga resch 
East Fornaj 
District Of Tripoli 
Industries 
Clothes and printing 
Tobacco, leather and printing 
Shoes, rubber and textiles 
Wood, rubber and paper 
Rubber and food processing 
Food processing 
Furniture, paper and other building 
materia Is 
Textiles and clothes 
Wood 
Cement production 
Plastics, soft drinks, metal work, 
chemicals and other building materials 
Food processing 
Cement production 
Paper 
The foodstuffs, wood, rubber, other building materials and metal 
work industries have moderate coefficients of localization. The food industry 
is widely distributed, located in 15 districts, but its moderate coefficient 
results from about 80 percent of its workers being located in only six 
districts. In spite of the fact that the chemical industry is located in 
seven districts, it has a low coefficient, possibly because most of its workers 
are located in one of the industrial districts. Other industries show a high 
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concentration, each of them located in a few districts. Table 8.7 shows 
the type of industry concentrated in each district according to coefficients 
of location. Only six districts depend significantly on one industry and 
the other districts have more than one. Five highly industrialized districts 
have about two-thirds of the total workers, each having three industries or 
more concentrated in it. These districts are Omar Muchtar, Sidi Kal ita, 
Sug-Talathai Forest En-Nasr and Hadbah E!-Khadra. 
By comparing this distribution of industrial concentration among 
the districts in relation to their respective products with the answers to 
question No. 45 of the questionnaire, certain conclusions may be reached. 
Industries which deal with foodstuffs, wood and building materials production, 
whose products are mainly for local consumption in the city, are found in 
many districts, as close as possible to the local district markets. Other 
industries, such as tobacco, soft drinks, furniture, plastics and chemicals, 
are localized in one or two districts, especially in The Suani Road area, 
because their products do not depend on the local market, but are taken to 
other parts of the country. 
Are industries distributed throughout each district, or are they 
concentrated in one or two parts of each district? Comparison of Figures 
8.3 and 8.4, which show the various industrial locations in Tripoli, indicate 
that except in Sus Talatha district, industries are mostly concentrated either 
at the western or the eastern edge of each district, largely because they are 
adjacent to main roads. 
Nine industrial areas can be recognized within the metropolis. 
(6) They comprise about 6.6 percent of the total land in the city, and 
correlate with four main roads, connecting Treipol i with other parts of the 
country (Figure 8.5) : (A) Suani Road, (B) North West, (C) Sidi Kalifa, 
(D) Su.g Talatha, (E) North Central, (F) South east, (G) South west, 
(H) South Central, and (I) Bab-Ben Gashir. The rationale for determining 
and defining the types of industries that are characteristic of each area is 
now exp I a i ned in deta i I • 
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A. Suani Road Area 
This is the main industrial area in Tripoli in terms of number of 
industrial workers, number of establishments and size. It extends from 
north-east to south-west along the Suani Road, covering the east part of 
East Gurgi Districts, the north-east of West Gurgi, and the west part each 
of Forest En-Nasr and Hadbah EI-Khadra. In 1971, about 2,890 workers, 38 
percent of the total workers in Tripoli, worked here, and more than one-third 
of the establishments in the city are sited here. Several industrial act-
ivities have been established on both sides of this road along a distance of 
approximately 3 Kms. Development as an industrial area is recent, 87 percent 
of the total number of establishments having been established since 1966, and 
most of the bui I dings were erected for industrial purposes. These factories 
are either newly-established or transferred from the inner part of the city 
and erected on larger plots of land in cheaper areas. 
The industrial structure of the area is diversified. Leading 
industries are plastics, furniture, foodstuffs, bui I ding materials and 
chemical industries, the first two with 100 percent, and the latter with 
more than 50 percent of the total workers in each industrial group. Industries 
have been set up here for many reasons. Land was becoming increasingly 
scarce and expensive in the urban core, where annoying legislation was also 
proving less conducive to the establishment of large-scale production. 
Individual corporations have been erecting plants in outlying districts during 
the last seven years, where there were large lots of cheap land close to the 
city. The land value in this area is much cheaper than in other parts of 
the city (Figure 8.6). Much of the land in this area was zoned for industrial 
purposes, and this factor has to a large extent been responsible for the 
present expansion and diversification. The establishments are therefore 
capable of expanding over a wide area without increasing costs tremendously, 
especially those establishments whose raw materials and finished products 
REPRESENTATIVE LAND VALUES -TRIPOLI CITY 1967 Fig. 86 
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are bulky (e.g. building materials, metal work and soft drinks). This area 
can be extended further south to accommodate more industrial establishments. 
It is far from residential areas, and the municipality was right to decide 
that most heavy and noisy industries should be placed here to avoid consider-
able nuisances caused either by noise, such as that of cutting steel or 
clanking bottles, or by unpleasant smel Is, such as that of rubber or chemicals 
which can be srnelt at a considerable distance ·during the hot summer. 
Moreover, it is located near the Suani water station (Figure 8.7) 
which provides Tripoli with all its water requirements. The establishments 
can obtain their water from public pipelines, especially from the major 
pressure pipeline 'A' (600 mm) which passes along the Suani Road. .On the 
other 'hand, half of the establishments interviewed had installed their own 
water supply by sinking wei Is. The public water is sti I I required by some 
industries, especially the food and soft drinks industries, because of the 
(7) 
salinity and high calcium content of Tripoli underground water. . Suani 
Road site is suitable for getting water any time, while establishments inside 
the city are sometimes unable to get the quantity which they need because of 
the smal I pipelines and the increased consumption inside the city in summer. 
The location of the area along the main road a!so minimises the 
transport costs of raw materials and of finished products. The Suani Road 
runs from the north to the south-west, I inking with the central business 
district to the north, and with the important agricultural part of the Geffra 
plain in the south, which provides a large proportion of the city's fruits 
and vegetables. In addition, many heavy vehicles traveli this route carrying 
agricultural produce into the city and manufactured articles from it. Con-
sequently some of the biggest garages, services and repair stations have been 
located on this road which has naturally and unavoidably become very congested. 
The major handicap of this area might be its distance from the res-
idential areas of the workers, but this problem has been tackled by providing 
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special transport services and pub I ic buses (Figure 8.8) which bring workers 
from different parts of the city. Twenty-two of the 40 city establishments 
interviewed were in this area, and five of these provided special transport-
ation while workers for the remainder came either by pub I ic buses or by private 
cars. Table 8.8 reveals that the largest number of pub I ic passenger journeys 
on buses i.n 1967 was made on the Fellah and Gargaresch I ines. (8 ) The 
Fellah I ine runs along the southern part of the Suani Road (see Figure 8.8). 
Table 8.8 Distribution Of Daily Journeys To Work, Tripoli; 1967 
Direction of No. of 
Bus Line journey . journeys 
Ad-Dahrah-Sus EI-Jumaah East 56 3,360 
Arada-Sus EI-Jumaah II 56 3,360 
Armus - Arada 
" 
56 3,360 
Zhata - Arada II 56 3,360 
Jama Bent E 1-Bay " 70 4,200 
Sidi Msri - F ornaj South-east 56 3,360 
Gargaresch West 84 5,040 
Gurgi " 56 3,360 
Fe II ah 
" 
84 5,040 
Had bah E 1-Khadra South-east 70 4,200 
Accara - sh. EI-Zawia South 36 2, 120 
" 
56 3,360 
Circle No. C. B.D. 18 I ,080 
Circle No. 2 C. B.D. 18 I ,080 
Circle No. 3 C. B.D. 18 I ,080 
Circle No. 4 C. B.D. 28 I, 680 
.Tota I 818 49,040 
The twenty-two establishments interviewed here had 1,187 workers, 
and in answer to question No. 31, 27 percent were reported to I ive within 
one Kilometre, 47 percent came from between one and five Kilometres, and 
26 percent I ived more than five Kilometres away. 
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As for the disadvantages of the industrial area, its location 
in the south and south-west of the city is satisfactory from the point of 
view of the prevai I ing north-westerly winds, but not for the Ghibl i winds 
which blow over the city for many days during the year (Table 8.9). These 
south-westerly winds carry the fumes, odours, dirt and gases of the establish-
ments over the residential areas. Moreover, there is no sewerage system in 
the area. Thus some of the establishments have constructed special sumps, 
some of which contain acids and alkalis which pollute the ground water, while 
others burn their sewerage in the area, in the case of the match works, 
causing frequent fire hazards and threatening their neighbours. There is 
also no regular service for the removal of waste materials; ten of the 
establishments interviewed rely on their own disposal trucks, the others 
sel I ing their refuse, or even throwing it onto nearby land. 
Table 8.9 The Number Of Days With Ghibl i Winds ·1ri Tripoli, ·1960-1964 
Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
J 
4 
3 
9 
F 
10 
10 
8 
M 
9 
3 
8 
9 
II 
A 
10 
9 
10 
7 
6 
M J 
13 7 
12 3 
12 5 
2 12 
8 8 
Source Meteorological Office, 1966. 
B. North-West Area 
J 
3 
3 
4 
5 
5 
A 
3 
2 
8 
s 
2 
3 
5 
0 
9 
3 
3 
16 
.N .. D Total 
4 72 
6 8 50 
3 52 
8 13 82 
4. 8 83 
This is one of the oldest industrial areas, old industries oper-
ating here, including the tobacco establishment (established in 1924), fhe 
Tripoli Gas Company (1935), and The Libyan Company of Gas Production (1931 ). 
Here the tobacco, leather, and printing industries are highly concentrated. 
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These industries owe their importance to the fact that they were established 
before the area gained popularity as a residential area, its present main 
function. 
In this old inner urban area the establishments have character-
istically drawn their workers from the old city close by. The area is also 
close to the harbour and to the main power station. In the past the location 
was suitable since it was away from the residential area, but as time prog-
ressed, urban growth crept towards the west and the south and surrounded the 
area, and its location is no longer satisfactory. Moreover, its location 
in the north-west of the city means that the prevai I ing westerly winds annoy 
the residents I iving in the east and south-east of the area. 
C. Sidi Kal ifa Area 
This is a smal I area in the west part of Sidi Kal ifa district, 
where industries are clustered together in a few streets. It is within 
half a Kilometre of As-Sarim and Gamhoria streets which connect it with the 
C. B.D. Approximately 550 or 7.5 percent of the industrial workers of the 
city worked in this area. The leading types of manufacturing are shoes, 
where.al I of the industry's workers are concentrated, rubber (24 percent) 
and textiles (23 percent). Such goods are orientated largely to a local 
market, hence their development here over the past ten years when land was 
made avai I able for factory sites. The avai labi I ity of workers and proximity 
to the pumping station of Bu-Mel lana were further reasons for its development. 
Like the north-west area, the Sidi Kal ifa area is unsu)tably located from the 
point of view of the prevai I ing winds. Perhaps the location of industry in 
this area is one of the reasons which discourages rapid urban growth farther 
south, because the prevai I ing westerly winds carry some of the industrial 
pollution towards the south. 
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D. Sug Talatha Area 
A sma I I industria I area I ocated in the southern part of the Sus 
Talatha district, north of Wadi' Megenin, this is considered as the northern 
extension of the Suani Road area. The area has about 5 percent of the 
total workers, is dominated by I ight industry, and most of the establishments 
are smal I, employing between 10 and 30 workers. The important industries are 
carpentry, rubber and paper; which employ 4! percent, 34 percent and 25 per~ 
cent respectively of the total workers. These types of industry are noisy 
or smelly. 
The low density of residents, the cheapness of land, the wadi 
Magenin (which could be used for sewerage disporalj though it is far from 
ideal for this purpose), the proximity of the Suani Road and its wood stores, 
and the first ring road, were the main reasons for industrial location in 
the area. However, this area offers no other advantages to industri~s, 
because it is I imited by urban growth and by the wadi whose flats are subject 
to flooding. 
E. North Central Area 
This area is occupied by very I ight industries which are scattered 
within one square Kilometre. Total industrial workers were slightly less 
than 200, mainly employed in clothing, printing and food processing. The 
industrial structure shows the expected emphasis on these three types of 
industry traditionally associated with city centres. Most establishments are 
of one-storey only, because alI industries located here are I ight and smal 1-
scale and the rents are high. The market offers the advantages of easy 
contacts with consumers; other location factors were fluctuating demand for 
workers, the high transport costs of this type of industry and personal pref-
erence. Moreover the raw materials and finished products are small· and not 
bulky and there are no serious problems concerning amenities, because these 
industries create I ittle industrial nuisance. 
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F. South-East Area 
This smal I area is located at the.beginning of the Motorway which 
goes to the east of the country (Homes Road). Foodstuffs and the paper 
industry are concentrated here. It has the advantage of the avai labi I ity 
of cheap land, and the motorway which provides a good I ink with the central 
commercial district and the eastern agricultural lands, used both as a source 
of raw materials and as a market. It is also located beside the main 600 mm 
water pipelines. The location from a climatic point of view might be suit-
able for industry, but this area offers I ittle possibi I ity for further exten-
sion, being bounded by arable land whose produce is of great economic value 
to the city. 
G. South-Western Area 
The area is located mostly in the southern part of Georgompopol i 
district on the main western road which connects the city with the western 
parts of the country. Its industrial structure reflects the significance 
of the large foodstuffs and textile establishments. The presence of the 
western motorway, the low cost of the land, and the avai labi I ity of workers 
from surrounding areas were the location factors. 
H. South Central Area 
The area has a similar industrial structure to the north central 
area, and the reasons for its location are the same, thus the comments made 
about that area apply equally to this. 
I. Bab Ben-Ghashir Area 
This is a small old industrial area, all of those establishments 
were established before 1967. Its site beside the Ben-Ghashir pumping 
station and the eastern motorway, and the low price of land, were the main 
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reasons for its evolution here. Now the possibi I ity of industrial location 
is I imited, owing to urban growth surrounding the area. 
The remaining I, 184 of the city's industrial workers' strength, 
or about 15;5 percent of the total workers (Table 8. 10) were scattered in 
establishments in different parts of the city outside the boundaries of these 
nine areas. The reasons are either personal choice, or to build prosperity, 
or the close proximity of an anci I lary activity in the case of the flour mi I I 
located at Fornaj to be close beside the pub I ic grain store. 
Table 8.10 Distribution Of Industrial Workers Arilorig Industrial Areas 
I n T r i po I i , I 9 7 I 
Industria I area No. of workers. % of tota I 
Suani Road 2,896 38.0 
North-West I, 704 22.4 
Sidi-Kalifa 553 7.3 
Sug Talatha 363 4.8 
North Centra I 184 2.4 
South-East 268 3.5 
South-West 214 2.8 
South Centra I 81 I. I 
Bab Ben-Ghashir 168 2.2 
Outside industrial areas I, 184 15.5 
Source Computed by author from data in I.R.C. Industrial Establishments 
Census 1971, Tripoli, 1972. 
A chronological study of industrial development in Tripoli shows 
that the western, the southern, and especially the south-western parts were 
those in which a distinctive industrial area originally developed. This 
may be due to the fact that the growth of the city during the ltal ian period 
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was more rapid towards the east. During this period the Libyans were 
concentrated in the old residential areas of Mizran, Belkhair and Ad-Dahrah 
~hi le the Italians bui It new residential areas to the east and south-east 
of the old city. Khuga stated that, 
"The lt.al ians succeeded in regulating the height and 
layout of multi-storey bui I dings, and also developed five 
residential areas on the Ita I ian style. These areas are 
now located within the middle zone, I.C. Ad-Dahrah, "Case 
Populare" and "Citta Giardino" and Shara EI-Shatt. Three 
of these were reserved for ltal ian settlers and Shara EI-Shatt 
residential quarter was reserved for high I tal ian officials 
(army and civi I servants). The creation of "Citta Giardino" 
or garden city was inspired by the idea of garden cities as 
propounded by Ebenezer Howard." (9) 
The concentration of the population in the east during that time made the 
ltal ians locate their establishments on the open land in the south and north-
west parts. Once a factory succeeded tn its location, new entrepreneurs 
were encouraged to build close by, especially when there was no city planning 
system. The new growth of the city towards the south and west in recent 
years has influenced some new industrial locations, especially those of 
industries dealing with construction (such as carpentry, furniture, cement 
products, bui I ding materials and some chemical industries), so as to avoid 
the high costs of transportation, since most of their raw materials and 
products are bulky. 
Moreover, in the east arable land and many gardens, the Air Base 
and a large number of government administrative bui I dings impede industrial 
development. In addition, the land value here is more expensive than in 
the south and none of the main roads leading to other parts of the country 
pass through the eastern area. 
B. Industrial Distribution And Location In Benghazi 
Benghazi is the most important city in eastern Libya, and its 
major growth pole. In 1973 the city had about 264,500 inhabitants, slightly 
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more than half of the population of Tripoli. It covers an area of about 
1,035.00 hectares, (IO) but industrial sites occupied in 1969 only about 
17.10 hectares, about I .6 percent of the total area. In 1971 the city had 
about 27 percent of alI Libyan establishments, employing 1,789 workers, or 
about 14 percent of the total number in establishments employing more than 
I 0 workers. Table 8. I I shows that the present manufacturing base of 
Benghazi city consists of food production I ines (such as macaroni, sweets, 
flour, bread and soft drinks), building materials and metal work, these 
industrial groups accounting for 60 percent of the total establishments and 
about 53 percent of the total workers. 
Table 8.11 The Distribution of Industrial Establishments And Workers 
·In Benghazi~ · 1971 
Industry 10-19 
Foodstuffs 15 
Soft drinks 
Textiles 
Leather 
Carpentry (wood) 16 
Paper 
Printing 6 
Chemicals I 
Cement products 4 
Other bui !ding materia Is 10 
Metal work II 
Others 2 
Total 68 
20-49 
4 
2 
4 
6 
3 
50 and 
over 
2 
23 4 
Total Total % of 
establish- workers workers 
ments. 
17 285 15.9 
2 39 2.2 
4 250 14.0 
23 I • 3 
20 326 18.2 
I II 0.6 
6 74 4. I 
4 136 7.6 
8 134 7.5 
16 294 16.4 
14 196 II .0 
2 . 21 . I • 2 
95 I I 189 .. 100.0 
Source Computed by author from data in I.R.C. ··Industrial Establ ishrilents 
..!..22.!_, Tri poI i, 1972. 
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Although there is some diversification, activities connected with 
construction industries form a striking majority. 
I ime production are the large traditional groups. 
Carpentry, plumbing and 
Comparing this table with 
Table 8,4, it is clear that establishments in Benghazi are more traditional 
than those in Tripoli. In Benghazi four establishments, only about 4 percent 
of the total, have more than 50 workers, while 36 (22.5 percent) of Tripoli's 
establishments are in this category. Tripoli also has more types of estab-
I ishment than Benghazi : tobacco, rubber, clothes, plastic, matches, shoes 
and paints, which are already produced in Tripoli, have not yet appeared in 
Benghazi. 
Turning to industrial location within Benghazi, Figure 8.9 reveals 
that in the city's present stage of development industry is not concentrated 
in any major belt or area. Several' establishments of a traditional nature, 
such as carpentry, bakeries, soft drinks establishments and others concerned 
with bui I ding materials and metal work, exist in various sections of the city 
associated with crowded areas near the interior local markets, and generally 
near the main roads. Other establishments are scattered along the Ring Road, 
including a Pepsi Cola bottling plant, some bui I ding materials establishments 
and various metal work industries serving the whole city market. 
The remaining industrial activities are mainly associated with oi I 
exploitation and consist of oi I company storage yards, such as Macobar Libya 
Inc., Borwed of Libya,and Tabal ino, mostly located on the Tripoli Road, an 
unsuitable location because their fumes and dust affect recent urban resident-
ial areas, especially during Ghibl i winds. 
Industrial location in Benghazi contrasts with that in Tripoli. 
Unlike Tripoli, Benghazi has no particular industrial area. The distribution 
of establishments in Benghazi may be ascribed to the morphology and the shape 
of the city, which is divided by swamps into many quarters, such as Berka, 
Sabri, Keish, Fuwehat, Sidi Hussein, EI-Wahichi and the old city. Each of 
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these quarters grew up as an isolated area, in contrast to Tripoli. This 
might influence factories of each type to find locations in each quarter, 
especially in the case of traditional industries, so as to provide close 
I inks with the local markets. It is true especially of establishments 
which deal with daily demand, such as bakeries, printing, soft drinks and 
bui I ding materials, and these account for a high percentage of the smal I 
establishments within the city. Time is important and direct contact with 
the consumer is often imperative, because of the intermittent and ephemeral 
demand for their products. Industries of this type are generally composed 
of numerous smal I plants which are insensitive to the high rents of the 
t lb . d"t"t d t· (II) cen ra us1ness IS r1c an con 1guous areas. 
Most of the establishments in Benghazi are smal !-sized units, 
about 96 percent having less than 50 workers and 68 establishments less than 
20 workers. Small establishments do not require specially constructed 
bui I dings; obsolete bui I dings are often suitable since the process units are 
relatively smal I and the processes are of seasonal character and have a 
fluctuating demand tor workers. 
C. New Industrial Zones 
Having discussed the present industrial location in Tripoli and 
Benghazi, it is of value to discuss the proposals for new industrial zones 
in these two cities. Where are they to be located, and why? Have they 
a good potential for future growth? The previous section showed that 
industrial location in these two cities did not evolve according to any 
particular plan. There was no concept of zoning in Libya, residential 
areas and commercial business were allowed to develop alongside industrial 
plants, and industries allowed to establish themselves in residential areas. 
These trends, however, could not continue, and the cities of Libya, part-
icularly those which accommodate modern industrial establishments, need 
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master plans to put forward basic policies for their development, to 
determine the framework of their structure, and to decide general relations 
between the various uses for land. 
In both Tripoli and Benghazi new large establishments have 
contributed to the accelerated development of industrial zones. (l 2 ) 
Problems have been 
(I) lack of suitable industrially zoned land in the o!d centres of the 
cities; 
(2) traffic congestion and the cramped condition of older industrial 
areas; 
( 3) the increased use of the automob i I e as a preferred method of trave I I i ng 
to work, necessitating ample parking space for employees at new plant 
sites; 
(4) increased truck transport of industrial products, requiring additional 
space for service parking and loading; 
(5) a preference by institutional investors for financing construction 
in planned districts where security of investment is more certain; 
(6) change in the plant design for establishing new facilities demanding 
I a rge r s i tes. 
It would be more economic for establishments to be located to-
gether for their mutual benefit in zones where alI could profit from the 
avai I able faci I ities and site services. The regulations should be based 
on accurate studies of future urban growth and of factories affecting 
industrial locations, in order not to zone for industrial occupancy any 
district which for reasons of topography or other geographical features 
( 13) 
might be for residential use. In 1968, the municipalities of Tripoli 
and Benghazi each set up a master plan for future development of land use 
within their cities, each one containing zones for the industries proposed 
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for future development. In Libya there was no legislation dealing with the 
location of industry within the cities, so these proposed zones may be 
effective in reducing the problems mentioned above. Moreover, they offer 
large areas of land for the organization of a suitable zone for industrial 
development in relation to services, communications and other facilities. 
The locations chosen by some establishments have previously been discussed, 
and the following study wi I I throw I ight on the future trends of industrial 
location and expansion. 
In Tripoli, the municipality chose many zones for industrial 
location from 1969. According to the master plan, these zones were dis-
tributed in various parts of the city (Figure 8. 10), under certain class-
ifications (Table 8. 12) and preference standards. When the writer asked the 
chief engineer-in-charge in the municipality the main reasons for the location 
of these zones, and why just one or two zones had not been selected instead 
of such a large number, the answer was that when the municipality started to 
classify land use, it found that some industries were already established in 
these areas and since it might have proved difficult to transfer them, alI 
the empty space around them was zoned for future industries, as is 
seen from a comparison of Figures 8.10 and 8.5. Obviously, this is an 
inadequate criterion for future industrial locations, because previously the 
choice of industrial location was that of the entrepreneurs themselves, some 
of whose locational decisions may be irrational. Moreover, most of the areas 
mentioned earlier (e.g. the Suani Road, the zone of Sidi Kal ita and the one 
beside Bab Ban-Ghashir) are located within residential areas. Sooner or 
later, these zones wi II be removed. 
Studying these new planned industrial zones and their potential 
for future industrial location, it becomes clear that they are totally 
insignificant Simply to delineate existing zones, without provision of the 
necessary faci I ities, gives no incentive to entrepreneurs to set up new 
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Table 8.12 The Industrial Zones Proposed In Tripoli, 1969 
Size in 
Categories Location hectares 
I. Light industries I. Ai n Zara 65,300 
2. Sidi EI-Msri 26,600 
7 Had bah EI-Khadr'a 51,500 _;. 
4. On the north of Homes 
Road 28,600 
2. Intermediate industries 5. North part of Suani Road 79,900 
6. South-west of " " 20,200 
7. Beside Bab-Ben-Ghashir 30,700 
8. Gargaresch 38,500 
3. Heavy industries 9. Gurgi Road 13,700 
10. Suani Road 506,400 
I I • Ai n Zara 45,400 
12. South of .Homes Road . 97,000. 
Source Ministry of Planning, Tripoli Master Plan, Final Report, 
November I 969. 
establishments there. Possibly because most of the land is private, the 
municipality does not have ful I control over zoned land, the size of a plot 
of land to be sold, or over its price. So the land of these zones was not 
classified and offered for sale, except for the north part of Suani Road, 
which was sold by the owner himself. In the southern zones there are no 
faci I ities, no paved roads, sewerage, communications or electricity, and some 
have no water supply as yet. Moreover, after establishing the new zones, 
municipal permission was given to some new concerns (The Mansura Textile 
Factory, Sidi Saud Factory and some carpentries in Su9 EI-Jumaah) to set 
themselves up outside the zones. 
INDUSTRIAL AND NON-INDUSTRIAL LAND USE 
IN THE SUANI ROAD ZONE 
Industries 
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In these zones the municipality not only gave bui I ding permission 
to industrialists, but also allowed other commercial bui I dings, such as ware-
houses, open stores, garages and the general office headquarters of some 
companies to be set up alongside industrial plant, and Suani Road is an 
example of this (see Figure 8. I I). The problem was that the zones, except 
for the northern part of the Suani Road Zone, failed to attract new establish-
ments. 
In these circumstances, the future of the zones is very I imited, 
unless the authorities change their attitude. It should be explained that 
the municipal officers responsible for the location of industry within the 
city have many responsibi I ities and projects to deal with, and the problems 
of industrial location are inadequately discussed. The future of industrial 
location in these zones depends on the efforts of the municipality in control-
ling the land and sel I ing it at a reasonable price over a long period of time, 
and in supplying it with the necessary faci I ities. But, since some of the 
zones are unsuitable for industrial location in any case, one might suggest 
that the municipality propose more suitable zones in future. 
In Benghazi, the locations proposed are based on a different pol icy 
from that in Tripoli. The master plan for Benghazi has three industrial 
zones : western, eastern and northern (Figure 8. 12). Two of these are 
located on the outskirts of the city where there are no established sites at 
present, except for two state-owned establishments under construction in the 
eastern zone. The third is in a residential area where many establishments 
already exist. 
The western zone includes an area of about 140 hectares, with 
access to Tripoli Road, of which some 50 hectares are already occupied by the 
existing establishments, consisting of transportation and storage yards 
. I It d t 'I t t' d t t' t' 't' (l 4 ) ma 1 n y re a e o o 1 ex rae 1 on an cons rue 1 on ac 1 v 1 1 es. The 
reason which is given by the master plan for choosing this zone is its prox-
imity to the harbour and Tripoli Road. The area might have been a good choice 
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when it was located on the outskirts of the city, but it is now surrounded 
by new residential areas. Recent urban growth of the city has been more 
rapid in the west and south, increasing the price of land from LD I per 
square metre in 1960 to about LD 5 or 7 in recent years. Po I I uti on and 
other industrial problems affect the surrounding areas, because of the wind 
direction. Clearly this zone is unsuitable for future industrial locations, 
and the reasons for choosing it are invalid. The municipality should either 
prevent new establishments from setting up in this area, or make it into a 
specialist warehousing centre. 
The Eastern Zone, covering an area of about 400 hectares, is 
bounded by Bnina Road in the north, the Fifth Ring Road in the west, Bahrain 
Road in the south, and Sixth Ring Road in the east, and is proposed for heavy 
and food production industries. Although the master plan does not give the 
reason for the choice of this area, there are probably several. The topo-
graphy of the area, for example, is unsuitable for agriculture, consisting 
mainly of rocky outcrops (Figure 8. 13), and avoids the region of rapid urban 
growth, so the land is relatively cheap. Moreover, the empty area to the 
north and east of the zone is an advantage, because it provides space for 
future expansion, and there wi I I be no problems of wind pollution. The zone 
is also close to the main pumping station which supplies the city, so water 
is easily available in large quantities. Bnina Road connects the city with 
the eastern agricultural areas of EI-Abiar and EI-Marg plains, and adjacent 
land to the north has been proposed for an industrial residential area, which 
wi II satisfy labour requirements. 
Up to 1973 only two establishments had been constructed in the 
zone, a wire and cables factory and a grain mill. Other establishments are 
intended for location in this zone. Because the municipal effort in develop-
ing the zone for industry stopped after outlining and dividing it into 
categories of industries (Figure 8.14), it is sti II without faci I ities and, 
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for example, Figure 8.12 shows that the sewerage pipes under construction 
or under study are far from the zone. Moreover, the land is sti I I privately 
owned, and the municipality has given the owners no compensation (1973). The 
establishments existing here were established by the N.P.O. I. which solved 
this problem by paying a huge sum of money for special services, uti I ities 
and land. The zone has reasonable potential for industrial location, but it 
is inadequate at present and its future wil I depend on solving the problems 
out I i ned above. 
The northern zone is located in the north-east of the city on EI-
Marg Road, and includes an area of about 300 hectares between Aruba Street in 
the south, the Fifth Ring Road in the east, Tocra Street in the north, and 
the Third Ring Road in the west. The zone was classified for workshops and 
for I ight industries such as carpentry, some bui I ding materials and chemical 
products. It has several advantages for industrial location, such as (a) 
the swampiness of the Sebka land which is unsuitable for agriculture and 
heavy bu i I dings; (b) it is government-owned; (c) it is in the I ee of the 
winds which blow over the city; and (d) it is sited along the main road to 
the Gebel Akhdar. In addition, the master plan also proposed that Benghazi's 
main power station be located at EI-Manster, 3 Kilometres to the east, and 
suggests this as an ideal location for a new industrial harbour. ( 15 ) A 
steam power and desalination plant is now under construction. It is the 
largest plant in the eastern part of the country, with a capacity of about 
182,000 K.W. and takes 48,000 square metres of fresh water from the sea. 
The first stage wi I I be finished in June 1975, and the whole project wi I I be 
completed by June 1976. So f~r, the main disadvantage of the zone is that 
it is largely swamp land without any sort of faci I ities. The municipality 
has stated that it wi II reclaim this land and sell it to entrepreneurs, but 
it has not yet done so. It took LD 50,000 from the Ministry of Industry to 
reclaim a large area on which it established its workshop. The rest of the 
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land was divided amongst the entrepreneurs. The southern part was divided 
into smal I areas of between 1,280 and 3,700 square metres, for metal work, 
carpentry etc., while the northern part was divided into large areas for 
light industries which require more space (Figure 8. 15). 
The rent asked is 10 Dirhams per square metre a month for only 
five years. No entrepreneurs can establish a firm there, because the 
municipality has refused to reclaim the land, sel I it to the entrepreneurs, 
or arrange a rent agreement for a longer period. They cannot reclaim the 
land themselves because the cost of reclamation of an area of swamp with an 
average water level of between one and four metres would be prohibitive and 
impossible for smal I entrepreneurs, and because the rent contracts were for 
five years only, and it would be difficult for them to recoup their invest-
ments in such a short time. The public organization for electricity has 
refused to supply electricity to the zone unti I the land has been reclaimed. 
It is also interesting to note that although alI the establishments to be 
located here are smal 1-scale ones, which have the right to obtain loans from 
the R.E. I.B., the regulation of the industrial bank (see Chapter 5) does not 
allow loans under these rent conditions. Besides, the municipality has 
agreed to rent many parts of the zone to non-industrial companies. 
Obviously, the municipality of Benghazi, I ike that in Tripoli, has 
forgotten its objectives and has been working as a commercial agency. To 
allocate swamp land for this purpose, and divide it between entrepreneurs, 
does not help. This zone wi I I have no future for industrial expansion under 
these circumstances. It may be said that the shortcomings of the municipal-
ity may be explained by its inadequate budget and by its lack of co-ordination 
with other industrial development authorities. Furthermore, the development 
of these zones came only in the final stage of municipality plan. The new 
industrial pol icy concentrates on the rapid growth of industrialization, and 
the municipalities of Tripoli and Benghazi already have many other projects 
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to deal with. One may suggest that they should take further steps to 
coordinate with industrial departments. Otherwise, after the new industrial 
zones have been outlined, responsibi I ity for them should be transferred to 
the Ministry of Industry, which is the specialized department and which 
may suggest changes to industrial estates. 
D. Industria I Estates 
In the previous section we studied the potential of the industrial 
zones in the two main cities, while this section wi II discuss the possibi I ity 
of establishing an industrial estates system in these cities. The main 
distinction between industrial estates and zones is that the latter offer 
only improved sites, while the former feature standard factory bui I dings 
bui It in advance of demand and include a variety of services. Industria I 
estates are a useful tool for the devefopment of industries, because they 
provide not only accommodation in workshops and factories equipped with basic 
uti I ities, but also common service faci I ities of various kinds. Furthermore, 
a whole group of industries at one site wi I I help to overcome many of the 
initial difficulties facing industrialists and might induce a relatively high 
degree of worker mobi I ity between them. They thus give favourable conditions 
for modernization of tools and machines, for improvement of ski lis and product-
. . t d f . . th I f t . I t · b · ( 16 ) lVI y, an or organ1z1ng e supp yo raw ma er1a son a coopera 1ve as1s. 
Industrial estates can be considered as subsystems of economic and industrial 
development planning. . < I 7) This dual relationship is shown in Figure 8. 16. 
Industrial estates have proved in many countries that they are an 
effective instrument to attract industry and to regulate its location. In 
Malta, Cyprus and Turkey, industrial estates have been increasingly used in 
conjunction with other measures. In Kuwait, The Shuaiba Industrial Estate 
was started in 1964 in an area of about 7.5 square Kilometres adjacent to the 
sea, and was designed to create an area in which alI necessary industrial 
250 
faci I ities can be found. The area is meant to serve medium- and large-
size industries by leasing them land at a nominal rent for a period of 
50 db I · th "th t d th fac"ll.lt.les. (IS) years an y supp y1ng em WI wa er, power an o er 
The Indian second five-year plan provided for the construction of industrial 
estates in which small industries could obtain cheap gas, water, power and 
other services; arrangements were also made for the supply of improved tools, 
machines and raw materials at a reasonable rate. (! 9 ) In Nigeria, estates 
occupy about 2,500 acres and provide factories and industrial bui I dings which 
(20) 
are leased to prospective industrialists for upwards of 99 years. 
In Libya, no plans or projects for industrial estates have yet 
been formulated. One might wonder why the authorities have omitted 
industrial estates from their development plans, since they are very import-
ant and useful for industrial growth, especially in its earlier stages. The 
question was put to some officers in the tvlinistry of Industry, who rep I ied 
that such a scheme had been considered, and that a committee was set up for 
this purpose in 1972, but before the committee had completed its study and 
given the primary recommendation, it was disbanded by the Higher Planning 
Counci I. The reason given for this was that it was a Municipality 
res pons i b i I i ty. 
Libya, which has been carrying out a planned programme of indust-:-
rial ization in recent years, should have industrial estates sooner or later 
to assist rapid industrial development. The authorities should realize that 
industrial estates are one of many elements and that, together with other 
measures such as a tariff pol icy, technical assistance, manpower development, 
financial help and many other incentives, the creation of these estates might 
have a great influence on industrial growth. Giving loans and tax exemptions 
to an establishment is not enough for industrial development in Libya. Again 
one might suggest that the Municipalities should either take their responsib-
i I ities seriously and act quickly, or should leave industrial control to the 
Ministry of Industry which has been successfu I in estab I ish i ng industria I 
Fig8·16 
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centres for the promotion of handicrafts in Benghazi, Misurata and 
Sebha. 
The previous studies showed that most of the establishments in 
the country are concentrated in Tripoli and Benghazi, where there are good 
markets, power and other faci I ities, and where workers are avai I able. 
Expansion is expected in these sities, so the growth of industry in these 
two conurbations shouid be watched and guided. in order to aid industriai 
growth, it seeems justifiable, particularly in these towns, to establish 
industrial estates in suitable places where particular areas could concentrate 
industrial establishments, and where these could then be given enough floor 
space and a set of integrated services. This would solve some of the locat-
ional problems of industrial concentration within metropolitan centres. 
Another consideration should be borne in mind during the choice of 
a site for an industrial estate, mainly whether the land is pub I ic or private 
property. The problem here is the amount to be invested, for if it is 
private property, the cost of buying private land accounts for a large part 
of the total investments in industrial estates. Other considerations are 
the distance from the site to the market, access to main roads, prospects for 
urban expansion in neighbouring areas, and the gradient of the ground- a 
slight slope might faci I itate drainage - although the avai labi I ity of uti I ities 
and services within a reasonable distance of course is also important, as is 
the avai labi I ity of public transportation for workers at low cost. (2 l) One 
must consider the type of industries to be prom0ted and the number of estab-
1 ishments to be accommodated, and the space required for roads and parking. 
The direction of the prevai I ing winds must also play a very important part 
in the choice of the site, which should be on the lee side of residential 
areas. Furthermore, the prospects of an estate's growth should also be 
considered at the detailed planning stage- land for future development should 
be acquired at the same time as the basic area, since land values would rise 
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as the estate developed, a factor which might seriously affect the economy 
(22) 
of the project at a later stage. 
The classification of industrial estates should give low priority 
to warehouses, workshops and administrative offices. The fo I I owing are the 
typical percentages of land uti I ization in some industrial estates constructed 
with assistance from the United Nations. (23 ) 
- Factory plots for standard custom-bui It factories 
- Land area under internal roads including pavement, 
footpath and verge 
- Land area of open space 
- Land area under administration buildings, gate houses 
and parking faci I ities 
- Land area under canteen, clinic, staff residence 
- Land area under warehouse 
- Land area under workshop 
62.0% 
20.9% 
3.3% 
3.5% 
3.8% 
3.4% 
3. I% 
In Tripoli, as in Kuwait city and Riyadh, one might suggest that 
planning should be directed towards the uncultivated land outside the con-
urbation and separated from it by parks and open space. Possibly several 
areas should be suggested for this proposal, such as Tajora, east of Tripoli, 
and Suani Ben-Uadim, south of the city. But it seems that the most suitable 
area that might be suggested is that beside the sea, adjacent to Jansur town, 
to the south-west of Tripoli. As a whole, it is undulating and parts of it 
consist of rough pits and are eroded so that level I ing and dressing operations 
would be required to make the site suitable for construction, and a surfaced 
approach road would have to be bui It from the adjacent main road. Land for 
the construction of an industrial estate could easily be found between the 
road leading to EI-Zawia and the sea shore. 
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The advantages of this location are as follows : 
(I) The land is government-owned and unsuitable for agriculture. There is 
adequate space for factory premises and for residential areas for the staff 
and workers. The area is large and it could be extended in future. 
(2) The area is relatively rich in ground water. It seems that underground 
water is much more easily available here than in any other area around the 
city. It has the nearest big well to the city and water can be drawn at a 
. (24) 
rate of about 4 cubic metres per hour. 
(3) The location is on the main road which connects the city with the 
western part of the country. It is near the densely populated and cultivated 
region, and therefore the improvement of transportation faci I ities to the 
latter region would not be very expensive. 
(4) It is close to the major market in the country. According to the 1973 
census, Tripoli and EI-Zawia Muhafadat have 42.3 percent of the total pop-
ulation of the country. EI-Zawia city, about 20 Kilometres west of the 
location, wi I I become of greater importance as a market after the completion 
of the oi I industrial complex. 
(5) The proximity to EI-Zawia Refinery which is under construction. An 
industrial estate site here could get anough power and suitable quantities 
of good quality raw materials easily and cheaply after developing the oi I 
complex and establishing some petrochemical industries. 
(6) The location beside the sea gives the establishments the advantage of 
draining their effluent into the sea. Besides, sea water might be de-
salinated, as in Benghazi, or used for cooling, as in the Shuaiba Industrial 
Estate. Also it might be useful in the future to establish a small artificial 
industrial harbour. This might serve those establishments which receive 
their raw materials from abroad, and would enable the finished products to be 
transported to the eastern part of the country or exported abroad in future. 
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It may be for these reasons that two N.P.O. I. establishments have 
recently been set up in this area, and the location of I.R.C. here might 
reduce the cost of some faci I ities already introduced by the organization. 
The obvious disadvantage is the longer distance from the residential area 
for the workers, but this problem might be solved by having workers from 
Jansur town, or by improving the public bus services, and using private 
transportation for each establ ishrnenL Another suggestion is that some 
establishments should be compel led to site themselves in the industrial 
estate because of their bulky raw materials. An example would be the cement 
industry, which uses bu I ky raw materia Is I ike gypsum, I i mestone and cement 
clinker, so it might be better to locate it close to its raw materials and 
far from the city; the recent location for the cement factory in Benghazi, 
for example, is suitable. 
In Benghazi, two of the new industrial zones (northern and eastern) 
which have been outlined for industrial location seem to be suitable for the 
establishment of industrial estates, but the success of any such scheme 
would depend on the abi I ity of the authorities to solve the problem of 
bui I ding an industrial estate with all the necessary faci I ities. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Industrial Problems In Libya 
Industrial location and industrial development strategy require 
much experience, ski II and above all overall industrial planning and policies. 
Otherwise, they may produce more frustrations and disappointments than positive 
and desirable results. 
Libya has, as have many other underdeveloped countries, many serious 
industrial problems. During the previous discussion of the distribution, 
structure and basic characteristics of the various industries in the country, 
several problems have been mentioned. This chapter wi I I attempt to organize 
and discuss these problems in a manner relating them more directly to the 
factors of production and to the considerations necessary to industrial develop-
ment in the country, in both public and private sectors. 
chapter wi I I exclude the oi I industry. 
Consequently, this 
Despite the efforts made by the government in its plans to industr-
ial ize the country, and the successes achieved so far, the industrial sector 
sti I I faces basic hurdles, some of which tend to keep down the pace of 
industria I' deve I opment. Table 9. I itemizes the major problems and the results 
which were obtained from answers to question No. 63 which was concerned with 
the problems of industry. But we shal I now discuss the problems related both 
to existing industry and to developing the industrial potential of the country. 
It is emphasized that the discussion is to throw I ight on problems in order that 
this may prove helpful in improving the path of industrial development in the 
future. It should be noted that the problems discussed in this chapter are 
neither identical for each group of industries, nor of the same importance. 
The problems wi I I be discussed under three categories : planning, economic 
and administrative problems. 
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Table 9. I The Main Industrial Problems Stated By The Respondents 
No. of % of 
Type of Obstacles Estab I i shments. total 
Labour supply, movement and absence 37 59.6 
Efficiency of Uti I it i es 27 43.5 
Raw Materia Is 26 4!. 9 
Administrative routine 16 25.8 
Markets and Marketing 9 14.5 
Transportation 9 14.5 
Government restriction 8 12.9 
Capital 5 3.0 
Others 4 6.4 
Source Answers to questionnaire, 1973. 
I. Planning Problems 
A. Concentration And Agglomeration 
In Libya, as in many developing countries, especially in Africa, 
planners are faced with the concentration of industry in one city or one area 
which affects their choice of industrial location. The problem has not yet 
received sufficient attention from the development planners. Libya in 
particular has the problem that the degree of concentration in manufacturing 
is increasing, and the movement of manufacturing has been mainly to the 
peripheries of the existing industrial areas. The previous studies showed 
that Tripoli and Benghazi registered more than 75 percent of the total increase 
in the number of workers between 1964-1·971. Excluding the new public est-
abl ishments, alI modern industries have been established in or near the main 
cities in these muhafadat, which have enormous advantages, both economi ca I I y 
(roads, uti I ities), and socially (health, schools). This may be explained 
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by the unequal distribution in the economic development of the regions and 
also by the large amount of single-function planning in such fields as 
C I ) housing, water supply and motorway construction. 
The concentration of establishments in one city has its advantages 
which in combination presumably make larger urban centres more efficient and 
more suitable as sites for industry than smaller towns. tvb reove r i n an 
agglomeration region, estabi ishments are inter-dependent in some faci I ities. 
The disadvantages of industria I concentration fa I I into two 
categories, locally within the area or region itself, and also at national 
I eve I. Locally, the biggest single result in Tripoli and Benghazi is a large-
scale movement from the rural to the urban areas, resulting from the economic 
"pul I" of better opportunities of I ife in these two cities, and the "push" of 
the less developed and more neglected rural regions. The uncontrolled and 
uncoordinated movement from rural areas, and the lack of preparation of the 
cities for the increase in population, leads to the worst features of urban-
ization, with lack of housing and therefore overcrowding in slums and shanty 
areas created around the cities. Other costs, economic and social, also rise 
above a tolerable level, such as land prices and transport costs, which increase 
along with the problem of traffic congestion. 
At the national level there is an unequal distribution of economic 
activities and productive forces throughout the regions. Thus, instead of 
becoming reciprocal partners with the more advanced areas, neglected areas 
generate problems which wl I I continue to act as a drag on the national economy 
as a whole. (2 ) Moreover, these problems might give rise to conditions of 
l ·t· I. t b"l"t d d" · t t" (3) po 1 1ca 1ns a 1 1 y an 1s1n egra 1on. 
However, I eav i ng the I ocat ion of new estab I i shments without pI ans 
and control might increase the concentration and the problems would then 
become even more difficult. It is true that most regions in Libya are 
sparsely populated and the costs of infrastructure in these regions are not 
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only high in themselves, but very much more so in relation to the population 
they are serving. But distribution of the establishments, especially the 
pub I ic ones, is important in developing the remote areas. Despite recent 
action by the government in locating pub I icly-owned industries, it should 
stress this more strongly in future, including also the private sector. It 
might be economically sound to restrict industrial expansion to Tripoli and 
Benghazi cities, but Industrial development at other key points in the country 
may be both economically sound and socially desirable, as the success of the 
cement factory in Homes demonstrates. Libya should follow a pol icy aimed at 
discouraging industrial location in large cities and encouraging decentral-
ization in order to stimulate balanced industrial development in alI regions 
of the country, especially the coastal zone, as suggested by Vardjan, an 
industrial adviser, 
"Now the job of the planners should be to create such 
favourable conditions of industrial growth in other regions 
as well. In future years the task is not easy because of 
many I imiting factors which wi I I be met in these regions. 
In future years the concentration of industries in the coastal 
area wi I I certainly continue, sti I I the planners should foster 
the creation of as many agglomerations along the coast as they 
wi II consider feasible". (4) 
Many proposals of this sort have been made in general terms. Arthur Lewis 
suggests, for example, 
"That alI attempts for development in towns whose 
population already exceeds 500,000 should be restricted and 
that for any one city so restricted some four or five others 
under 100,000 should be selected for special development". ( 5) 
If such a proposal were to be implemented in Libya, some second-rank cities 
such as Misurata, Homes,.Derna and EI~Marg would be developed as industrial 
centres in coastal regions. 
Imbalance wi II not be solved by industrial development alone, 
because to develop industry in some regions requires that other sectors which 
are necessary for industry are also developed. So special committees should 
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be formed from the different departments and bodies to give advice in 
this matter. 
B. The Choice Of Production Technique 
In spite of the growing complexity in production techniques which 
have evolved from techniques which used a large number of workers to ones 
needing few, Libya stl I! uses less developed techniques In many processing 
industries. It is true that production may prosper at various levels of 
technology, but there is quite a difference in quality and quantity of 
production, the number of workers, and amount of capital investment required, 
as wei I as in output/worker, capital/worker, and output/capital ratios. 
The problem of choice of production technique is closely related 
to the two main factors of production, capital and labour. The national 
reconci I lation of these two factors wi I I ultimately shape the level of economic 
and social development in any country, as wei I as influence the structure of 
( 6) 
the industrial growth. Libya has an acute labour shortage and rising 
labour costs, while there is an abundance of capital, so capital-intensive 
production techniques are obviously suitable. The shift of the whole 
industrial sector towards greater capital intensity and new techniques of 
production would not only solve the problem, but it develops ski II and the 
quality of adaptabi I ity among the labour force, and so increases labour 
productivity. (7) The growth of productivity in the chemical industries 
during 1964-1971 is a good example. 
C. Choice Of Type Of Industries 
Generally speaking, there are three basic groups of industry 
producing (a) consumer goods, (b) capital goods, and (c) intermediate 
goods. Which of these types does Libya choose? In a country where there is 
a shortage of labour, the problem involves more than the abi I ity to invest in 
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industry. The type of industry depends on the ava i I ab iIi ty of ski I I ed 
workers and managers. These two factors form one of the main tools used by 
Hirschman to attack the balanced growth theory which proposes that developing 
countries push forward simultaneously on all fronts, agriculture, consumer 
goods, and capital goods, without taking into consideration the lack of ski I Is 
0 d f . th . t ( 8) requ1re or progress In ese various sec ors. 
Recent circumstances in the level of education and economic 
development in general and industrial growth in particular do not appear to 
warrant the encouragement of capital goods industries. It seems that the 
problem is not acute from this point of view because most of the existing 
industries, both private and pub I ic, are of consumer and intermediate goods. 
In the case of consumer goods, the problem has another side. Which kinds of 
processes should be selected? Should Libya concentrate on basic goods, sue h 
as food and clothing, or on non-basic consumer goods, such as fridges and 
electric machines? 
With Libyan circumstances in mind, it may be suggested that the 
planners should develop the basic consumer goods first, and then, along with 
increases in income, some non-basic consumer goods industries, such as electric 
machines, could develop as wei I. Priority should be given to industries which 
are largely shaped by the joint influence of some oral I of the following 
factors (a) the avai labi I ity of raw materials, (b) the need to produce 
goods easily by less complicated production processes requiring less technical 
ski II, (c) the needs of the domestic market, and (d) industries making 
the largest net contribution to national income. 
In the case of intermediate goods, the encouragement of petro-
chemical and chemical industries appears to be the most sound proposition. 
First, huge amounts of raw materials are available. Secondly, it is a 
heavily capital-intensive undertaking. Thirdly, the recent trend in Libyan 
industry has involved the rapid growth of chemical industries. Fourth I y, 
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the country can benefit from the backlog of research and experience amassed 
by the established producers. Fifthly, the industry has a core of returns 
to scale; it could be expanded threefold, and the costs required might 
. b I 20 t 45 t f th . . . I I I (9 ) F. II th Increase yon y o percen o e1r or1g1na eve. 1na y, e 
economic benefits to workers resulting from am expansion of the petrochemical 
and chemical industries would be greater than in other industries. 
In the ~hort term some consumer durable goods, such as cars and 
washing machines, are not suitable for many years to come because they need 
more technical and managerial experience, more ski I led labour and large markets, 
besides specialized raw materials. However, in the long term, these must be 
taken into consideration for industrial development. 
2. · Economic Problems 
A. The Limited Market 
Libya has a smal I population and high purchasing power, annual 
income per head being estimated at $ 1450 in 1971. ( IO) The annua I income 
per head increased at an annual rate of 23 percent from 1962 to 1969, while 
the annual rate of population increase for the same period was more than 4 
percent. So Libya has a problem arising from the size of its population, 
not from its purchasing power. However, some considerations are very import-
ant in this case, such as the income distribution and the picture of the 
average Libyan's I ife. 
The average annual income per head is far from the actual income 
for each inhabitant. According to a study in 1968 of family budgeting, 
Tripoli and Benghazi showed the average monthly income of a household was 
about $ 260.4 in Tripoli and $ 305.2 in Benghazi. The average income per 
person was $ 42.0 and $ 49.5 respectively. The income distribution sample 
showed that in Tripoli 32 percent of the households in the lower income group 
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got about 10 percent of the total income, while 5 percent of the households 
in the high group got 22 percent; in Benghazi the figures were sharper, 
( I I ) 34 percent got 811 percent, and 7.5 percent got 28.8 percent respectively. 
At ti ga a I so estimated that in 1969 about 70 percent of the tot a I income was 
( 12) distributed between 20 percent of the population, and that the difference 
in the actual annual income between a poor family and a rich one was about 
LD 60 toLD 10,000. (l 3) The above figures dernonstr-ate that the range of 
income between the poor and wealthy people in Libya is relatively great, 
especially between urban and rural areas, bearing in mind that these figures 
represented the largest urban centres. 
Although there is maldistribution of this income, it is spent 
mainly on basic essentials, particularly food, clothes and housing. Table 9.2 
reveals that family expenditure on food, housing and services (education, 
medical care etc), ·Was about 77 percent in both cities. Keeping in mind that 
as incomes rise there is a shift from the lower to higher degree of industrial 
processing, accompanied by a proportional increase in outlays for clothes and 
industrial goods, it must be noted that in Libya most of the expenditure was 
for essential items, owing to the rise in the cost of I iving. Wages and 
salaries in general rose many times, but they were depreciated by creeping 
inflation. During the period 1956-1969 the price level rose by 8-10 percent 
( 14) year I y. 
Another consideration is the geographical distribution of the 
market. Libya Is considered as one of those under-populated countries with 
a smal I population I iving in a large area. The market is concentrated in 
two major cities, which:.has created many negative results for industry, such 
as the small size and fragmented production of the establishments. According 
to the 1971 industria I census, despite the new I arge estab I i shments, the over-
whelming majority of establishments are too smal 1. Establishments of ten 
workers and more constitute less than six percent of the total. The sma I I 
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Table 9.2 Consumption Expenditure By Main Groups In Tripoli And Benghazi 
I n 197 I ( I n . LD, . 000) 
Tripoli Benghazi 
Items 
.Total ·.·amOunt %. .Total amount % 
Food 31 '565 37.2 29,820 41.7 
Other consumer goods 2, 776 3.3 2,596 3.6 
Fuel and Electricity 2,698 3.2 2,739 3.8 
Housing 19,420 22.8 14,673 20.5 
.. '• 
Household equipment 6,896 8. I 6,041 8.4 
Clothing 6,368 7:5 4,884 "6~ 8 
Services and personal 
expenditure 15,218 17.9 10,778 15.2 
Tota I. 84,941 ... . . . . roo.o 71 '531 . 100.0 
Source Census and Statistical Dept., Statistical Abstract 1971, Tripoli, 
1973. 
size of the establishments tends to fragment production, which is not able 
to meet the competitiori of imported goods, in either quantity or quality. 
Small-scale industry might provide small savings and have less perilous 
( 15) 
repercussions on the economy of the country as a whole, but for many 
items the market is bound to be I imited, and this does make the major part of 
. ( 16) 
such operations inefficient and uneconomical. The answers to question 
No. 58 showed that 33 establishments interviewed were operating under capacity 
and seven of them indicated that the smal I market was the main reason. 
Another aspect of the problem is that there is no regulation in 
the pub! ic departments to buy local products. For example, the director of 
the Libyan El-Fares Factory stated during tnterview that his application to 
supply the Pol ice Force with ties for 1973 was rejected and the contract was 
given to another merchant who imported them at a higher price. 
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Increasing the Libyan market is no easy matter, but it might be 
enlarged by redistributing income fairly, and by developing the rural areas. 
Also one might suggest that the government should set itself the target of 
buying its requirements from the local production. Pub I ic sector and semi-
government agencies also should buy many items in large quantities by giving 
contracts to the factories. It might be reasonable to establish special 
public organizations to pursue this objective. In Turkey, for exampie, the 
purchases of many ministries and departments are centralized in a purchase 
office cal led the Devlet Malzeme Ofise <D.M.O.). Contacts with the D.M.O. 
disclosed that it buys many manufactured items from smal 1-scale firms. (l 7 ) 
However, the ultimate solution obviously I ies in the extension 
of the market to other countries. Participation in the Arab Market, espec-
ial ly in joint production projects, besides creating export opportunities for 
industries, would bring export potential in the future by providing trade 
agreements with other countries in Africa and the Middle East. 
B. Limited Raw Materials 
Of the establishments interviewed, 26 were faced with the problem 
of I imited raw materials, and 15 of them were consequently operating under 
capacity, as, for example, tomato canning, date packing (68 percent of the 
total capacity), and fruit canning (45 percent of the total). Only in some 
agricultural and bui !ding materials industries are raw materials produced 
locally for industry. Industry in general depends mostly on imported raw 
materials, as stated earlier, and so this affects its growth and its share of 
increased national income, because the high cost of imported raw materials 
raises the total cost of production. Even in agricultural Industries, raw 
material production is not adequate, but the difference is not very large in 
some cases (wheat, barley); in others, raw materials I ike wood, are totally 
imported. Table 9.3 reveals that the difference is clearer in 1971, especially 
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for wheat and barley, which provided less than 13 percent of industrial 
requirements. This is due partly to the decrease in the production of 
these items from 1968 to 1971, wheat by about 77.5 and barley by 96.5 
* percent and partly to increased industrial requirements. 
It seems that except for oi I and gas, Libya has few raw materials, 
and since the majority of libyan establishments are of small size, this 
problem affects them more acutely. In spite of that, Libya is potentially 
rich in some kinds of raw materials, but unfortunately the quantity of natural 
resources available for industry is sti I I unknown. The preliminary studies 
Table 9.3 Some Agricultural Productions And Industrial Requirements In 
Type Of 
Production 
Wheat 
Bar I ey 
Maize 
01 i ves 
1971 ~ · lri Quintals 
Local 
Production 
( I ) 
177,262 
32, 127 
9,510 
.50,000 
Industrial %of (I)- (2) 
requirement 
( 2) 
I ,406,260 12.6 
366,358 8.8 
16,788 56.6 
.... 77,000 64.9 
Sources : (I) Computed by author from data in I. R. C. I ridustri a I Census· 1971, 
Tripoli, 1973. 
(2) Census and Statistical Dept., Statistical Abstract, 1971, 
T r i po I i , I 9 7 3. 
which have been made on some of the mineral resources indicate that resources 
are insufficient to be uti I ized for industry; an example is phosphate. More 
* During this period the production of wheat decreased from about 520 to 
I 17 thousand quintals and barley from 984 to 32 thousand quintals. 
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exploration work is needed to prove the extent and quality of the resources, 
but the work of the Industrial Research Centre (I.R.C.) in this field is 
st i I I in progress, though encouraging. 
So far as the agricultural and fishing resources are concerned, 
not much has been achieved. Agriculture has been kept at a low level of 
It can be seen from Table 9.4 that the value of agricultural 
production over a period of ten years showed no significant increase. This 
might be explained briefly as the result of the difficulties caused by 
dividing the land into smal I units, the land tenure system and the inefficient 
and traditional agricultural techniques connected with the tribal system, as 
wei I as by the absence of effective agriculture extension services and the lack 
of a development scheme in the 1960s. Moreover, the migration of the rural 
population to urban areas has to be taken into account. The lack of agri-
cultural raw materials might also have been caused by the restriction in the 
price of some agricultural products. For example, the director of EI-Fellah 
Factory, which produces canned tomatoes, stated to the author that the prod-
uction in 1973 was affected by the shift of farmers to cultivate other crops 
Table 9.4 The Value Of Agricultural Production From 1958-1968 In LD 
· Mi II ion·ln.l964 Price 
1958 CT 1962. 1967 1968 
20.0 17.3 21.0 21.7 
Source Ministry Of Planning, Census Departments. 
after the local authorities had fixed the price of tomatoes at 16 Dirhams 
* per Kg. Obviously, these factors have held back both the quality and 
* I Libyan Pound 1,000 Dirhams. 
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quantity of agricultural and animal products. But the new government 
pol icy towards agriculture includes large projects which are under construction 
in various places in the country, and this part of the problem may wei I be 
solved in due course. 
Another raw material consideration is the delay in del Ivery and the 
lack of information concerning non-avai labi I ity of the required quality of 
imported raw materials at the right time and at a reasonable price. This 
could increase the cost of production and the factories might have to use low 
quality raw materials which naturally affect the quality of industrial prod-
t . h th · tit" t t "1n the market. (IS) uc 1on, ence e1r compe 1ve sa us 
Since most Libyan industries are on a small scale, they are unable 
to buy and store a sufficient quantity of raw materials to ensure against 
fluctuations in supply. One can go further and suggest that alI entre-
preneurs should be compulsory members of a local Chamber of Industry and 
Commerce which might help them in this respect, especially by providing in-
formation. It might be more successful if public organizations or private 
co-operatives were formed in order to procure the new materials required at 
acceptable prices, and distribute them fairly between entrepreneurs. This 
might save time and solve the problem. The organization should be free from 
restrictions on importing from specified countries, otherwise the problem 
would again be serious. 
C. Uti I ities And Services 
Power, water supplies and many types of services are difficult 
problems for industrial development in Libya. Table 9. I shows that the 
inefficiency of uti I ities is the second most important problem which faced 
the factories interviewed. Electricity is the main power of Libyan industry, 
as mentioned earlier. In spite of the new plants and the improvement of 
the electricity system, it is still insufficient, especially outside the main 
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cities, where most industries admitted that their power adds a great deal 
to their production costs, as in the cement factory at Homes, olive oi I 
processing in Garabol i and metal working in EI-Gawarsha. In EI-Abiar the 
animal fodder factory closed for more than a year as a result of insufficient 
power, unti I the N.P.O. I. instal led a special electricity plant. To give an 
example, on 5.10.72 the N.P.O. I. appl led to the Public Organization of 
Electricity CP.O.E.) to conduct electricity to its industrial factories in 
EI-Gawarsha and after the positive reply that the I ine would be ready in 
January 1973, it paid the required fees of LD 6,278. But the P.O.E. had not 
laid the I ine by September 1973, the time of interview with the director of 
N.P.O. I. Benghazi branch, hence stopping work in these factories. Even in 
the main cities, the problem sti I I arises and many factories interviewed 
commented on the lack of electricity from time to time. A bui I ding material 
factory, for example, stated that it lost more than 100 bags of cement due to 
the absence of the electricity on 19.3.73. 
It is clear that the probl~m is acute, particularly in the rural 
areas. To help solve the problem, the government cut down the electricity 
price by 50 percent for industrial purposes, but the problem wi I I not be solved 
by reducing the price, because this may increase the total consumption. In-
stead, the system must be improved. 
Industry in Libya is now facing a lack of water supply. The problem 
is more acute in the cities where water consumption rises as the population 
expands, and the demand also grows as I iving standards rise. Most of the 
establishments, especially the large ones owned by N.P.O.I ., face this problem. 
For example, in the Ready-Wear Suit Factory in Derna, the N.P.O. I. applied for 
water supply by a four inch pipeline in I I. 12.71, but the municipality in Derna 
laid only a two Inch pipeline in 23.8. 72, which made it necessary for the 
N.P.O. I. to bring the water through private contract by trucks. Another 
example in Benghazi; in EI-Gawarsha factories the municipality agreed to 
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supply water, but later it changed its decision and refused, while the 
construction was actually going on. After negotiation, it agreed again to 
supply the factories by a four inch pipe! ine instead of an eight inch pipe! ine, 
but it connected just a two inch pipe! ine and supplied other companies from 
th . I . ( 19) e same p1pe 1ne. Since most of the establishments depend on the pub I ic 
water supply because it is expensive to dri I I wei Is, and there is a lack of 
water in some areas, the government should have a strong pol icy to improve 
water supply. Otherwise the problem wi I I become more difficult as the number 
of establishments increases. In particular, it should not give a I icence to 
any factory until it is sure about the water supply required. 
D. Capital Resource 
As indicated earlier, Libya has been more favourably endowed with 
capital supplies for development than many other developing countries. The 
problem here is not lack of capital, but the unwi I lingness to use it in the 
creation of a suitable environment to attract the capital of local and foreign 
entrepreneurs towards industry. From the local capital point of view, 
Table 9.5 shows that most of the private capital investment is directed towards 
trade and real estate rather than to industry where returns are slower and 
unsure. It is clear in spite of the government's efforts in establishing 
the industrial bank, with its loan faci I ities and other services and exemptions, 
that the entrepreneurs sti I I prefer to invest in other business. This problem 
takes away a part of the local capital from investment in industry, and industr-
ial development wi I I depend on government finance. Since there is private 
investment in other sectors, the government should have an attractive plan to 
divert it towards industry, as mentioned previously. However, it is clear 
that the significant reorganization of the industrial bank is essential and 
that the bank should receive authorization to follow a clear Industrial pol icy 
and to establish more joint-company projects. 
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' Table 9.5 Number Of Companies Registered In Busiriess·ln Libya, 1963-1969 
Mixed 
Year . Commerce Industry .. business .Construction. Agriculture Total 
1963-
1965 736 179 107 I ,022 
1966 84 38 143 265 
1967 107 69 35 211 
1968 106 18 54 178 
1969 128 68 70 50 6 322 
Source Census and Statistical Dept., Statistital Abstract 1971, Tripol i,l973. 
E.· The Limited Labour Force 
At present the shortage of both ski I I ed and unsk i I I ed I abour is a 
critical problem facing industrial development as wei I as some other economic 
sectors. The problem has many aspects, as can be seen from the answers to 
question No. 29 in Table 9.6. The lack of ski I led and unski I led workers is 
regarded as the main labour problem, and has occurred in most of the establish-
ments which employ a relatively large number of workers. Also, in the case 
of unski I led labour, the answers to question No. 27 (Table 9.7) reveal that 
establishments depended heavily on foreign unski I led labour, which accounted 
for more than 17 percent of the total unski lied labour, and 40 percent of the 
total foreigners. The employment of foreign ski I led workers no doubt is 
inevitable in the early stages of development, but it has its own drawbacks 
and burdens. Foreign ski lied labour demands higher rewards abroad than it 
would accept at home; the standard of ski I I obtained is often not the highest, 
and work is often interrupted either by ordinary leaves or iII ness, or in-
b. I . t t f. t . . th I I d. t. (20 ) H th f a 1 1 y o 1 In WI oca con 1 1ons. owever, ere are, o course 
many factors contrlbuting to the shortage of labour. Some of the most 
Table 9.6 Libyan Industrial Labour Problems 
Problem encountered 
1. Lack of ski lied and unski lied labour 
2. High turnover 
3. Absenteeism 
4. Official and unofficial strikes 
Source Answers to Questionnaire 
Frequency 
.of.response 
35 
13 
29 
2 
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Table 9. 7 The Number Of Libyan And Foreign Workers, According to Occupations, 
In Establishments Surveyed 
.. Occupations Libyan Foreign. Total Foreign 
Officers and administrative staff 172 102 274 37.2 
Ski II ed 293 434 727 59.7 
Semi-ski lied 727 85 812 10.5 
Unskilled . I, 942 410 2,352 17.4 
Total 3, 134 I ,031 4, 165 24.8 
Source Answers to questionnaire. 
important factors are the following 
1. Historicai·Reasons. It is known that before Independence, the Italians 
largely reserved entrepreneurship and management to their own nationals. 
Before the Second World War Ita I ian workers suppl led most of the ski I led 
( 21 ) 
workers in Libya, and this situation has tended to perpetuate itself. 
Moreover, they did not give adequate chances to the Libyans to obtain the 
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needed ski I Is and training and neglected their education. The Economist 
in 1965 stated that, 
11 Libya lacks .••..• planners, administrators and technicians; 
the government is forced to compete with wealthy oi I companies 
and other foreign firms for the I imited supply of trained people. 
Though a crash educational programme is being implemented, it 
wi II be years before Libya can make good the appalling neglect( 2Q) 
of education by former ltal ian colonial administration. 11 
Farley also pointed out that, 
11 The critical situation was the visible consequence of the 
hundreds of years of failure to invest in the development of 
high-talent manpower." (23) 
2. The Government Employment Pol icy. Up to 1970, the employment pol icy 
diminished the avai I able labour force in the country. It encouraged the 
pol icy of appointing large numbers in government and public agency offices, 
which made many departments overcrowded. This pol icy gave large numbers of 
non-productive jobs, and many ski I led people were employed even where there 
was no post to f i I I . Salaries and grants were given to some people and to 
tribal leaders in the form of social assistance, and through the local govern-
ment advisory system, and this reduced persona I incentive and discouraged 
work, so that phenomenon of 11 disguised unemployment 11 exist in Libya. 
3. Social And Cultural Attitudes Of Llby~n Society 
(a) The backwardness of the country. Industrialization in Libya in 
general means the introduction of a modern sector into an area which, unti I 
recently, was dependent for its I ivel ihood on agriculture and handicrafts 
and had high rates of iII iteracy. It had no experience of mechanized 
industrial process. It makes it very difficult for such people to understand 
and adapt easily to the industrial method of work. 
(b) The traditionalists oppose women working outside the home. Women 
have been employed so far only In exceptional cases, such as in tobacco, 
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textiles and some soft drinks factories. The 1968 data reveal that the 
percentage of Libyan females in the labour force was very low; only 4.3 
percent of the total female population were working. The answers to 
question No. 29 indicated the same result, that women as labour account for 
only 5 percent of the total labour force, and 20 percent of them are employed 
in offices as secretaries. This percentage is very low compared with the 
rate in neighbouring countries such as Tunisia, and Is obviously much lower 
(24) 
than in European countries where it is in general more than 20 percent. 
This Libyan custom has left almost half of the labour force unproductive 
and unutilized. 
(c) The attitude of the people to manual labour. Students prefer to go 
to universities for white collar jobs rather than to technical institutions, 
because they believe that it is beneath them to work with their hands. 
abundantly clear, due to the sociological dual ism, that there is a great 
amount of prestige in getting a university degree. 
It is 
4. The Shortega Of Industrial Edutation. Technical education provided by 
the government has so far been on a very I imited scale, compared to ordinary 
education. Table 9.8 indicates that the present educational system is in-
adequate to produce the number and types of ski I led workers required not only 
in industry but in alI the economic sectors. This critical shortage of 
highly ski I led manpower obviously threatened to h·inder the advance of the 
Libyan economy. The I imited expansion in technical education has led some 
departments to establish their own training centres and vocational training 
to provide the ski lied workers they required. 
In terms of the industrial sector, the ministry and its agencies 
have carried out two types of industrial training (a) on the job it 
trained about 1,100 workers in various industries during the period 1963-1968; 
and (b) vocational training in five centres in Tripoli, Benghazi, Derna, 
276 
Misurata and Sebha. However, comparing the estimate of the ski I led workers 
required by the industrial sector for the three years 1972-1975, which is 
(25) 5,374, at a yearly average of about 1,791, with the number of trainees 
in 1971-72 (738, as shown in Table 9.9), even if one assumes that the number 
Table 9.8 Supply And Demand Of Libyan Labour, ·1963-1969 
Education a I I eve I The Demand 
Pub I ic Private Total 
The Supply The Shortage 
including 
University Graduates 2,514 2,540 5,054 
High School 10,459 3,893 14,352 
Less than High School 
I. Skilled 8,325 5, 484 13, 809 
2. Unskilled 3,934 3, 934 . 
Tqtal 25,232 11,917 37,149 
Students .abroad 
I, 841 
7' 171 
2,210 
enough 
~ 
II ,222. 
*Does not include the unski lied workers. 
3,213 
7,181 
II, 599 
21 '993 
Source Ministry Of Labour And Pub I ic Work. Survey Of Libyan Need of 
Labour force, During Period 1963-1969, Oct 1964. 
under training wi I I complete their training the gap is sti I I seen to be large, 
and despite the recent efforts of these centres they are unable to provide the 
number of workers required. It is quite apparent that the training faci I ities 
now operating in the country could be multiplied several times over and sti I I 
be inadequate to meet demand, and it is impossible for the present technical 
education system to meet these needs for a long time to come. Two notable 
factors indicate this. Firstly, it is clear from Table 9.9 that large numbers 
of trainees do not stay to complete their training. The best year recorded 
was in 1963-64 when just 16.7 percent of the number under training completed it. 
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Table 9.9 Number Of Trainees Under And Having Completed Training From 
Source 
1964~1972 In The Training Centres 
Under Completed % 
.Year Training . Train i rig completed 
1963-64 204 34 16.7 
1964-65 327 46 14.0 
1965-66 326 43 13.2 
1966-67 314 46 14.6 
1967-68 204 34 16.7 
1968-69 320 37 I I. 6 
1969-70 423 43 10.0 
1970-71 971 38 3.9 
1971-:-72 738 58 7.8 
Ministry Of Industry Industrial Education In Libya, Apri I 1973, 
unpub I i shed. 
In the last three years, the percentage was less than ten. This may be 
attributed to three reasons : (a) there is the instabi I ity of the training 
centres, which moved from one site to another. For example, Naser El-Din 
Ghami was moved to three different sites, up to 1961 in Tripoli, 1961-66 in 
Sabratha, 1966-1971 in Tripoli again, and from 1971 in Jansur. Tobruk centre 
was moved to three different sites also; up to 1971 in Benghazi, 1971-73 in 
Tobruk and from 1973 in Beda. These moves reduced the number of trainees, 
who refused to leave their homes and the large cities, (b) the amount of 
the grants which were given to trainees in these centres was too low compared 
with other programmes control led by other bodies, Including the oi I companies, 
which attract the trainees to them. For example, trainees in the P.O.E. 
were getting grants of LD 45 monthly, while trainees in industrial centres 
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were getting between LD 12 and 33 monthly, (c) the lack of coordination 
between these centres and the rest of the educational system makes it 
impossible for outstanding trainees to go on to further education elsewhere. 
Secondly, the present educational system is drawn up by the 
Ministry of Education, without any attempts being made to devise a national 
development plan or even an overal I educational plan with coordination between 
its branches. In other words, there is no coordination between the education 
system and the development plan. As shown in Table 9. 10, technical education 
for alI branches (commerce, agriculture, industry) had only about 0.7 percent 
of the total number of students registered in 1970-71. The lowest absolute 
expansion was recorded in technical schools, where the number of students 
increased from I ,190 in 1964 to 3,202 in 1971. In the same period the number 
of technical schools decreased by 10 percent, while the number of general 
(26) 
schools doubled. 
Yet despite an apparently growing and expanding school system, 
Libya is taking the "promotional ism" system in education, that is, a system 
which is designed to get students to the next grade and eventually to a 
(27) 
col lege degree. Students drop out from school in the general education 
stage, usually become unski I led workers, and then need more time to develop 
spec i a I ski I I s. 
Finally, it is worth noting that another factor has its importance 
in this respect, namely, the withdrawal of most of the old men from the labour 
supply, as wei I as the shifting of young children from the labour force due 
to the expansion of schooling. 
It may be concluded that the educational problem wi I I become more 
acute. It might be suggested that the government, in terms of industry, 
should include a comprehensive training programme with a keen consciousness 
of the needs of industry after a careful estimation of requirements for various 
industries. This might not be practical unti I it induces a strong and comp-
rehensive system for technical education, and changes its present philosophy 
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of education. This must include also alI bodies and companies which have 
training programmes. Also any attempt to alter the situation, with respect 
to female labour, and release a large number of staff from government depart-
ments and transfer them to more productive occupations in industry wi I I be 
beneficia I • But the latter should be assessed carefully, due to the fact 
that they are unski I led and they are used to high salaries with low product-
ivity. 
Table 9. 10 Student Registration In The Year 1970-71 According To 
Educational Classification 
Classification Number % of total 
Less than University level 393,678 97. I 
University level 5' 198 1.3 
Teacher education 3,666 0.9 
Technical education 3,088 0. 7 
Total 405,630 100.0 
Source Ministry Of Planning, Education Development And Its Relation 
With The Development Plan, Tripoli, Apri I 1973. 
Finally, to turn to absenteeism and labour turnover, the first 
has been stated to be a problem in 29 establishments and the latter in 17. 
Only six establishments complained of both. There is no significant 
correlation between them and any particular region or type of industry, 
except in Benghazi (8 establishments), where turnover is higher than in any 
other parts because of its proximity to the main oi I terminals, and the 
attractiveness of the high wages paid by the oi I companies. 
The problem of absenteeism, which is found everywhere, might be 
attributed partly to government routine which means that it takes a day or 
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two for workers to pay bi I Is or get any official certificate (one of the 
respondents stated that to pay the electricity bi I I takes almost a day). 
This extraordinary situation was even criticised by the government itself 
during the cultural revolution. The situation may also be attributed partly 
to the social insurance law which allows workers to have three days sick-leave 
on fu I I pay. It is too easy to obtain sick-leave more than once a month. 
Strikes have not been a major problem, possibly because there is no strong 
labour union, and there is a large number of foreign workers. Besides, 
most of the establishments are new, and entrepreneurs offer relatively high 
waves to avoid this problem. 
3. Administrative Problems 
A. Poor Management 
Industrial development in Libya is facing the scarcity of ski I led 
management which is a serious obstacle to the progress of industry. Answers 
to questions No. 8 and 9 show that 37 establishments have the system of owner 
manager, while six establishments were joint stock companies which have many 
shareholders. Only eight establishments have a foreign manager. This means 
that most of the entrepreneurs themselves combine alI the responsibi I ities and 
functions of the factory management. The average smal I entrepreneur is un-
informed about the right choice of industry or product I ines, the amount of 
capital needed, the economic size of the establishment, the best equipment and 
(28) 
materials, and the most efficient production processes. So establish-
ments tend to operate below their rated capacity and with a high production 
cost. Therefore it is clear that management techniques have not made their 
way into industry except in very rare cases. It is attributable to the smal 1-
ness of establishments and to the fact that industrial management is a very 
neglected disci pi ine in the educational institutions avai I able to trainees. 
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It may not be a great problem at the present time in Libya, when most of 
the factories are on a smal I scale, but it represents a serious obstacle to 
their future growth and expansion. In an interview with the manager of 
Misurata shoe factory, he indicated that this problem is now the basic dilemma 
confronting the public establishments. As Harbison and Myers clearly stated 
"As latecomers to industrial development, these countries 
are strongly compel led to use modern machinery and process. 
In technology, it is possible for them to jump from the primitive 
to the most advanced stages in the space of few years. The 
required managerial resources wi I I not suddenly appear out of 
thin air; they wi I I be forthcoming only as a result of meticulous 
planning, wise investment in education, and concerted efforts to 
use human resource ski I Is effectively." (29) 
Since proper management would know of the important factors in industrial 
development, they would be able to meet the ever-growing complexity that 
present-day operations involve. The improvement and increased efficiency 
of management should be an important concern in developing industry. 
Managerial training programmes, evening and night courses, should 
be provided free or for acceptable fees for managers, as wei I as providing 
solutions through advisory help. In India, for example, the National 
Productivity Counci I <N.P.C.) undertakes development programmes designed to 
develop knowledge of general principles, practices and techniques of manage-
ment; and India is not alone in this. The Korean Productivity Centre offers 
training courses in management and short-term special courses related to 
(30) practical problems which arise from the actual management situation. 
The University Faculties of Economics and Engineering should provide more 
courses in the field of industrial management. Practical studies of some 
establishments from time to time by these col leges, and criticism of their 
management systems, might be helpful in this respect. 
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B. The Lack Of Co-Ordination Between Authorities 
Industrial development and the choice of location usually commands 
assistance from many departments and agencies, and to have beneficial effects 
they should coordinate their regulations. This study has shown clearly that 
there is no strong coordination between most of the bodies which deal with 
industry. These bodies sometimes have incompatible regulations, as in the 
case of loans from the Industrial Bank and regulations concerning the renting 
of land in the Municipality of Benghazi. The problems are also clear in 
the time lag between the decision to establish a project and the start of it. 
In many cases it took more than a year, due to inadequate cooperation between 
the different departments, such as electricity, water, the municipalities and 
N.P.O.I. For example, according to an official letter sent by the N.P.O.I. 
branch in Benghazi on 20.3.73, a sardine factory was to be constructed, but 
the municipality had sti I I not provided a suitable site in September 1973. 
In Derna, the municipality changed its decision about the location of the 
ready made suit factory after Reko company had already carried out alI the 
studies and investigations of the physical site, a change which cost about 
LD 100,000, besides more than six months delay. There can be no doubt that 
these circumstances cal I for an effective system of communication and co-
ordination at all levels. Furthermore, special coordinating devices may 
save considerable time and money in establishing a project and in showing 
the problem of poor coordination. 
C. Undervaluation Of Research And Information 
As indicated in Chapter five, even after establishing the 
Industrial Research Centre, there is no sound method for providing feasibi I ity 
studies for the private sector. In terms of information, in spite of the 
large number of I ibraries which are established everywhere in each of the 
government departments, the author found that none of these tackles the whole 
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spectrum of industrial information sources required for the comprehensive 
preparation of an industrial project. Limitations are set by inadequate 
documentation in a wide range of relevant literature 1 lack of in-depth 
descriptions and unavai labi I ity of qualified or trained staff in the field 
of industrial information services. For example~ the annual industrial 
survey of large establishments contains no information on industrial location 
and the distribution of variables arnong regions. The Industrial Census and 
Industrial Establishments Census of 1971 has many deficiencies (see Chapter 
I ) • There is also no information as detailed as that for 1964. In the 
absence of this information~ one finds it difficult to determine indicators 
for industrial growth or location movement by the combination of two or more 
variables. It is clear from the data used throughout this research that it 
is impossible in the case of Libya to find satisfactory statistics for a 
deta i I ed study. Therefore the I.R.C. should have a special library~ including 
all industrial information to be provided to anyone who needs it. A further 
step is to send officers abroad for advanced training~ especially in orient-
ation and the collection and classification of industrial information. 
D. Existing Government Routine 
Government routine~ rules and procedures are one of the most 
severe obstacles in a country anxious to develop its industrial sector quickly 
by using development funds. Sixteen of the establishments interviewed stated 
that the existing routines~ such as those in the ports 1 and in labour and 
immigration offices~ make any immediate action impossible. Six establishments 
stressed that the Labour Office with its complicated procedures is the main 
target. Others stressed the complication of exemption procedures. An 
N.P.O. I. officer stated that to get information~ detai ls 1 or any help from 
other departments~ takes months, and in many cases letters do not even receive 
a rep I y. The author himself had this problem. This situation can stop 
entrepreneurs from going into industry~ besides which it can be used as an 
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excuse for any delay in action as wei I as for any hasty decision, especially 
in the case of the public sector. The responsibi I ity for decisions and 
measures taken is as a rule collective and shared by many authorities which 
makes it difficult to be traced. (3 i) A simp I ification and I iberal ization 
of the existing administrative routine would have an additional advantage 
for promoting industry. 
Lastly, it is perhaps necessary to point to other important 
aspects of the industrial problem, including physical, social and psycho-
logical problems. The most important is psychological, namely the lack of 
industrial mentality. The people sti II believe in foreign industrial items. 
A good example is the tobacco industry : in spite of the fact that Libyan 
cigarette production is of good quality and more than thirty percent cheaper 
than the imported products, a large number of Libyans sti I I smoke the latter. 
The author found during his field work that many officers in different 
Industrial departments sti II smoke imported cigarettes. 
Before the close of this chapter one might ask in what way Libya is 
similar to other developing countries in this respect. Certainly the problems 
are not particularly unusual. Mountjoy, analysing Egyptian industrial 
development in 1952, noted that drawbacks to growth included a smal I home 
market, I imited raw materials, shortages of technicians and skilled labour, 
the poor quality of available unski I led labour, and a dearth of capital for 
. (32) Investment, most of which are drawbacks today in Libya. 
The above study makes it clear that the country's rush into rapid 
Industrialization without giving close attention to these problems may lead 
to undesirable, even disastrous effects. Certainly industrial growth wi I I 
be very difficult to achieve without massive subsidies. 
I. Jack, S. 
2. ~-· p.8. 
3. Aleave, E. 
4. Vardjan, V. 
5. Lewis, A. W. 
6. U.N. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
CONCLUSION 
A. The Present 
It is obvious from this study that industrial development in 
Libya has been handicapped by the general economic backwardness of the 
country up to the early 1960s. The lack of capital, technology, market 
and entrepreneurs hindered the rise of industry. By 1959 the discovery 
and development of Libya's oi I resources began, and numerous oi I fields 
were discovered, providing huge quantities of oi I. Oi I production, which 
has been almost totalyexported in crude form, recorded more than 950 mi I I ion 
barrels, with a value about LD 957 mi I I ions in 1971. The direct impact of 
the oi I industry takes the form of providing the country with a large 
revenue for development as wei I as cheap energy and raw materials. 
Although Chapter Four shows that manufacturing industries 
expanded between 1964-1971, and the number of workers increased by 81 percent 
in this period, the government did not play a major role in industrial 
development before 1970, leaving its development in the hands of private 
investors and entrepreneurs in a difficult industrial development climate. 
But since the change of regime in 1969 the new government has become more 
and directly involved with industry, and its actions appear in the strong 
industrial pol icy, the establishment of N.P.O. I. and of many factories. 
The new pol icy puts the greatest possible stress on expanding industrial 
programmes, especially in less developed areas. 
Chapter Six makes it clear that the general patterns of 
industrial distribution are generally the same as those found in many 
developing countries. A large proportion of the industries are in the 
food, soft drinks and tobacco, wood and furniture and building materials 
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groups. In other words, present industry in Libya is essentially 
concerned with consumer goods for which demand is widespread across the 
country. Consequently, industries in Libya comprise a large number of 
smal I traditional establishments with simple equipment and a smal I number 
of medium and large establishments with advanced techniques. 
The establishments are mainly in the large urban regions. 
Tripoli and Benghazi Municipalities contain the bulk of the industries, 
while industry is absent from some municipalities. A major characteristic 
is the location of several large employment industries in Tripoli, and a 
large proportion of the industries are entirely localized in Tripoli and 
Benghazi. In most towns employment is in smal I establishments serving 
a local market, and within only some of the industrial groups are individual 
establishments serving large areas or most of the national market. 
In Chapter Seven the study presents many factors that influence 
the industry in Libya, namely city amenities and services, market, trans-
port, and raw materials. City amenities and services have dominated the 
majority of industrial locations followed by the influence of the market. 
Population distribution among the muhafadat shows a high correlation with 
the distribution of industrial workers and is highly concentrated in 
Tripoli and Benghazi. Moreover, the transport network is most dense in 
the north, especially in the north-west. Many industries appear to have 
been located especially because of raw materials. The study also shows 
that power, labour, government influence, personal choice and historical 
inertia have also played a very large part in the distribution of the 
industries during recent years. 
In Chapter Eight it is clear that industrial location in Tripoli 
and Behgnazi are different in both structure and location. In Tripoli 
industry tends to be concentrated in certain areas, while in Benghazi it 
is dispersed over the city. The industrial location in these towns is 
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based on a conceptualization of urban industrial location factors, 
mainly the avai labi I ity of land, transportation and service faci I ities. 
In Tripoli itself, Suani Road area is the main industrial location, 
largely because of the avai labi I ity of the relatively cheap land. 
Finally in this study, some general categories of economic 
planning and administrative problems influencing the industrial sector 
have been examined. There has been a lack of sufficient attention, invest-
ment, or effort to adequately solve these problems for an aggressive and 
planned development of the sector. It is believed that if these key 
improvements were achieved, Libya's rate of industrial development would 
be greatly increased. 
B. The Future 
It is impossible to predict with confidence the specific 
direction of the country's industrial growth, even if we recognize that 
industry achieved a moderate growth between 1964 and 1971. The growth of 
industry in the future is the important question here. Wi I I the rate of 
growth of industry change? The present problems of attracting industry 
into the country no doubt affect the continued growth of industry at a fast 
rate, but it may be that industry has a better chance in the future, with 
a high growth rate, but the level of that rate depends on the solution to 
present problems. 
The chance is clear, firstly from the increased level of the 
economic development in the country, particularly due of course to the 
positive attitude of the recent government in the development of industrial-
ization. The industrial sector's share: Ln the three year plan, 1973-1975, 
is about LD 228 mi II ion, double the amount budgeted in the 1969-1973 plans. 
The result is an industrial programme which is not only bigger than the 
previous one, but also different in its form, as shown in Table 10. I. 
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Ideally, this development programme should be spelled out in terms of 
the number of new establishments. This would mean stating in advance 
that various establishments wi I I exist in the near future. This remarkab I e 
investment wi I I be followed by a large increase in industrial production in 
the near future when the new projects begin operation. 
Furthermore, attempts to develop the agricultural sector wi I I 
affect the industrial future. In spite of the I imited agricui-1-ural iand, 
Libya is witnessing remarkable concern with agricultural development, which 
Table 10.1 Public Sector AI location In the 1973-75 Industrial Plan 
Industry LD, 000 % 
Food, soft drinks and tobacco 28,989 22.2 
Textiles and clothes 14,833 I I • 3 
Wood and Furniture 8,000 6. I 
Chemicals 15,240 I I • 6 
Sui I ding Materials 40,807 31.2 
Metal engineering and electricity 
production 22,966 17.6 
.Total .130,835 100.0 
Source Ministry of Planning Development Plan of 1973-75 Report, 
Tripoli, 1973. 
is clear from the allocation of LD 278 mi I I ion to agricultural development 
in the 1973-75 plan, and which is taking place in various parts of the 
country. This is considered to be only the first phase of a ten year 
agricultural plan, which has allocated LD 701 mi I I ion for this sector 
during the period 1973-83. These figures i I lustrate the strong commitment 
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of the government to the development of the agricultural sector, which 
may enhance the expansion of industry. For example, the agricultural 
sector provides an important market for certain producer goods, not merely 
a market for consumer goods. As soon as agricultural production begins 
to be influenced by new techniques and new products, then a whole new 
range of opportunities wi II open up for industrial production. For 
instance, the use of terti I izer and pesticides for agriculture encourages 
expanding chemical industries. The introduction of new irrigation and 
agricultural methods wi I I open a market for machines such as mechanical 
cultivators, pipe I ines, sprayers and pumps. Improvement of I ivestock 
makes possible the development of animal fodder production. The relationship 
is also clear in some complementary industrial or semi-industrial projects 
such as spinning and washing wool, grading and packing dried fruit in fruit-
packing factories. Agricultural output wi I I also play a crucial role by 
providing raw materials for food industries, and many food industries which 
now operate on a smal I scale owing to lack of raw materials wil I be expanded. 
The oi I industry may provide a very good opportunity for the 
supp I y of cheap energy as we I I as raw materia Is and secure the market for 
industry. Already natural gas and oi I are being supplied as power to a 
number of projects, especially power stations and some industrial establishments 
Utilization of natural gas and oil will both have major effects on developing 
industry, especially petrochemicals where the greatest industrial potential 
of the Libyan economy I ies. Some industries (see p.65) which depend on 
natural gas and crude oi I have a good future in Libya, and the petrochemical 
industry can provide other industries such as chemical industries with raw 
materia Is. 
Rapid expansion could take place in certain industries such as 
foodstuffs, because the demand for them is spread over alI the regions. 
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Chemical industries and petrochemicals have an almost unlimited potential, 
but their growth depends on the avai labi I ity of ski I led technical workers. 
Manufacture of iron and steel in a large factory at Misurata wi II be the 
basis of the metal industries and engineering equipment. The increased 
demand for bui I ding materials and the avai labi I ity of local raw materials 
such as calcium carbonate, I imestone and clay, strongly indicate that the 
building materials industry, especially cement production, should have a 
successfu I future. 
As regards the broad regional possibi I ities of industrial 
development in the future, in recent years increased attention has been 
focussed by the government on more decentralization of location of some 
pub I ic industrial establishments by locating new establishments in less-
/ 
developed regions. Techno-economic factors were no longer the main 
influences upon the final decision of some of the public factories. Social 
considerations began to play an important role too. The strength of this 
pol icy and the success of those agricultural projects which were located in 
various regions means that new industrial roles wi II rapidly develop; El-
Zawia, Gharian, Oerna, Misurata, Homes and EI-Marg are expected to see more 
industrial growth in the near future. E 1-Zaw i a, for examp I e, is I ike I y to 
benefit from the current development of the refinery and the Jeffra agri-
cultural plain project. In Misurata, some metal work and engineering 
equipment industries are expected to result from current expansion of the 
old harbour and the proposed large iron and steel establishment there. 
The future industrialization of the south, especially Kufra, wi II depend on 
the future extent of transportation. 
A strong industrial development makes sense for an undeveloped 
country which has a serious balance of payments problem to produce domestic 
products which cost more than the equivalent imports simply because the 
country does not possess the foreign exchange to pay for imports, (I) 
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but this is not relevant to the case of Libya which every year since 1962 
has earned much more foreign exchange than the amount needed to spend on 
imports, and some imported industrial goods sometimes cost less than similar 
ones produced locally. But, even so, it is not a wise pol icy to iqnore 
industrialization, which is important in Libya for many reasons. 
Firstly, it is unacceptable for Libya to depend solely on oi I, 
because in the short run the price is not stable and so cannot insure the 
market against the possibility of crisis, or if a substitute for oil is found. 
The world witnesses great technoloqical development in the uti I ization of 
atomic energy which could make the position of oi I as a source of energy very 
weak. This is indicated by the fact that atomic energy has already been 
uti I ized in the operation of submarines and power-generating plants. There-
fore, the day may come when the oi I deqenerates to a secondary position as a 
source of power, as happened to coal. Mayer pointed out that 
"Oi I ministries feel that they must press oi I companies 
for more per barrel without upsetting the balance of the 
market forces which have kept the price of crude oi I remarkably 
free from wild fluctuation over the past two and half decades. 
Huge tax-paid-cost per barrel increases could conceivably face 
western nations with no alternative but to go 'flat out' in 
developing substitutes. While the latter path would be costly 
indeed for industrial oi I consuming nations, it could be dis-
astrous for big one crop economy oi I exporter-s. " (2) 
It is obvious that the country needs economic diversification, and to find 
other substitute sectors which wi I I help the country to diversify its economy 
and save itself from the gamble of dependence on one source. It seems that 
industrialization is feasible, especially since the aqricultural sector can 
absorb only a I imited amount of investment, and Libyan agricultural development 
is I imited by the peculiar Libyan circumstance of lack of water resources. 
Therefore industrialization is the acceptable way to diversify 
the economy, while the hiqh concentration on the industrial sector wi I I develop 
and improve the agricultural sector through the processing of agricultural 
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products. To neglect agricultural development, therefore could be as 
serious as neglecting industrialization. 
Industrial development is in some ways more important than 
agriculture, where the output per worker is always lower. The development 
of industry is usually more rapid than agriculture because the possibi I ity 
of import substitution is greater in industrial products, and demand grows 
more quickly for manufactures than for foodstuffs. 
I~' \J) Consequently, a 
developed industry might be a source of saving and stop the leakage of 
purchasing power out of the country. 
Investment in the industrial sector also indirectly 
contributes to economic development. It leads to more investment in other 
activities such as transportation, commerce and uti I ities. It also has an 
effect on the general level of education of skills, way of life, inventive-
(4) 
ness, habits, and role of modern technology, and it creates new demand. 
AI I this means that there is no reason for Libya to delay 
industrial development, but it can not be left to accident and ad-hoc decisions 
or some resolution. The government has no excuse to make the mistake of 
developing industries which are unsuitable, economically and socially 
unprofitable for the country. Industry should be planned and located 
carefully according to the country's circumstances and requirements. 
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Appendix 1- I . Lay-Out Of The Questionnaire Used For The Study, 1973 
I. Name of the establishment? 
2. Date when established : 
3. Estab I i shment 1 s ave rage a rea (sq.m.) 
4. Address of the establishment 
5. c; • • ~!nee opening, have your premises been P ... Expanded? 
B. Moved? 
6. If the answer was "A", why? 
II II II II 
"B"' A. Where was the first location? 
B. Why did you move? 
7. Do you want to move your establishment from its present location? 
If yes, why? 
8. Does the owner(s) manage the establishment by himself? Yes, 
No, 
9. If not, is your manager I • Libyan? 
2. Foreign? 
10. Is the bui I ding A. Personal property? 
B. Rented? 
II. Is the land A. Persona I property? 
B. Rented? 
12. If "B", do you rent it A. From the government? 
B. Privately? 
13. How much is the rent per square metre Crough estimate)? 
14. Was the bui I ding bui It specially for the establishment? A. Yes 
B. No 
15. Has the establishment obtained any loan from the following sources ? 
A. Industria I Bank 
B. Commercial Bank 
C. Government source 
D. Elsewhere 
16. Have you provided any faci I ities for your labourers? A. Yes 
B. No 
17. If "Yes", what are they? 
18. What is the main product of the establishment? 
19. Where do you dispose of your waste materials? 
20. Do you deal with the commercial banks? A. Daily 
B. Weekly 
C. tv1onthly 
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21. Does the establishment sel I the final product through wholesalers? 
A. Yes B. No 
22. What fuel is used? A. Electricity B. Oi I 
C. Coal 
E. Wood 
23. What is the annual consumption of fuel? 
D. Gas 
F. Others 
24. In the case of electricity, where do you obtain your power? From 
A. Pub I ic station 
B. Private station 
c. Both 
25. In other cases, how do you obtain your fuel? 
26. Is there any warehouse for the fuel? 
27. How many workers are employed? 
A. Official Staff 
I. Libyan 
2. Foreign 
B. Ski II ed 
I • Libyan 
2. Foreign 
C. Semi-Ski I led 
I. Libyan 
2. Foreign 
28. In case of seasonal production, when is the best season? 
D. Unski lied 
I. Libyan 
2. Foreign 
29. Which of the following problems have been encountered to a significant 
degree in the labour force? 
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A. Lack of ski I I ed I abour 
C. High turnover of labour 
E. Strikes 
B. Lack of operational experience 
D. Absenteeism 
F. Official vacation 
G. Others 
30. Which of the following do you pay labourers in addition to their 
salaries or wages ? 
A. Suciai security 
C. Retirement and savings fund 
E. Rent or houses 
B. Insurance 
D. Medical services 
F. Others 
31. Can you give a rough estimate of proportions travel I ing to work? 
A. Less than one Km. Number 
B. Between one and five Kms. 
C. More than five Kms. 
32. How much of your Libyan labour has been trained in the following places? 
A. In Libya 
B. Outside Libya 
33. What percentage of the raw materia I which you use in your estab I i shment 
is from the following sources ? 
A. From local derivation 
B. From Elsewhere in Libya 
C. From abroad 
34. Of the machinery you use, how much is derived as follows? 
A. Of Libyan origin 
B. From abroad 
35. What is the source of the imported raw materials? 
36. Can you indicate the sort of raw materials which you use? 
A. From Libya 
B. From abroad 
37. Do you use materials manufactured by other factories in Libya? 
A. Yes B. No 
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38. Does the raw materia I I ose great I y in weight in manufacturing? 
A. Yes B. No 
39. Do you use water, and for what purpose? A. For cleaning 
B. For Process as raw material 
C. For both 
40. What is the annual consumption of water? 
41. From where does the estab! ishment obtain the water? 
A. From pub I ic sources B. Private C. Others 
42. What kind of machinery do you use and what is the capacity? 
A. Steam Engine ~lo. Capacity 
B. Oi I No. Capacity 
c. Electricity No. Capacity 
D. Wind No. Capacity 
E. Gas No. Capacity 
43. How do you repair your machines? 
44. How do you obtain the spare parts? A. From local markets 
B. From abroad 
45. In which Muhafada do you market the production? 
46. What was the reason for your establishment's location? Please arrange 
the following factors in the list below in order of importance. 
A. Convenient Transport B. Labour supply 
c. The cost of land and bui I ding. D. City amenities and services 
E. Availability of the market F. Persona I choice 
G. Agglomeration H. Ava i I ab i I i ty of raw materials 
I • Power J. Others 
47. Are the owner(s) of the factory from the same region? A. Yes 
B. No 
48. Do you think you would get the same benefit if the factory was 
established in other towns, and why? A. Yes B. No 
49. What was the reason in choosing this site in this region? 
50. Do the I imited faci I ities of electricity and water supply affect 
your establishment site? 
51. By what means is the raw material transported to the establishment 
from abroad? A. By road B. By sea c. By air 
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52. Which of the fo I I owing do you use for transporting the finished product? 
A. Lorries B. Vans c. Carts 
D. Bicycles E. Buses F. Porter 
53. Who is responsible for transporting the finished product? 
A. The factory B. The Wholesaler or consumers 
54. Has the distance Qf transport of the product to the market affected 
its price? A. Yes B. No. 
55. Is the sale price of the product the same in all Libyan towns? 
56. By what means do workers travel to work? 
A. Pub I ic transportation 
C. Estab I i shment 1 s " 
B. Private transportation 
D. Other means 
57. What is the destination of the product? 
A. Other factories 
C. Retailers 
B. Wholesalers 
D. Export 
58 .. Does the establishment work at full capacity? A. Yes 
B. No 
If not, why not? 
59. Does the establishment use the shift system? A. Yes 
B. No 
60. Is there any I imited time for using electricity? 
61. Does the establishment obtain from the government any of the following? 
A. Exemption from tax 
B. " " " duty on raw materials and machinery 
C. Bui I ding D. Land E. Advice in Management F. Others 
62. Does the establishment provide any training for the labourer? 
63. What are the problems which the factory previously faced, and 
what are the problems now? 
64. What is your suggestion to solve these problems? 
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·Appendix 3.1· The Distribution Of The Concesslons·Among The Owners . 
. . Owner 
Esso Standard 
Arab Gulf 
Mob i I Oi I 
Esso Si rte 
Oasis 
B.P. (Arab Gulf) 
Arroseas 
Omoco 
E lwerath 
Cori 
Libyan Atlantic 
Agip 
Occidental 
Aquitaine Auxirap 
Union 
S i rt i ca I She I I 
Scholven Cheme 
American Mining 
Libyan Clark 
Bosco 
N.O.C./Aquitaine 
N.O.C./Agip 
N.O.C. 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7 
65 
9, I O, I I , 12, 
124, 125, 126 
16, 17, 20 
Concessions . No •. 
13' 14, 15, 50, 57, 62, 72, 
25, 27' 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 59, 71 
80, 81 
42, 43' 44, 45, 46, 47, 
132, 133 
76, 93' 9'jl-, 95 
78, 96, 97, 99 
82 
88, 89, 136 
100 
I 02, 103 
I 04, 105, 137 
I 06, I 07, 108, 
114 
I 15, 116, 117 
118 
119' 120 
134' 135 
LPI, LP2, LP3 
LP4 
109 
LP5, LP6, LP8 to LP24 
51 ' 73' 83' I 31 , 
N.O.C./Si rtical Shell LP7 
Source : N.O.C. Libyan Oi I 1954-1971, Tripoli, 1973 
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Appendix 3. 2 The 0 i I Pipe I i rie System Arid · Its Lengths i ri Libya . 
From To Length i n km Size in inches 
Group I 
Esso Company G.69 
Gebel 
Zelten 
Raguba 
Zelten 
, , 
M. EI-Brega 
Km.IIO (Zelten 
I i ne) 
Zelten South I Zelten 
Tota I 
Group II 
Oasis Company 
Total 
Group I I I 
I. Occidental 
Company 
Total 
, , 
, , 
Arshad 
Leh i b 
Gialo 
Oefa 
Wah a 
Zaggut 
Samah 
Qatar 
Oahra 
Bahi 
103.A 
102.0 
I 03.0 
I 03.G 
I 03.A 
I 03./\ 
I 03.0 
103.A 
,, 2 
,, 3 
, , 
, , 
Pipeline 36 inch 
, , 
Wah a 
, , 
Samah 
EI-S i dra 
Qatar 
Oahra 
EI-Sidra 
, , 
Oahra Pipeline 30 
Zuwaytinah 
I 03.A 
103.A 
I 03. A 
103.0 
Zuwaytinah 
I 03.A 
103.0 
2. Agip Company Concession 100 Concession 103 
Total 
3. Omoco Company Shabi 0 
Total 
Group IV 
I. Amoseas Nafoora 
Company Group Kotla 
Nafoora 
Dor 
Bed a 
Tota I 
Occi denta I Line 
Amal 
Bed a 
Amal 
Kotl a 
Ora Line 
7.9 8 
33.7 4 
172.0 36 
87.6 
7.9 
6.3 
6.8 
16.0 
12.2 
350.4 
151.7 
33.2 
159.7 
269.7 
112.4 
71 .8 
210.2 
45.7 
1054.4 
212 
66.5 
24 
7 
23.4 
225 
23.7 
23.7 
605.3 
132.3 
132.3 
4.8 
4.8 
52 
22 
52 
29 
27.3 
182.3 
20 
8 
20 
20 
4 
6 
30 
30 
30.24 
24 
32 
32 
30 
20 
40 
24 
40 
16 
40 
20 
10 
10 
30 
14 
20 
10 
32 
6 
14 
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From To Length in km Size in inches 
Group IV (Contd. ) 
2. Mob i I Bed a Line Sida Connection 135.6 24 
Company Connection 
EI-Hofra , , , , 57.2 24 
Sida Conn- Ras- Lanuf 87.5 30 
ection 
Ama I , , 273.0 30 
Second I i ne , , 227.0 36 
of Amal 
Tota I 780.3 
3. Aquitaine Mansour Khuff 23 8 
Company Khuff Bed a 29.3 8 
Magid Nafoora 104.0 14 
Total 156.3 
·Groue v 
B.P. (Arab EI-Sarir Tobruk 513.7 34 
Gulf) from wei Is to Sari r 96.3 
around 
Total 610.0 
Source N.O.C. Libyan Oi I~ 1954..;,1971, Tripoli, 1973, pp. 68-70. 
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Appendix 3.3 The Gas Pi pel lne System And Its Length And Size. 
· In· Libya 
From To Length in km Size in inches 
Esso Company Zelten M. EI-Brega 172.3 36 
, , , , 172.3 30 
Raguba Zelten Line II 0 87.5 20 
Megh i I Zelten I 0. 5 8 
, , Zelten Line 0.3 20 
Total 442.9 
Occidental 103.A 103.0 23.4 40 
Agip Concession Concession I 03 132.3 24 
100 
Source N.O.C. Libyan Oi 1, 1954...;.1971, Tripoli, 1973, pp. 68-70. 
Appandix 5.1 F8nttiOns Of Tha National P8blit Orgahitation For 
·IndUStrial itation. 
(I) To assemble data on industrial production and about requirements of 
the local market fro~ industrial products. 
(2) To give the green I ight for industrial projects. 
(3) To take part with competent circles in selecting industrial sites. 
(4) To work out engineering designs for industrial projects and lay down 
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their specifications whether by itself or in collaboration with 
industrial research centres or Arab and foreign competent bodies. 
(5) To conclude contracts for the implementation of projects included in 
industrial development schemes. 
(6) To carry out industrial projects with or without other firms and 
individuals. 
(7) To provide human ski I Is for the management of projects and give proper 
training to national elements whether inside or outside the country. 
(8) To implement provisions of technical cooperation agreements concluded 
between L.A.R. and other states. 
(9) To purchase or sel I factories. 
( 10) To give the Green I ight" for· industrial project.s. 
Source : L.A.R. The Third Anniversary Of The First Of September 
Revol8tion) government printing press. 
308 
Appendix·s.z 
Factories Transferred to N.P.O. I~ Ft6~ Other Ministries. 
·Factory Location Ministry 
I • Fruit processing factory Tripoli Agriculture 
2. Date packing , , Derg 
3. Gypsum , , Tripoli 
4. Tannery , , Tripoli 
5. , , , , Benghazi 
6. Cement , , Benghazi Semi -gave rnment 
7. , , , , Homes , , , , 
8. Tobacco , , Tripoli Finance 
9. Salt , , Tripoli , , 
Source Fieldwork, Summer 1973. 
Appendix 5.3 The Distribution Of Trainees In Each Establishment By The Places Of Trai~ing. 
1::+-
0 u 
Type of s;:: >- D ·- Q) 0 D c c co +- "--:> 
Establishment ·- c co co ·- Q) co co co 0 +- co E - > u >- ·- ·- U L co - L L co c - (J) L +- 0 0... co 
u Ol Q) Q) - co co ·- Q) 0... - +-0 c (.9 N (J) L +- c Ol >- Q) 0 
_J UJ +- 0 l.J..... - ::::1 - Ol Q)£ I-
. 
·-
Ol I- <( UJ £+-
3:: 3: ::::1 +-(.f) >- '+--
c 0 
-
Textile Jansur 7 3 13 - - - - 94 162 37 316 
Dyeing wool EI-Marg - - - - - 3 - - 2 20 25 
Ready made clothes Derna - - - - - - - - 22 35 57 
Cables Benghazi - - - - - - - - 52 45 97 
Scrap iron Tripoli - - - 57 - - - - - - 57 
Dry batteries Tripoli - - - - - - - - - 18 18 
Glass Azizia I - - - 3 - I - 54 41 100 
Shoes Mi surata - - - - - - 21 - - 201 222 
Tanning Tripoli - 3 - - - - - - 55 32 90 
Ce rea I m i I I i n g Tripoli - - - - - - - - - 33 33 
Dairy Tripoli - - - - - - - - - 39 39 
Sanitary ware Gharian - - - - - - - - 42 - 42 
Sp i ra I I y we I ded 
pipes Benghazi - - - - - - - 36 - - 36 
Sardines Jansur 
Tuna Jansur - - - - - - - - - 13 13 
Sardines Zuara - - - - - - - - - II ++ 
' ' 
Homes - - - - - - - - - 10 10 
' ' 
Benghazi - - - - - - - - - 7 7 
Animal fodder Tripoli - - - - - - - - 5 - 5 
Dairy Benghazi' - - - - .,. - - - -
Total .8 ... 6 13 57 .. 3 3 22 .. . 130 394 573 .. I ,209 
Source : N.P.O.I •. Statistical· Information About Ski I led Labour Required Unti I 30~6. 73' Unpub I i shed. w 
0 
lO 
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